

**THE ISLAMIC PARTY OF MALAYSIA
ITS FORMATIVE STAGES AND
IDEOLOGY**

SAFIE BIN IBRAHIM

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SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION

The writer employs both old and new Malaysian spelling systems, e.g.:

Old Spelling:

Che
Meshuarat

New Spelling:

Cik
Mesyuarat

The Arabic letters and words are transliterated as follows:

ا	a	ز	z
ب	b	س	s
ت	t	ش	sh
ث	th	ص	ṣ
ج	j	ض	ḍ
ح	ḥ	ط	ṭ
خ	kh	ظ	ẓ
د	d	ع	‘
ذ	dh	غ	gh
ر	r	ف	p

ق	q	ه	h
ك	k	ء	ʾ
ل	l	و	w
م	m	ـ	double letters
ن	n	—	Long Vowel

E.g.:

برهان الدين	Burhān ud-Dīn
علماء	'Ulamā'
عثمان حمزه	'Uthmān Ḥamzah

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SAFIE BIN IBRAHIM.

INTRODUCTION

That 'the PMIP¹ bubbles up a strange brew of Islamic conservatism and intolerance, Marxist idealism and dogma, anti-Western, anti-Chinese, anti-Alliance, and pro-Indonesian bias'² is a relatively mild but comprehensive and typical characterization of the PAS. The PAS is the only legal party in Malaysia which has failed to provide sufficient information essential for an adequate understanding of its rise and ideology. The party has been reported in such a way that it has created a bad impression and misunderstanding. In addition publicity material concerning it was (and still is) almost entirely written in the Malay language.

This study is focussed on two aspects of the party, its formative stages and its ideology.

I

Part I, 'The Formative Stages of the Islamic Party of Malaysia,' is an attempt to understand and explain the rise of an Islamic political party in Malay politics within the context of the multi-racial society in pre-independent Malaya. It is by no means a comprehensive work and, as the title itself suggests, is limited to the early phase. From the brief historical background (Chapter I), it is shown that a 'religious outlet', a conglomeration of religious expressions and activities, not necessarily political, gave birth to the forerunners of the PAS (Chapter II). This was followed by the actual advent of the party (Chapter III) and its first conference (Chapter IV), which was characterized by a crude ideological synthesis and

¹ The PMIP is an abbreviation of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party or the PAS.

² Willard A. Hannas, *Sequel to Colonialism, the 1957-1960 Foundation for Malaysia*, N.Y. American Universities Field Staff, U.S., 1965, p. 27.

internal conflict. The party's characteristics remained unclear although its political naivety was apparent in its second conference (Chapter V). The party was then engulfed in a leadership crisis – an actual internal conflict – during and immediately after its special conference (Chapter VI), but the crisis passed shortly after. The ideological party had to choose its own way, to undergo the process of crystallization of its identity (Chapter VII), before finally establishing its self-identity at its third conference (Chapter VIII).

Observing the nature of the subject of study it is quite possible to scrutinize the theoretical framework of analysis.³ It is the case that explanations of human behaviour are examined not only in terms of the canons of logic but in terms of personal, subjective knowledge about the internal states of human beings.⁴ In broad terms causal explanation relates the explicandum (a single event) to a set of antecedent conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient to generate the explicandum.⁵ Specifically in political science the knowledge of cause and effect or action and reaction, though essential for understanding any event, is probabilistic in nature and seems, fundamentally, to require a deeper insight into the background responsible for the generation of the explicandum.

Observing the fact that the PAS is one of the superstructural phenomena, being built up upon a religiously sociopolitical substructure – or a realization of the mental activities and world outlook of its adherents – and its contact with the religious or cultural barriers of the other ethnic groups, the probable appropriateness of the framework of analysis, which seems to have relatively strong bearing on the subject, is the developmental and internal conflict analysis. It is the case that, as Karl W. Deutsch observes, causality was replaced by probability, and the search for single causes and

³ Cf. Geoffrey K. Roberts, *A Dictionary of Political Analysis*, London, 1971, s.v. 'Political Analysis', p. 155.

⁴ Eugene J. Meehan, *The Theory and Method of Political Analysis*, Illinois, 1965, p. 97.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

for master keys to prediction or control gave way to multivariate analysis.⁶

The developmental and internal conflict analysis's objectives, other than dealing with the scope and concepts, are to employ it as a conceptual framework for screening variables in the situation where a phenomenon occurs. It also suggests related variables, and even the manner in which they interact.⁷ A reader may be aware that explicandum may be alternatively explained. 'Psychological' analysis may, for instance, require a deeper insight into the effect of socio-political phenomena upon individual behaviour; or 'functional' analysis may, as one of its modes, dissect and identify the structural entity of an organization and the interrelated role of its individual parts.

An ideological party is more closely linked with the internal conditions or mental activities of the political actor than is a non-ideological one. This is in the sense that the behaviour of the political actor, including his political articulation, is to be in line with, or is judged according to, his ideological commitment. This is specially the case with the PAS development. Apart from the chronological factor, 'development means not only change, but implies change for the better'⁸ and, in the case of the party, development refers to its tangible characteristics, ideologically and, in its physical existence, organizationally. So the party formative stages – roughly from 1950 to 1954 – were characterized by its own mode of change. Adherents to an ideological party, when faced with a changing national political environment, will develop, in order to escape stagnation, its own mode of response. In such a process internal tension arising basically

⁶Karl W. Deutsch, 'Recent Trends in Research Methods in Political Science,' James C. Charlesworth (Ed.), *A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives and methods*, New York, 1966, p.150

⁷Eugene J. Meehan, *The Foundation of Political Analysis: Empirical and Normative*, Illinois, 1971, pp. 91–92.

⁸Robert A *Packenham, 'Political Development Research', Michael Hass and Henry S. Kariel (Eds.) *Approaches to the Study of Political Science*, Pennsylvania, 1970, p. 170.

from different political calculations may, if it runs out of control, develop into an internal conflict which is not necessarily for the worse but may be for the better. This is again specially the case with the PAS which was originally a break-away party from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and was then faced with its leadership crisis before assuming finally its self-identity. It is also not irrelevant to observe party development at the regional or branch levels and to link their movements with the top level, as an example of the party's inherent character because both contribute to the party's movement and development as a whole.

II

An examination of the PAS ideology is made in Part II. It is an attempt to study how this party understands its ideological pillars, i.e. Malay nationalism and Islām, and how it explains and expresses their meanings.

In the first place an attempt is made to examine comparatively the meaning of ideology (Chapter IX). This is followed by a discussion of the Malay nationalism of the PAS (Chapter X). However, main ideological element of the party is based on, or derived from, its understanding of Islām (Chapter XI) from which it expresses conceptually, but vaguely and inadequately, an idea of an Islamic state. Such a state, as envisaged by the party officers, is examined from different angles: its purpose (Chapter XII), the doctrine of *kbilāfab* (Chapter XIII), the concept of sovereignty (Chapter XIV), *Kbilāfab* and the structure of government (Chapter XV), its citizens (Chapter XVI), and finally its economic system (Chapter XVII).

As the nature of the subject in this part is rather abstract, it requires a different theoretical framework of analysis.

It has been observed that social and political philosophy is a branch of philosophy; it is an application of philosophical thinking to ideas about society and the state. Generally philosophy, in the Western tradition, has had two connected

aims: (a) the clarification of concepts, for the purpose of (b) the critical evaluation of beliefs.⁹

Considering the fact that the PAS ideology is normative in that it sets up norms or 'ideal' standards for society, government and state, or prescribes what politically ought to be done or what ought to be political objectives,¹⁰ the main purpose here is an attempt to clarify the norms and concepts envisaged by the party officers, not to pass judgement whether they are right or wrong.

The discussion in Part II is very relevant to linguistic analysis, the study of logical relations of ideas. Such a study is inextricably bound up with study of language, the use of words as human instruments.¹¹ It naturally entails an analytical presentation in which the ideological element of the party is dissected and identified, while an examination of its relation with other parts and the whole is made. Nevertheless it is not to neglect circumstances or political condition, the factors which usually influence the direction of mind and mode of behaviour of political activists, under which the expression is made; or how the PAS leaders employ, express and rationalize their political ideas or concepts in the political conditions of Malaya (Malaysia). In other words, the philosophical conception of political ideology has, in this respect, two important and related consequences. Firstly, it reflects an understanding of the political ideology in terms of the specific historical-social context within which it is expressed. Secondly, it does not sever political ideology from those political objectives which its advocates try to transform into a recognizable political force in society.¹²

⁹ See D.D. Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy*, London, 1970, p. 3.

¹⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹¹ Charles L. Reid, *Basic Philosophical Analysis*, California, 1971, p. 15; the main function here is to understand concepts or expressions and to analyse their meanings (cf. A.J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Middlesex, 1956, p.8) or semantic aspects (cf. John Plamenatz, *Ideology*, London, 1970, p.8).

¹² Cf. Richard Ashcraft, 'Political Theory and the Problem of Political Ideology,' *The Journal of Politics*, University of Florida, Gainesville, Vol. 42, Number 3, August 1980, pp. 689-690.

There is no doubt that the PAS wants to 'change the world' and has a doctrine of action, but it is very different from Sartre's: what man needs is to find himself and to understand that nothing can save him from himself.¹³ The principles of PAS action is derived from its understanding of Islām, the vision of the world which it wants to have and the belief in the Supreme Being. From these there must be, as it advocates, right intention and right action. This *weltanschauung* thus becomes one of the main reasons for its involvement in everyday political struggle.

III

Part III, the 'Epilogue' (Chapter XVIII), contains a brief concluding observation on the PAS and Islām.

Faculty of Islamic Studies
National University
Bangi, Selangor
Malaysia.
30th June 1981.

S.B.I.

¹³ Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, (tr. by Philip Mairet), London, 1973, p. 53.

PART 1

**THE FORMATIVE STAGES OF THE ISLAMIC
PARTY OF MALAYSIA**

CHAPTER I

A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The political phenomena in pre-independent Malaya witnessed the rise of Malay and Islamic political parties. It was not until 1937 that the first Malay political party, the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* — KMM (the Young Malay Union) was formed in Kuala Lumpur by Ibrāhīm Hāji Yaakub,¹ who was its first President, and his colleagues. Although the KMM was led by secular-minded elements a large number of those who had Islamic educational background played important roles especially at the grass-root level. In fact Ibrāhīm himself had initially approached students of Islamic educational institutions for political purposes.² However the party was banned by the Japanese in June 1942 when the latter occupied Malaya from 1941–1945.

When the War was over, a new party, the *Parti Kebangsaan Melayu* — PKM (the Malay Nationalist Party), was formed in Ipoh, Perak, on 17 October 1945. It was successively led by Mukhtār ud-Din Lasso, Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn al-Hilmi and Ishāq Hāji Muḥammad. Known as a leftist Malay political party the PKM had later formed several satellite political organizations: the *Angkatan Pemuda Insaf* — API (the Conscious Youth Movement), the *Angkatan Wanita Sedar* — AWAS (the Conscious Women Movement) and the *Barisan Tani Se Malaya* — BATAS (the Pan-Malaya Peasant Front).³

¹ Ibrāhīm Hāji Yaakub, *Melibat Tanabair*, Kuantan, 1975, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 11 and 14.

³ See Safie bin Ibrāhīm, 'The Islamic Elements in Malay Politics in Pre-Independent Malaya, 1937–1948', *Islamic Culture*, Vol. LII, No. 3, July 1978, pp. 186–195.

Encouraged by the PKM leaders, the first Islamic party, the *Ḥizb al-Muslimīn* – HM (the Muslim Party), was formed on 14 March 1948. It was the product of the second day's 'People Congress',⁴ held at an Islamic school, *al-Iḥyā' asb-Sbarif*, Gunong Semanggol, Perak. Like the PKM, the HM had some influences from Indonesian nationalism as it adopted, for instance, the 'red and white' as its symbol but in addition it differed from other parties in its commitment to Islām. Influenced by the biggest Indonesian Islamic party, the now defunct *Mashumi*, the HM's objective was to attain independence for the 'sovereign' Malaya nation, to found an Islamic society and State (*Dār al-Islām*) in Malaya.⁵ Led by Ustadh Abu Bakr al-Bāqir, the principal of *al-Iḥyā' asb-Sbarif*, Ing. Ḥaji 'Ārifīn from Johore and Maḥmūd Daud Jamīl from Kelantan, as the general, the first and the second leaders respectively, the HM had a number of departments such as religious, education, information, political, economic, social, youth and women departments.⁶ Having Islamic and national-

⁴The *Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya* – MATA (the Supreme Religious Council of Malaya) was formed on 14 March 1947 at *al-Iḥyā' asb-Sbarif*, Gunong Semanggol, while the *Pusat Perekonomian Melayu Se Malaya* – PEPERMAS (the Centre of the Pan-Malaya Malay Economy) was formed one day earlier. In September 1947 the MATA founded the *Lembaga Pendidikan Ra'yat* – LEPiR (the Institute of People's Education). It was in the MATA congress, also known as 'People Congress', on 14 June 1948, that the *Ḥizb al-Muslimīn*(HM), originally and implicitly suggested by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, was formed. See Nabir bin Ḥāji 'Abdullah, *Maabad Il Ibya Assyariff Gunung Semanggol 1934–1959*, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, pp. 104–202. This is to correct earlier statement, see Safie bin Ibrāhīm, p. 190–191.

⁵See *Majlis*, 22 March 1948. The HM's adherence to Islām and to the concept of Malay nation and Malay state (cf. *Utusan Melayu*, 27 March 1948, hereafter *UM*) seems to be an attempt at reconciliation. The HM stated in its circular that in implementing all aspects of Islamic struggle and realizing the present nationalism it would develop politically an Islamic awareness, unite all strata of Muslims in an *īm*, attain and implement freedom of printing, meeting and speaking, develop people's private schools, introduce subjects appropriate with the needs of time, improve the behaviour and ethics of Malay nation and finally improve their living conditions and economy.

⁶*Majlis*, 22 March 1948.

istic elements the HM 'identified' itself with the Malay leftist political parties. This was not without a concealed objective as revealed later by its general leader: to gain support from PKM members who were interested in religion and to let a small numbers of those who were weak in religion remain as PKM members.⁷

The political activities around Gunong Semanggol took place in isolation from those of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) which was officially formed on 11 May 1946⁸ with Datok Onn as its first President. From the very beginning Datok Onn gave negative response toward PKM's 'Greater Indonesia', a concept of a union of Malaya with Indonesia under the banner of red and white.⁹ But the 'rightist' UMNO, being given greater support by the sultans,¹⁰ their religious functionaries and the Malay masses, was more acceptable to the British government. After undergoing a long process of negotiations and deliberations between the UMNO – sultans *Vis-a-Vis* the British government, the Federation of Malaya was founded on 1 February 1948 replacing the Malayan Union.¹¹

To Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn's PKM the demand of the UMNO was merely an acceptance of the Federation of Malaya as a substitute for the Malayan Union, but both remained to open

⁷Nabir bin Hāji 'Abdullah, pp. 194–195.

⁸UMNO 10 *Tabun*, p. 33. It is a historical record of the UMNO movement for the first 10 years of its existence published by the UMNO in 1956; for details about the formation of the party see Moḥammad Yūnus Ḥamidi, *Sejarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu Semenanjung*. Kuala Lumpur, 1961, pp. 10–105.

⁹Moḥammad Yūnus Ḥamidi, pp. 48 and 50.

¹⁰The words sultan, ruler or raja denote the same person who occupies constitutionally the position as head of individual Malay states. Specifically the heads of the states of Perlis and Negeri Sembilan are called Raja and Yang Dipertuan Besar respectively.

¹¹Many works on the subject have been published; see for instance Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, *From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Political Unification in the Malaysia Region 1945–65*, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp. 41–55.

opportunity for the growth of Malayan elements undesired by the Malay nation.¹² In fact his opposition to the Federation was not new. Since February 1947 the Malay leftists formed the *Pusat Tenaga Rakyat* – PUTERA (the Centre of People Force) which later in March formed an alliance with the non-Malay leftists, the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA).¹³ Though the PUTERA–AMCJA opposition to the Federation was based on different grounds, their ‘superficial’ cooperation raised doubt among the Islamic circle at *al-Ihyā’ asb-Sbarif*: if the PKM might be under the grasp of the non-Malay leftists. It considered that the HM was to be an alternative for the PKM members or that the *al-Ihyā’* could at least strengthen religion and patriotism among the PKM individual member.¹⁴

The advent of the Federation witnessed one of the greatest Datok Onn’s political achievements and also the beginning of his eclipse and downfall. His antagonistic attitude towards the leftists and in particular the Islamic movement at Gunong Semanggol prevailed in this period. In connection with this, the Communists, since 1946, made known that they did not recognize the unilateral talks between the British government, the sultans and the UMNO.¹⁵ Their opposition transformed into an armed confrontation in early June 1948. On 16 June an official emergency was proclaimed by the authority¹⁶ which outlawed some leftist political organizations and in 1950 the PKM was banned.¹⁷

The UMNO was safe due to its anti-communism and its support to the government’s anti-guerrilla war. Datok Onn’s

¹² Dr. Burhān au-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, Bukit Mertajam, 1954, p. 71.

¹³ See Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, pp. 41–45.

¹⁴ Nabir bin Hāji ‘Abdullah, pp. 158–195.

¹⁵ Gene Z. Hantahan *The Communist Struggle in Malaya*, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, p. 96.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 111–112.

¹⁷ R.S. Milne, *Government and Politics in Malaysia*, Boston, 1967, p. 34.

outspokenness against the leftists contributed much to the government readiness to accept the UMNO role in undermining or destroying the 'leftist' movements. He was the one who branded the HM as a 'red Islamic party'¹⁸ and reminded the people to be 'beware of the danger from the Gunong' referring to Gunong Semangol.¹⁹ Nevertheless the HM was not banned but the enforcement of the Emergency Regulations and the arrest of its several leaders²⁰ were enough to put an end to its movement. This gave unparalleled opportunity to the UMNO to fill the political vacuum and dominate the political arena in Malaya.

¹⁸ Nabir bin Hāji 'Abdullah, p. 188.

¹⁹ Safie Ibrāhīm, p. 193.

²⁰ Among the arrested leaders were Ustādh Abū Bakr al-Bāqir, and the HM's two publicity officers, Ustādh ar-Rabb at-Tamīmī and Ustādh 'Abd ar-Rauf bin Nūr. See Nabir bin Hāji 'Abdullah, p. 198.

CHAPTER II

THE FORERUNNERS OF THE PAS

The disintegration of the leftist political parties marks a new era for the UMNO. It opened the better way for this party to deal with the British government without being openly harassed by the leftists, some of whom joined the UMNO, while others, including former HM members, remained inactive but quietly watched the political development.

It was obvious from the beginning that the UMNO, under the influence of its religious elements, had given attention to Islām. Perhaps in the mind of its leaders, this seemed to be a good policy for gaining support of the religious functionaries and teachers who had considerable religious control over the Malay masses in the countryside. It is, therefore, understandable that according to the party the profession of the Islamic religion should be an inherent characteristic of a Malay in addition to the ability of speaking the Malay language and observing Malay customs.¹ Also at the outset some of the religious-minded leaders occupied positions at the higher level of the party hierarchy, such as central executive committee. Although their number was small compared with that of the secular elements, their position indicated that they could more effectively influence the hearts and minds of the Malays and play a major part in the UMNO propaganda machine which, later, competed with the *Parti Islām Malaysia* — PAS (the Islamic Party of Malaysia) for winning the support of the Malays.

Perhaps not unaware of the Islamic movement at Gunong Semangol, the 10th UMNO general meeting at Penang on 24

¹ Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf, *Kamus Politik*, Vol. I, Penang, 1949, s.v. 'Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya', pp. 165-166.

April 1948 resolved to appoint a five-member committee to arrange and draft a regulation for running the religious departments and councils in every state in the Federation.² The concern with religion seems to be not irrelevant to the general policy of the UMNO. For on 11 and 12 May 1946 the party ratified its charter which stated, among other things, that one of the departments in the UMNO was the Department of Religious Affairs and Education.³ The UMNO's Religious Affairs was always headed by a religious scholar. Shaikh 'Abd Allah Pa'him, the Penang *mufti*,⁴ had once, for instance, been a Chairman of the party's Committee of Religious Affairs.⁴

It seemed that any important religious matter was, however, subject to the party scrutiny which was normally done by its Executive Committee. It was evidently this Committee that resolved to sponsor an '*ulamā*' conference⁵ which was originally suggested by the Religious Council of Perak Hilir.⁶ The Committee also appointed Ḥāji Muḥammad Nūḥ bin 'Umar as a Chairman of a Sub-Committee to organize the conference.⁷

²'UMNO/SG 43/1948' this is one of the UMNO files located at the Negara Archives.

³UMNO 10 *Tabun*, pp. 29-30.

⁴*Warta Negara*, 31 October 1949 (Hereafter *W.N.*).

⁵*U.M.*, 17 January 1950. It was decided that the following bodies had right to send delegates to the conference: i, every UMNO division; and ii, state religious councils or religious departments or religious organizations - each to send two delegates. The proposals which were to be moved in the conference should be forwarded to the Conference Honorary Secretary, Aḥmad bin Ya'qūb, Johore Religious Department.

⁶*Straits Times*, 21 February 1950 (hereafter *S.T.*); *W.N.*, 22 February, 1950; *Majlis* 22 February 1950. The proposed conference was also urged by Hilir Perak UMNO (*Majlis*, 20 February 1950). That Ustādh Muḥammad Salleh Awang from Trengganu initiated the conference (*Berita Harian*, 12 June 1979) is rather dubious.

⁷*W.N.*, 22 February 1950.

In fact the proposed conference was publicly heard before the end of 1949. The *Warta Negara*⁸ was the first Malay daily welcoming it and it offered some suggestions which were to be discussed and decided by the conference. Its suggestion of a unified religious administration was identical with the UMNO's religious unification policy. But to the left-inclined *Utusan Melayu*, the proposed conference was a reminiscence of the religious conference at Gunong Semanggol sponsored by the PKM, resulting in the formation of the HM.⁹ From the beginning the view was expressed that the 'ulamā' or their organization were supposed to be more than a religious wing of the UMNO, such as to struggle for ultimately realizing an Islamic revolutionary society.¹⁰ Nevertheless an expression of this kind was not espoused by the 'ulamā' and was unwanted by the UMNO.

The conference was fixed on 21–22 February 1950 and was attended by 52 delegates and 300 observers. All states, except Pahang, sent delegates, but from Perak, no one represented *al-Ihyā' ash-Sbarif*, Gunong Semanggol.¹¹ Four

⁸ 1 December 1949. The daily stated: '... There must be an able and responsible central administrative body with full authority. The first need is to unify religious rulings (*fatwas*) or injunctions concerning religious practices such as synchronizing fasting day... and to develop and improve religious knowledge... Although there are religious departments, religious councils and religious advisory councils in the states, each follows its own individual way and no step for unification is taken... Therefore a supreme religious body as a central administration for religious affairs throughout Federation must be created. It can be done by organizing a pan-Malaya 'Ulamā' association...'. For further observation on the conference see W.N.'s comments on 26 January, 18, 21, 24 and 25 February 1950. All the comments and suggestions were for the betterment of the Islamic *ummah*.

⁹ *U.M.*, 20 January 1950. Before 1958 the *U.M.* was regarded as left-inclined and was considered as left biased.

¹⁰ *Majlis*, 20 February 1950. This was expressed by a person named Sa'ba of South Perak.

¹¹ Detailed information on the names of the delegates who represented their respective organizations of various states was published by W.N. (25 February 1950). It is interesting to note that the *Persekutuan Penuntut-penuntut Melayu Mesir* was represented by Isma'īl 'Abd al-'Aziz, *Penuntut-penuntut Melayu Hijāz* by Hāji Ahmad Badwī bin 'Abd Allah Pa'him. However the W.N. (22 February 1950) reported 49 delegates attended the conference.

categories of delegates were discernible namely religious bodies, the UMNO divisions, districts and Malay organization.¹²

Started at Muar Club at 9.30 am, the conference was preceded by having a group photograph, recitation of the Qur'an and speeches by the conference Secretary, Ahmad bin Ya'qub, by conference Chairman, Hāji Muḥammad Nūḥ bin 'Umar and by Chairman to the UMNO general meeting, Sayyed 'Abd al-Qādir bin Muḥammad. All these speeches were to convince the audience that the UMNO was taking greater effort for the advancement of Islamic religion and its administration¹³ in Malaya. Because of limited time seven proposals out of 34 were debated¹⁴ and decided. The conference resolved to appeal to the Sa'ūdi government to reduce the tax of \$360.00 collected on every pilgrim,¹⁵ and to offer the latter good treatment.¹⁶ The second resolution was to establish an Islamic college.¹⁷ The third was to form a liaison council consisting of heads of religious departments and religious councils, with the objective of consultation on

¹² The majority of the delegates was from religious bodies which sent 19 while districts, the UMNO divisions and Malay organization sent 15, 11 and one respectively. This classification is based on the nature of the names of the bodies or organization such as *Majlis 'Ulamā' Hilir Perak* and *Kesatuan Melayu Singapore* or names of the districts like Segamat or party division like the *UMNO Kuala Langat*. Consideration should be made that some districts, like Rembau, were represented by the UMNO divisions of those districts and that some states like Province Wellesley and Trengganu were represented by Hāji Ahmad Maliki and Hāji Ahmad Fū'ad respectively. Both were important religious figures in the UMNO. See *U.M.*, 16 February 1950; *W.N.*, 26 January (editorial columns) and 25 February 1950; and *Majlis*, 23 February 1950.

¹³ See *W.N.*, 22 February 1950; *U.M.*, 22 February 1950.

¹⁴ According to *Majlis* (23 February 1950), eight proposals were regarded as most important and given priority.

¹⁵ *S.T.*, 23 February 1950.

¹⁶ *U.M.*, 23 February 1950; *W.N.*, 23 February 1950. This resolution was proposed by Hāji Zubair bin Hāji Muḥammad Amin from *Kesatuan Melayu Singapore*.

¹⁷ *U.M.*, 24 February 1950; *W.N.*, 23 February 1950; *S.T.*, 23 February 1950. The resolution was proposed by Sayyed Ibrāhīm bin 'Umar as-Saqāf from *Majlis Penasibat Islām Singapore*.

religious affairs among the Muslims so that the running of the religious affairs could be unified.¹⁸ Fourthly, the question of fixing the first days of the months of *Ramadān* and *Shawwāl* were to be decided by that liaison council which would then forward its recommendation to the sultans so that the latter could issue directive to all religious heads throughout Malaya for the implementation of the decision.¹⁹ The fifth resolution was to demand the government to establish the Islamic religious departments in Penang and Malacca similar to those which existed in the Malay states.²⁰ As far as education was concerned the conference passed its sixth resolution appealing to the governments of Malay states to provide scholarships for students doing higher studies overseas. Also the conference was to ask the authority to provide afternoon religious class in every locality where Malay schools existed.²¹ Finally the conference agreed to recognize *Jam'iyyat ad-Da'wat al-Islāmiyyah* and to plan cooperation with it for fully implementing Islamic objectives.²²

The conference's closing speech²³ was delivered by Datok Onn, because he was previously preoccupied with political matters at Kuala Lumpur. It was felt that his speech reflected the existence of strained political condition — the strained political relation between him and the sultans.²⁴ But he

¹⁸ *U.M.*, 25 February 1950; *W.N.*, 23 February 1950; *S.T.*, 21 February 1950. This was proposed by the UMNO divisions of Johore Baharu and Kota Tinggi.

¹⁹ *U.M.*, 25 February 1950; *W.N.*, 23 February 1950. This was proposed by Perlis delegate and was an amended one.

²⁰ *U.M.*, 25 February 1950; *S.T.*, 23 February 1950.

²¹ *U.M.*, 25 February 1950.

²² *W.N.*, 23 February 1950. The original Rembau UMNO's proposal was to form an Islamic missionary committee for propagating Islām among the aborigines but it was amended by Hāji Ahmad Fū'ad from Trengganu. According to *S.T.* (23 February 1950), the proposed Muslim missionary work was adopted unanimously.

²³ For Datok Onn's speech, see *W.N.*, 24 February 1950.

²⁴ In 1949 there was 'conflict' between Datok Onn and the sultans who objected against the former's motion on the question of appointing deputy High Commissioner from among the Malays, see *UMNO 10 Tahun*, p. 57.

maintained his political strength as he had the confidence of the party.²⁵ In addition the conference's resolution of creating a liaison council²⁶ fitted in with the strategy of 'reducing' the power of the sultans on religious matters. He explicitly expressed that 'if you want religion to be organized as you have done with politics, certain of the religious powers of the state must be conceded, otherwise you will have conflicting decisions.'²⁷ According to him though the sultans were needed and supported by the people, the Malays wanted to participate in the government and religious administration. He even went on to the extent that if such objective could not be attained by peaceful means it must be done by force.²⁸ His impromptu speech reflected more or less his mental attitude toward Islām, for he rather jocularly remarked that 'the UMNO was not only supported by mischievous people but also by the faithful. In this group both satans and angels existed for which our paradise is well established.'²⁹

In fact the conference was given wide publicity by Malay newspapers, *Utusan Melayu*, *Warta Negara*, and *Majlis* which dispatched their respective special correspondents for full coverage. Their editorial columns expressed optimism and gave positive comments. Even Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, a potential 'ulama' leader from Trengganu, exulted at the conference success and anticipated that it could be held annually for deciding useful religious problems.³⁰ The Chairman, Hāji Muḥammad Nūḥ reiterated in his closing speech that the UMNO would never lag behind in giving full attention toward the formation of religious unity all over Malaya in accordance with the Federation Constitution and that the conference

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ The resolution was supported by *W.N.* (24 February 1950).

²⁷ *S.T.*, 24 February 1950.

²⁸ *W.N.*, 24 February 1950.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Majlis*, 26 February 1950.

was a serious step taken by the party to fulfil the will of the 'ulamā'.³¹

The first 'ulamā' conference had given no indication of the possibility that the 'ulamā' would drift into a certain political direction, but their forthcoming second one was visible of a new trend which influenced their movement. Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad Ḥasan³² became politically more prominent after the Muar conference and was much closer to Datok Onn. His political position as a member of the UMNO Executive Committee,³³ and his command of the Islamic 'religious knowledge' provided ample opportunity for him to express his views. He wrote under caption: 'The 'Ulamā' of Malaya are not yet United and have no An Organization':

The 'ulamā' are not united and their followers are splitting into groups simply because of trivial matters Indeed the beauty of the Islamic religion cannot be shown without an 'ulamā' union. The strength of Islām cannot be realized without the union. Indeed the 'ulamā' union will be a means for achieving good aspiration. Although all religious affairs and the questions of religious advancements are in the hands of Their Highnesses those advancements cannot be attained as desired if the 'ulamā' and religious experts do not unite in one front and advise Their Highnesses on religious matters and religious advancements.³⁴

A few weeks after the publication of Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's article the UMNO Executive Committee decided at its meeting on 30 June 1951 that the party would hold a pan-Malaya 'ulamā' conference on 23 August 1951 at Sultan Sulaimān Club, Kuala Lumpur.³⁵ In a circular, the party Secretary

³¹ *U.M.*, 25 February 1950. —

³² He was referred to either as Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad or Aḥmad Fū'ad or Fū'ad.

³³ *Suara UMNO*, 15 April 1951 (hereafter *S.U.*).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1 June 1951. The 'Their Highnesses' in the excerpt referred to the sultans, who were often referred to as *rajas* and rulers. Cf. *infra*, p. 5, n. 10.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 15 July 1951.

stated that three categories of delegates would be invited to the conference: every UMNO division and associated organization had the right to send one delegate; each of the Malay state religious council or department and, finally, any religious organization were entitled to send two delegates. All the proposals intended to be moved at the conference should reach Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the UMNO's Religious Affairs, Kuala Trengganu.³⁶

Despite the fact that Datok Onn was at loggerheads with his fellow Malays in the UMNO over the questions of nationality legislation and the admission into the party of non-Malays,³⁷ the proposed second UMNO — sponsored 'ulamā' conference had not faced any serious obstacle. As Datok Onn was about to leave the party, Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, wellknown as the former strong supporter, was initially one of the challengers for the party presidency against Tunku 'Abd ar-Raḥmān and C.M. Yūsuf and also for vice-presidency against Datok 'Abd ar-Razāq Husin and C.M. Yūsuf.³⁸ However he finally withdrew his candidacy plausibly because he wanted to concentrate on the formation of the 'ulamā' union³⁹ but probably because he was aware of his actual strength in the party, for which he contested for, and won, the membership in its Executive Committee.⁴⁰ As a member of the party Executive Committee and as a Chairman of the party's Advisory Committee on Religious Affairs, Hāji Ahmad Fū'ad's actions were not without being influenced by

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Datok Onn, the Member of Home Affairs in the newly created member system in the Federation of Malaya government, pressed for the admission into the UMNO of non-Malays who were (i) at least 16 years old, (ii) Federal citizens, and (iii) determined to work for Malaya independence. As the UMNO rejected it, Datok Onn left the party in August 1951 and subsequently formed non-communal Independence of Malaya Party — IMP. See B. Simandjuntak, *Malayan Federalism 1945–1963*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, pp. 64–66; *UMNO 10 Tahun*, pp. 63–69.

³⁸ *S.U.*, 15 August 1951.

³⁹ *Majlis*, 25 August 1951; *W.N.*, 24 August 1951.

⁴⁰ *S.U.*, 1 September, 1951.

the party's leadership crisis specifically his role in forming the pan-Malaya 'ulamā' union. Three proposals were forwarded by Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad to be decided at the second 'ulamā' conference: to review the resolutions passed previously at Muar conference, UMNO's lottery and, most important of all, to form a pan-Malaya 'ulamā' union.⁴¹

But from this very beginning, a sign of 'defiance' against Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad was noticeable. The 'ulamā' of Penang and Province Wellesley bluntly resolved that the 'UMNO lottery was *ḥarām* (frobidden).⁴² Chaired by Hāji 'Abd Allah Pa'him, they however decided in their meeting to accept by a majority vote the proposal for forming pan-Malaya 'ulamā' union under the UMNO administration.⁴³ Even at this early stage, Hāji Aḥmad Mālīkī had expressed a different view that the proposed 'ulamā' organization should be changed from its proposed denomination so that it might become broader by transforming it into an influential and independent party like Indonesian *Mashumi*.⁴⁴

There was relatively strong sentiment for Islām among some UMNO officers and members. There must also be reasons for Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad to call upon 'ulamā' and religious experts to unite and come to an understanding with each other to carry out *jibād* in the way of Allah's religion.⁴⁵ It was not very strange at that time to hear a suggestion for the establishment of an independent Islamic government in

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 15 August 1951.

⁴² *U.M.*, 20 August 1951.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Commenting on his call 'Idrūs wrote:

I am afraid that the call becomes hollow, for he himself does not come forward before the Islamic *ummah* to find out ways and means for uniting them without being an instrument of any other propaganda I mean that he should leave the UMNO and form an Islamic organization based on brotherhood and politics in accordance with the law of this country. In my view, so long as he is within the UMNO not even one of those efforts will have the support from the Islamic *ummah* See *Qalam*, July 1951.

Malaya.⁴⁶ Even the left-inclined *Utusan Melayu*⁴⁷ offered positive comment concerning the unification of religious administration and published an article by a Muslim scholar, Fadl Allah Suḥaimi, under the caption '*Menyatukan Pentadbiran Ugama dalam Tanah Melayu*,'⁴⁸ (The Unification of Religious Administration in the Malay States), while *Warta Negara*,⁴⁹ in addition, supported the formation of the '*ulamā*' union. Evidently there was general support for the formation of '*ulamā*' union and unification of religious administration from individuals⁵⁰ and social or religious organizations.

The invitation to the conference was extended to all states' religious councils or departments. No one, except Penang's Islamic Advisory Council, sent delegates. The delegates, 65 in all, represented various UMNO divisions, associate organizations and religious bodies throughout Malaya including

⁴⁶ This was a resolution to be moved by the Singapore Malay Union at the UMNO sixth annual general assembly at Kuala Lumpur. See *S.T.*, 22 August 1951; *Majlis*, 23 August 1951. Also there was news from Johore that an Islamic party of Malaya based on Islām was to be formed and it had the support from Malacca, Singapore and Negeri Sembilan. See *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ 13 July 1951.

⁴⁸ *U.M.*, 27 July 1951.

⁴⁹ 20 August 1951.

⁵⁰ It is interesting to notice that Enku Isma'īl bin 'Abd ar-Raḥmān, the head of the Johore Religious Department wrote an open letter to the conference. He stated that the formation of religious council or the council of religious heads throughout Malaya could be realized sooner than the formation of the '*ulamā*' party which had to go through a long process and to face many obstacles. It was, he argued, very unreasonable for the '*ulamā*' union to be under the auspices of the UMNO and as such inappropriate to the Islamic principle. Thus he proposed the formation of the *parti Muslim Malaya* (the Muslim party of Malaya) which was to be responsible for the Muslim affairs, independent from any other party and to be based on *Qur'ān* and *Ḥadīth*. See *U.M.* (23 August 1951). The synchronized publication of this expressed view and the occurrence of the '*ulamā*' conference (23 August 1951) might have an impact upon the latter. But his explanation later gave entirely different impression. He said that the Islamic organization could cooperate with other national organizations and the Muslims could be member of both bodies. That was, he added, definitely not a political party based on religious principle but an organization for safeguarding Islamic religion and Muslim affairs. See *Ibid.*, 8 October 1951.

Singapore.⁵¹ They assembled at the Sultan Sulaiman Club, Kuala Lumpur on 23 August 1951. In his opening speech at the conference, Datok Onn poignantly criticised the 'ulamā' themselves and the 'handful' of people who controlled officially the states' religious councils and departments:

As long as there are nine *muftis*, nine *qadis* and nine 'in all things' by which every one of them has different attitude and view and followed nine different ways, then the religious administration in Malaya splits apart and more so the people of Malaya . . . Only by means of forming a supreme body of Islamic *jama'ab* for religion will the Islamic *ummah* in Malaya reunite . . . In the past and present the religious administration was and is not in the hands of the people but was and is controlled by a small group. If that administration is handed over to, and based on the will of, the people then that power must be given to the people. The religious administration itself is the right of an *ummah* and furthermore to demand for unification of religious affairs is indeed the right of the Muslims.⁵²

In addition he expressed that the time had come for the Islamic *ummah* to demand their right and to establish a supreme Islamic organization.⁵³

Chaired by Muḥammad Fadl Allah Suḥaimī, the conference passed two resolutions which fitted in with main suggestions of Datok Onn. The morning resolution was to renew action for the formation of the supreme Islamic religious body as had been previously resolved at the Muar conference and the afternoon's was the formation of an

⁵¹ For details about the participating bodies see *S.U.*, 15 September 1951. According to *U.M.* (24 August 1951) the number of delegates was 61 representing 45 'ulamā' organizations all over Malaya. The conference was also attended by men and women observers. The *S.T.* (24 August 1951) reported 60 delegates. All of them were allocated at the 'Alam Sabab Mosque, Pudu, Kuala Lumpur.

⁵² *U.M.*, 24 August 1951; See *W.N.*, 24 August 1951; *Majlis*, 24 August 1951.

⁵³ *W.N.*, 24 August 1951. He sportingly said that it was his last speech as UMNO President because he would leave the party and requested the audience to support his successor.

'ulamā' union, an independent body, not subordinate to any other organization. The other 20 items on the agenda were deferred⁵⁴ until the next conference. As for the first resolution it was decided to form a sub-committee consisting of Ḥāji 'Abd al-Ḥamid Faḍil, Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, Ḥāji Muḥammad Faḍl Allah Suhaimi, Ḥāji Ghazālī and Ḥāji 'Abd Allah Pa'him. They would write a letter, signed by delegates, appealing to the sultans for the formation of a supreme religious body which would administer religious affairs.⁵⁵ Concerning the second resolution, it was decided to appoint a five-member interim committee consisting of Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad as Chairman, S. Muḥammad Shāfi'i from Kuala Lumpur and Ḥāji Ayyūb from Perak.⁵⁶ The other two members, appointed by Chairman,⁵⁷ were Sa'dūn Zubīr and Ḥāji Muḥammad Amin.⁵⁸ The main tasks of the committee were to carry out the resolution⁵⁹ and to draft a constitution for the 'ulamā' union.⁶⁰

Immediate reaction to the proposed formation of the 'ulamā' union came from *Utusan Melayu*⁶¹ which did not mention the 'ulamā' union by name but an Islamic political organization which had the objective of realizing an independent Malaya government based on Islām. But, it argued, the independence was not yet attained and thus political parties should concentrate on attaining it. It meant that the

⁵⁴ *U.M.*, 24 August 1951; See *S.T.*, 24 August 1951; *W.N.*, 24 August 1951; *S.U.*, 15 September 1951.

⁵⁵ *U.M.*, 24 August 1951; See *W.N.*, 24 August 1951; *S.U.*, 15 September 1951; *S.T.*, 24 August 1951. According to *Majlis* (24 August 1951), the last name of the sub-committee member was Ḥāji Aḥmad Badwi, not Ḥāji 'Abd Allah Pa'him, but Ḥāji Aḥmad 'Abd Allah Pa'him was known as Ḥāji Aḥmad Badwi. See *U.M.*, 20 August 1951.

⁵⁶ *S.U.*, 15 September 1951. According to *U.M.*, (24 August 1951), the name of the second member was Sayyed Muḥammad Saufi and according to *W.N.*, (24 August 1951) S. Muḥammad Hāfiz.

⁵⁷ *U.M.*, 24 August 1951.

⁵⁸ *W.N.*, 24 August 1951.

⁵⁹ *U.M.*, 24 August 1951; *W.N.*, 24 August 1951; *S.T.*, 24 August 1951.

⁶⁰ *U.M.*, 24 August 1951; *W.N.*, 24 August 1951; *S.U.*, 15 September 1951.

⁶¹ 26 August 1951.

ideology should be a secondary step as the first step was to attain independence.

This idea — independence first and ism second — had several implications. Firstly, Datok Onn's non-communal political transformation was, after he left the UMNO, said to be to the extent of splitting the Malays⁶² who were unprepared to accept a non-communal leader and regarded Malaya at that time as 'exclusively theirs'. Any leader who could voice such feeling might be welcome as a national hero. Secondly, realizing this and Datok Onn's political motives, Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān, who took over UMNO leadership from the former, bluntly refuted non-communal politics: 'the independence must be given to the Malays, it was taken away by constitutional means and to the Malays must also be returned by constitutional means and then the Malays will decide its pattern'.⁶³ Such an expression must change the political climate ensuing in an open battle between the two Malay political leaders. Datok Onn's non-communal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP)⁶⁴ became a new political rival of the UMNO.⁶⁵ Thirdly, this evidently became a political imbroglio for Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, jeopardizing his position in the UMNO, because he openly supported,⁶⁶ and became a member of the IMP.⁶⁷

Against this background, Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad developed independence-first idea which must not necessarily reflect the general attitude of the 'ulamā' but it was in line with Datok

⁶² B. Simandjuntak, p. 66.

⁶³ *U.M.*, 28 August 1951; *W.N.*, 27 August 1951.

⁶⁴ Cf. *infra*, p. 15, n. 37.

⁶⁵ Even the UMNO decided that if its member joined the IMP he would be expelled from the UMNO. See *UMNO 10 Tahun* (p. 79). On 21 September 1951, the UMNO Executive Committee held a meeting at the Majestic Hotel, Kuala Lumpur and resolved on what was called *parti disiplin* (party discipline), that is, no UMNO member was allowed to join any other political party. This decision was aimed at the IMP. See *U.M.* (8 October 1951). But it was doubtful to what extent the decision was implemented.

⁶⁶ *U.M.*, 26 September 1951.

⁶⁷ *W.N.*, 26 November, 1951.

Onn's political strategy. He wrote under the caption 'Face the Question of Malaya Independence, Forget Ism-Ideology':

Observing the necessity for a close unity among the inhabitants of Malay land for attaining independence, all parties needing it must not question today its form and pattern, because both of them are secondary questions, which will be solved after attaining independence and because by reflecting upon ism or ideology before establishing an independent state is like the saying,

من استعجل شيئا قبل اوانه عوب بحرمانه

the hasty work in implementing a thing prematurely will result in failure to achieve what is needed.

The form and pattern of a state are questions between ourselves without involving in itself other people but the independence is our collective question *Vis-a-Vis* the other side, for example Indonesia which had various isms and ideologies, but before independence all concealed their isms and ideologies in their breasts, because they knew that to voice ism was wasting energy. Malaya differs from Indonesia but making efforts for unity becomes an important and primary condition for all. Every party in Malaya that really needs independence should be certain that there can be no independence without unity. Therefore every political party should work for unity in order to negotiate together, analyse the question of independence and forget its pattern for the time being

Actually nothing is wrong for a political party to defend its ideology and even it is indeed a responsibility for a political party. Owing to the existence of various ideologies and their different effects in a country, various parties are founded. But what is wrong is to fight for that ideology not according to its place and time. For example, UMNO's ideology today is nationalism, so it is its right and obligation to fight for, and defend, its ideology; but it is very disadvantageous to the aspiration of indepen-

dence . . . because the ideology of nationalism is a symbol in the struggle for independence which is a first stage What is obligatory for the UMNO today is to contribute maximum capability to the realization of absolute independence for Malaya, besides that no one has the right to prevent the UMNO from, or condemn it for, organizing its ranks for the secondary struggle – to fight for realizing and defending its ideology

. . . . The battle ground for an ideology is in an independent state. Therefore the political parties, the IMP, UMNO and PEMAS are urged to forget the question of ism and the pattern of the state, and to form an effective, powerful force for the independence of Malaya.⁶⁸

In response to Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's article 'Abd Allah Ḥamid al-'Idrūs of Singapore, refuted and said that the pattern of independence worked out by Datok Onn and supported by Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad would be 'to eliminate the absolute right of the Malays by which the religious right would also be eliminated', and that the 'nationalism such as the one led by Datok Onn was prohibited by Islām'.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ *U.M.*, 26 September 1951. The Arabic saying, one of the *qawā'id fiqhiyyah*, was translated by Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad into Malay. This English translation is according to his Malay translation. The PEMAS which he referred to is the *Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung* (the Malay Union of the Peninsula).

⁶⁹ 'Abd Allah bin Ḥamid al-'Idrūs, 'Ke mana Aliran Bawaan Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad?', *U.M.*, 4 October 1951. Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad was even bluntly accused of trying to defend the IMP (*Qalam*, November 1951) and of intending to achieve Datok Onn's objectives by using the Qur'anic verses and *Ḥadīth* to influence the Muslims in the villages (*Ibid.*, December 1951). To add humiliation to Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān, probably in response to Datok Onn's friendly gesture that the UMNO and the IMP had no differences and were not contradictory (*U.M.*, 5 October 1951), retorted: 'We don't want that the independence of Malaya to be created as a Chinese colony or as a political playground for the Indians. All the policies of the IMP as have been observed, whether what have been concocted or being concocted, are only with the purpose of confiscating the right of the Malays. In addition the IMP bestows equal right to all inhabitants of this country without considering duration of their stay here and their allegiance'. This view was expressed by Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān in his speech at Alor Star, Kedah. See *Ibid.*, 28 October 1951.

Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān's public political expression at this stage of Malay political development in general must raise great hope among the Malays. They must have the impression that Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān was a 'genuine' Malay nationalist with religious inclination. When he regarded himself 'as an Allah slave who confessed and took an oath to enslave himself for the Malay nation',⁷⁰ it was felt that he met the essential elements as an ideal Malay political leader. This was not irrelevant to Hāji Ahmad Fū'ad's political dilemma: to leave the UMNO while he had a potential prospect of becoming the party's 'ulamā' union leader. This created a negative impression to some members of the public toward the two previous 'ulamā' conferences and doubt for the forthcoming one.⁷¹ Nevertheless he maintained the independence — first argument and equated the political struggle with a war in which deceitfulness was indispensable, and he believed, parallel to Datok Onn's thinking, that a collective effort would end the status quo government.⁷²

⁷⁰ *U.M.*, 30 October 1951.

⁷¹ See, for instance, an article in *U.M.* (30 October 1951) by Bakhtiar Jamīl under the caption, 'The Pan-Malaya 'Ulamā' Union':

There are several reasons for the conflict in the 'ulamā' meetings at Muar and Kuala Lumpur. With the occurrence of the meeting under the UMNO sponsorship . . . it reveals that the 'ulamā' group are unable to stand up themselves. To the public it is clear that the 'ulamā' ability to attain advancement is just to stand besides the UMNO. The meetings did not draw the attention of non-UMNO people, because the 'ulamā' resolutions are the UMNO's.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 12 November 1951.

CHAPTER III

THE ADVENT OF THE PAS

The third '*ulamā*' conference at Butterworth, Province Wellesley, was a continuation of the Kuala Lumpur conference,¹ but it conspicuously failed to get the blessing from the sultans. There was also news to the effect that the sultans would sponsor another '*ulamā*' conference and thus it prompted *Majlis*² to criticize them openly by specifically coining such words as *ber'ulamā' ra'ayat* (people's '*ulamā*') and *ber'ulamā' raja* (royal '*ulamā*'). It was, therefore, not surprising that the sultans and their advisers boycotted, as reported, the Butterworth conference and even the Raja of Perlis declined the invitation to open it.³

It was noticeable that the former activists of the HM did not actively involve themselves in the previous two conferences, although the *Persatuan al-Ihya' ash-Syarif* participated in the last one.⁴ An early sign of active participation of

¹ See *infra*, pp. 17-19.

² 5 September 1951, *Said Majlis*.

... Since the first '*ulamā*' conference at Muar a year ago petitions to the Malay sultans concerning the unification of religious administration in Malaya had been made twice, but no response as expected was given The Malay sultans are not so keen to have an '*ulamā*' movement which is not under their sponsorship. But why are they interested in organizing a conference of '*ulamā*' and officers of the Islamic religious departments after only the '*ulamā*' had made theirs twice? The group which founded the pan-Malaya '*ulamā*' union must carry on its aim until a political party like *Masbumi* is established

³ *S.T.*, 24 November 1951; see *U.M.*, 22 November 1951; cf. *W.N.*'s encouraging comment (19 November 1951) and expressed astonishment of the boycott (24 November 1951).

⁴ *S.U.*, 15 September 1951.

the former HM activists could be traced in an article written by Baḥar ud-Dīn 'Abd al-Laṭīf of Gunong Semanggol. He hailed the attitude of the delegates at Kuala Lumpur conference in resolving to form an 'ulamā' body, unbridled by any political party.⁵

Although the conference was reported earlier not to be under the UMNO administration and the organizations which sent delegates were responsible for their own expenditure,⁶ it was held at Butterworth UMNO headquarters on 24 November 1951.⁷ It was attended by more than 200 delegates and observers including 20 women throughout Malaya and Singapore.⁸ Unlike the previous two, the Butterworth conference was marked by very few items on agenda: to read and present the draft constitution, to ratify it, and finally to elect officers consisting of a president, a deputy president, three vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer and six executive committee members.⁹

After recitation of the Holy Qur'ān by 'Abd al-'Azīz bin

⁵ See *U.M.*, 21 November 1951. However Baḥar ud-Dīn suggested to establish 'for the time being' an 'ulamā' union instead of forming an Islamic political party because there was no capable and adequate number of cadres to run the Islamic political party. He also warned that the 'ulamā' must not be used as an instrument for highclass elite in order to realize the latter's idea. According to 'Uthmān Ḥamzah, Secretary of the *Persatuan al-Ihyā' as-Sbarīf*, Ḥāji Aḥmad Mālikī, the conference's Invitation Secretary (*U.M.*, 35 November 1951) clarified that the objective of the religious elements in the UMNO was to systematically organize the pan-Malaya 'ulamā' union with two main purposes: (i) the 'ulamā' would be united in one organization to guide the country toward Islamic aspiration so that the UMNO would not be guided by nationalism alone; and (ii) former PKM and HM activists would be members of the pan-Malaya 'ulamā' union as their political activity was required in facing the colonial government and in guaranteeing the replacement of the UMNO with the union should the former meet the same fate as that of the PKM and HM (Interview with 'Uthmān Ḥamzah, 23 October 1974).

⁶ *W.N.*, 25 August 1951. In his written reply to the writer's enquiry, Ḥāji Muḥammad Ghazālī bin 'Abd Allah said the conference was sponsored by the UMNO.

⁷ *W.N.*, 26 November 1951; See *U.M.*, 25 November 1951.

⁸ *U.M.*, 25 November 1951. According to *W.N.*, (26 November 1951) 200 delegates and about 40 observers. *Ibid.* (20 November 1951) published a list of registered bodies and delegates who would attend the conference.

⁹ *W.N.*, 23 November 1951; *U.M.*, 23 November 1951.

'Abd Allah, Hāji 'Abd Allah Pa'him opened the conference. As Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad was not well, his message was read by Hāji Aḥmad Mālīkī:

The service according to individual way usually does not fulfil the requirements for the development of religion and native land. The '*ulamā*' union or the Islamic party of Malaya aims at realizing this alliance to enable us work for the development of religion, native land and all Muslim brothers. Because of this I appeal to, and hope that, the '*ulamā*' and all Muslim brothers will unite in this organization.¹⁰

Perhaps forestalling any possible row in the conference, Hāji Ghazālī bin 'Abd Allah, as Chairman presiding it, made an early warning that all opinions that would be expressed by the delegates should be sound and sincere without touching any personality and should be for the sake of defending the Islamic religion.¹¹

There was not much problem in the case of naming the union. Out of seven proposals only the *Persatuan Islam Se Malaya* – PAS,¹² (the Pan-Malaya Islamic Union), proposed by Muḥammad Ma'sūm of *Jamā'ab Masjid*, Telaga Air, Butterworth, was adopted with majority votes. Other proposals, such as *perikatan 'ulamā*' *UMNO Malaya* (The UMNO '*ulamā*' alliance of Malaya), were turned down even by some UMNO delegates.¹³ It was reported that the PAS was a political party based on religion and would not form an alliance with any political organization in Malaya.¹⁴ Its constitution had

¹⁰ *Utusan Zaman*, 25 November 1951; See also *Sunday Times*, 25 November 1951.

¹¹ *W.N.*, 26 November 1951.

¹² The PAS is an abbreviation of Arabic-lettered Malay and thus P stands for *Pa* (پ), A for *Ahḥ* (ا) and S for *Si* (س) and thus PAS or *پاس*.

¹³ *W.N.*, 26 November 1951.

¹⁴ *Utusan Zaman*, 25 November 1951; See *W.N.*, 26 November 1951. This was confirmed by Hāji Muḥammad Ghazālī bin Hāji 'Abd Allah in a telephone interview with the writer (9 October 1980), (hereafter stated as *Hāji Ghazālī*). However no definition about the word alliance was given.

four objectives. Firstly, it was to realize a union of the Islamic brotherhood as a collective force in order to implement all the demands of the Islamic religion and political democracy. Secondly, the PAS was to concentrate its efforts and powers for unifying the constitutions and religious administrations all over Malaya. Thirdly, the PAS was to safeguard and defend the rights, interests and honour of the religion and Islamic *ummah*. Fourthly, the PAS was to cooperate with other political organizations which principles and objectives were not opposed to Islamic teaching. This was for attaining democracy, social justice and humanity.¹⁵ The party membership was open to every Muslim reaching, according to Islamic law, the age of puberty, and who was a citizen of the Federation and Singapore.¹⁶

A row broke out when the conference was to debate on the question of constitution ratification. The delegates faced a deadlock in solving the problem of electing party officers, because Article 22, Chapter One of the constitution stated that every one holding the post of the PAS executive committee should not join any other political party, and because all prospective officers were confessedly unwilling to leave the UMNO. As a method of overcoming the difficulty, the Chairman, Ḥāji Muḥammad Ghazālī, inevitably dissolved the conference and then transformed it into a special general one which passed a resolution abolishing the constitution's Article 22. It meant that the prospective party officers could be elected from those who were active in other political parties such as the IMP and the UMNO.¹⁷

Many names were proposed by delegates for the post of party presidency but, except Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad and Ḥāji 'Abd Allah Pa'him, all declined it and the former was duly elected

¹⁵ W.N., 26 November 1951; *Utusan Zaman*, 25 November 1951. The Articles 1-13 and 19 of the PAS first draft constitution were published by W.N. (17 November 1951) and the Articles 14-18 (19 November 1951).

¹⁶ *Utusan Zaman*, 25 November 1951.

¹⁷ W.N., 26 November 1951; *U.M.*, 26 November 1951. According to Ḥāji Muḥammad Ghazālī, he had acted instinctively to dissolve the conference without any proposal moved by the delegates, Ḥāji Ghazālī.

by majority votes.¹⁸ The other elected officers were Hāji Muḥammad Ghazālī bin 'Abd Allah from Perak as Deputy President, Hāji Ḥusin Che Dol from Kedah, Faqīr Muḥammad Nūr¹⁹ from Selangor, and 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Jamāl ud-Dīn al-Jampuli from Singapore, as Vice-Presidents for northern, central and southern zones²⁰ respectively. Hāji Aḥmad Mālīkī from Province Wellesley was elected as Secretary and Hāji Aḥmad Tuan Ḥusin also from Province Wellesley as Treasurer. Instead of six, eight Executive Committee members were elected, namely Ustādh Yaḥyā al-Junaid from Kedah, Hāji 'Uthmān Tālib from Negeri Sembilan, Hāji Muḥammad Nūr from Selangor, Hāji Zabīdī from Province Wellesley, Hāji 'Abd al-Waḥḥāb from Kuala Lumpur, Hāji Is'iyā²¹ Qādī from Perak, Muḥammad Maḥzūb from Negeri Sembilan and Hāji Aḥmad Badur from Province Wellesley. Hāji Aḥmad Mukhtār from Penang and Isma'il Hāji Sa'id from Anak Bukit, Kedah were elected as auditors. Four other Executive Committee members would be appointed by the PAS President.²² The conference also decided that its motto was *as-salām u-'alaikum*²³ (peace be upon you).

Hāji Ghazālī must be regarded as a saviour of the conference from going to rack and ruin. He was very much praised by Hāji Aḥmad Mukhtār from Penang for his efficient conduct of it.²⁴ In his closing speech he warned that the delegates in the future should think and be careful in proposing a motion so that a resolution could be carried out. He deplored that unpleasant events occurred during the con-

¹⁸ W.N., 26 November 1951.

¹⁹ According to *Utusan Zaman* (23 November 1951) Faqīh.

²⁰ The northern zone included Perlis, Kedah, Penang, Province Wellesley, Kelantan and Trengganu; the central, Perak, Selangor and Pahang; and southern, Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, Johore and Singapore. See W.N., 26 November 1951.

²¹ According to *U.M.* (26 November 1951) Hāji 'Ash'arī.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ W.N., 26 November 1951.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

ference as 'the *'ulamā*' were supposed to lead, and show the good example to, the people.²⁵

Though the active participants in the Butterworth conference were the UMNO prominent figures, its outcome might not be as much as expected by the party. From the very beginning there were voices indicating that the PAS had to be an independently separate political party. Apparently the UMNO response to the PAS was negative. At this stage the UMNO leaders, particularly Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān,²⁶ must have observed Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's political inclination and must have a fear that the PAS would drift to the UMNO's political enemy, Datok Onn's IMP. It was, therefore, not irrelevant to the events happening among the PAS leaders that the *Majlis*²⁷ urged them to cleanse themselves as soon as possible for the interests of the majority of the Islamic *ummah*. But far from coming together the UMNO and the PAS were gradually, at this stage, showing sign of developing their respective political identity, even though the majority of the PAS leaders were the UMNO's men and were unprepared to leave the party. However some PAS leaders expressed their conviction that an Islamic political party must be established for the developments of Islām and the Malays, while some of the Executive Committee members were not in favour of establishing such a party because it would split the Malay power in their struggle.²⁸ In addition, two Malay dailies expressed different opinions on the advent of the PAS. *Warta Negara*²⁹ hailed the new party, while

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Cf. Azhari Ṭayyib, 'Persatuan Islām Se Malaya Menimbulkan Tandatanya Kepada Orang Ramai Tentang Corak dan Perjuangannya di Masa Hadapan', *U.M.*, 29 November 1951. Tunku Abd ar-Rahman seemed to be cautious. He could not comment the UMNO members holdings posts in the PAS. According to him, it was a question to be decided by the UMNO Executive Committee meeting.

²⁷ 28 November 1951.

²⁸ Azhari Ṭayyib.

²⁹ 26 November 1951.

*Utusan Zaman*³⁰ posed serious political questions which had constitutional complications.

This trend, the sign of gradual development of political identity, then gradually transformed into a political rivalry. While the PAS was trying to win support from the Malays, the UMNO was to prevent the possible erosion of that support from the latter. Some public expressions of the UMNO leader, Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān, indicated that he was trying to convince the Malays that his party was for Islām; that the UMNO would never depart from religion; that the moment the UMNO left religion, it would be buried; and that the UMNO would never do any thing opposed by the '*ulamā*'.³¹ Realizing that Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad was Datok Onn's strongman, Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān equated the IMP and the PAS as an example of political parties which had the purpose of eliminating the UMNO and the Malay nation. In saying that the UMNO was also an Islamic political party he explained that he did not fully understand the real objective of the PAS.³²

The paradox is that despite such 'communal' and 'Islamic' expressions by the UMNO leader, the party was undergoing a process of adopting inter-communal policies. Though this was

³⁰ 2 December 1951. It said:

Even though the PAS did not mention to establish . . . an independent Islamic state in Malaya, its second objective written in its constitution has stated that the party will concentrate all its efforts and powers to unify constitutions and religious administration throughout Malaya. Probably the rajas will not be unreluctant to accept the unification of constitutions and religious administration in Malaya, but the right of making constitution and of running the administration was their political right . . . Because the pan-Malaya Islamic Party is a political organization its objective mentioned above inevitably touches the political right of the Malay rajas and its effect is that they will probably take great concern in that matter . . . The public are doubtful of the party ability to be firmly established because most of its officers are bound by other political party. It failed to enforce party discipline because its leaders are unwilling to break away their connection with their previous party . . .

³¹ *U.M.*, 31 December 1951.

³² *Utusan Zaman*, 6 January 1952.

at the experimental stage with the specific aim of facing Datok Onn's IMP,³³ it was enough to create anxiety among some PAS leaders.

All these events were not taking place without reaction from some PAS leaders. Hāji Aḥmad Māliki personally stated that 'the Islamic Party would do what the UMNO did not want to.'³⁴ He was reported to say:

I am astonished why Tunku . . . could attack this Islamic Party as the establishment of this Islamic Party was sponsored and agreed upon by the UMNO, which had agreed that this party was separate from the UMNO . . . The Islamic Party . . . is like a younger brother of the UMNO. If the UMNO President looks upon the Islamic Party not as his younger brother it is up to him to consider that. As the Islamic Party firmly adheres to its policies and objectives for the unity of the Malay *ummah*, it decided, far from taking action, not to bother about Tunku's criticism. This is an attitude to avoid split.³⁵

By February, Hāji Aḥmad Māliki had cleared the air that the aim of the PAS was to unify the minds and spirit of the Muslims for the loftiness and honour of Islām, to seek agreement with other political parties and not to take over the

³³ In January 1952 a joint press statement was issued by Datok Yahyā bin 'Abd ar-Razzāq and Colonel H.S.Lee declaring that Kuala Lumpur UMNO and Selangor MCA would ally in the forthcoming Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election (against the IMP). While Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān and Datok 'Abd ar-Razzāq hailed the 'alliance' (*U.M.*, 12 January 1952), the UMNO candidates contesting in the election denied the allegation, which followed that statement, that Kuala Lumpur UMNO sold the Malays to the Selangor MCA. See *U.M.* (10 January 1952). For that election, see *U.M.* (17 February 1952), and B. Simandjuntak, p. 68.

³⁴ *Utusan Zaman*, 13 January 1952.

³⁵ *Ibid.* In connection with the report, the political observers believed that the increased UMNO membership was due to the efforts and cooperation of some religious experts who became members and officers of the Islamic Party and they were acknowledged to have considerable influence among both the UMNO and the Islamic Party members all over Malaya.

religious power from the sultans.³⁶

At this stage, several PAS characteristics can be identified. Firstly, the apparent conflict between the UMNO and the PAS was not as serious as that between the former and the IMP. Some PAS officers at branch level were simultaneously the UMNO members and still had an interest in the latter,³⁷ but as the PAS was an Islamic Party it also drew their attention. The UMNO decision of automatic expulsion from the party was most probably not specifically directed against its members joining the PAS, but IMP.³⁸ Secondly, such a seemingly slow down UMNO — PAS antagonism gave the PAS a better opportunity to expand its influence which was taken up by Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad. This included elaborate explanation of the PAS leaders' political views and their party objectives,³⁹ the party religious education project⁴⁰ and social services.⁴¹

It was also at this advent stage that the PAS made an attempt to pronounce, even in a crude form which might confuse the mind, its ideological elements. This was found in a circular issued by the party's Publicity Secretary:

The Pan-Malaya Islamic Union will fight for the implementation of its aspirations, according to the political condition, as its members wanted. . . . The PAS does not take account of group or race, leftism or rightism, *Sbāfi'i* or

³⁶ *U.M.*, 2 February 1952. That the PAS would take over religious power from the sultans was denied later several times by Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad himself. He even said that the PAS would fight for the right and justice together with the sultans. See *U.M.*, 28 April and 9 July 1952.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 10 March 1952. This particularly referred to the PAS Penang branch.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 31 March 1952.

³⁹ This is a repetition of the same thing such as the PAS was for Muslim unity, for unified religious administration, democracy, social justice etc. See *Ibid.*, 28 April, 14 July and 2 December 1952.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 16 June and 12 August 1952. This included collecting donation for private schools.

⁴¹ Such as the PAS youth were reported to extend help to disabled pilgrims returning from Mecca. See *Ibid.*, 27 October 1952.

Hanafi, but, by fighting for its aspirations, it is solely as a real Islamic union demanded by Allah. The PAS does not distinguish the classes of human life to be based on language, nation, racial origin and even on religion The independence of the Malay land will actually release the people from foreign rule and slavery. It is a genuine independence based on democracy. The PAS is certain that only with a government founded by the people, from the people and for the people (sic) that democracy will fully be realized The Islamic *ummah* in Malaya will live together with other *ummah* by uniting themselves in a real Islamic union.⁴²

Thirdly, the PAS leaders' 'religious' outlook on certain aspects influenced their minds and actions. They were at one time known as *kaum tua* ('conservative' group – literally old group) for their views on some 'controversial' issues⁴³ were opposed to *kaum muda* (rationalist group-literally young group).⁴⁴ Initially both groups appeared to have a common Islamic political understanding and cooperated in building up the PAS. Then instead of burying their differences both revived their old conflict which threatened the party unity.⁴⁵

Fourthly, Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad himself seemed to be at odds with his colleagues, even among the conservative group. When

⁴² *Ibid.*, 11 October 1952. The PAS did not attempt to clarify as to what extent the democracy was compatible with Islām, nor did it define leftism, rightism and, at this stage, the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic state.

⁴³ This term is used to describe *mas'alah kbilāfiyah*, differences of opinion among 'ulamā' on certain religious rulings.

⁴⁴ A Study on this subject had been made by W.R. Roff, *The Origin of Malay Nationalism*, Kuala Lumpur 1967, Ch. 3, pp. 56–90.

⁴⁵ An example can be seen when Muḥammad Ibrāhīm 'Aqibī, a well-known *kaum muda* leader in, and also the PAS President of, Penang wrote in *UM* (7 May 1952) about the issue of initiating the fasting month of *Ramaḍān* by astronomical calculation (*ḥisāb*). It influenced Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad to express disappointment if anyone discarded the Four Schools of Islamic Law (the four *madhābib*) while one was unqualified to solve problem by Islamic methodical reasoning. See *U.M.*, 22 May and 3 December 1952; cf. *Ibid.*, 29 September and 9 December 1952.

he made a statement that nothing hindered the Malays from accepting the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) gift of \$500,000.00,⁴⁶ his Deputy, Hāji Muḥammad Ghazālī stated that the money need not be accepted and he refused to comment on Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's statement.⁴⁷ In opposition to several PAS 'ulamā'⁴⁸ Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, in addition, was reported to have supported the planned formation of the Federation regiment.⁴⁹ In fact the internal conflict resulted in a strained relation among the party leaders.⁵⁰

Finally, despite the fact that the PAS encountered those setbacks at this stage of its development, it showed signs of its ability to build up its strength. An Islamic Party like the PAS must draw attention from Islamic minded Malays. This became more evident when the first PAS branch was formed in the populous area of Penang on 9 March 1952 under the leadership of *kaum muda* leader, Hāji Ibrāhīm 'Aqībī as the branch President and 26 other officers.⁵¹ It was followed later in April 1952 by a meeting at *Sa'adat al-Islām*, Kuala Kangsar, Perak, attended by about 150 persons including Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, Datok Orangkaya Setia Bijaya Diraja, Dr.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 23 July 1952. That money was said to have a connection with lottery, which was considered as a form of gambling prohibited by Islām. Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad based his view upon *Mālikī* School of Law which ruled that illegal (*ḥarām*) money which was owned by second party became legal (*ḥalāl*). See *U.M.*, 23 July 1952.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4 August 1952.

⁴⁸ Bakhtiar Jamīl, 'Persatuan Islām Menghadapi Dugaan', in *Ibid.*, 28 August 1952.

⁴⁹ *U.M.*, 26 July 1952.

⁵⁰ Even though this was denied by Hāji Zabīdī, Chairman of the Publicity Sub-Committee of the PAS Butterworth (*Ibid.*, 3 September 1952) there was earlier report that some Central Executive Committee members intended to dissolve the party (*Ibid.*, 28 August 1952). Hāji Muḥammad Ghazālī terminated paying party subscription because according to him he found several insincere actions committed by some persons concerned. *Hāji Ghazālī*.

⁵¹ For detail see *U.M.*, 10 March 1952. Among other officers were Hāji Aḥmad Mukhtār, Che Din bin Chik, and S.A. Raḥmān as Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer respectively; and the other were Executive Committee members.

'Amam Allah al-Khuldi, Secretary of the Perak Pakistan Union. Chaired by Ustādh Aḥmad from Malim Mawar, the meeting gave birth to the first PAS branch of Perak, led by Ḥāji 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad and 15 other officers.⁵² On 6 July, the biggest meeting thus far was held at the hall of *Madrasat at-Tabdīb ad-Diniyyah*, Titi Serong, Parit Buntar, Perak, in which about 300 persons attended. Among them were Raja Muda and Encik Damanhuri, the Head and Secretary of the Perak Religious Department respectively, Ḥāji Aḥmad Mālikī, Ustādh 'Abd al-Wahhāb Nūr and Encik Ḥasan 'Adli.⁵³ Opened by Raja Mūsā and chaired by 'Uthmān Ḥamzah the meeting resolved to form a PAS branch of Kerian with Ustādh Ḥāji Ḥasan 'Abd ar-Raḥmān from Titi Serong as the branch President.⁵⁴

The activities for forming the PAS branches were not confined only to Penang and Perak, because earlier in May 1952 it was reported that a branch would be formed in Perlis on 8 May.⁵⁵ Then in July the party spread to Selangor where its Vice-President for central zone, Faqīh Muḥammad Nūr bin Muḥammad Zain initiated a meeting, chaired by Ḥāji Mas'ūd Hayāti, on 13 July in Kuala Lumpur.⁵⁶ Several persons tried to prevent or defer the formation but the majority of 40 persons attending that meeting supported it. Thus the PAS branch of Kuala Lumpur was led by Ḥāji Mas'ūd Hayāti.⁵⁷ In September an attempt was made to

⁵² For detail see *Ibid.*, 28 April 1952. 'Uthmān Ḥamzah, Ustādh Aḥmad 'Azam and Che Sha'arī Fa'i were the branch Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer respectively. The other officers were Executive Committee members.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 9 July 1952.

⁵⁴ Ustādh Idrīs Munir form Tanjong Piandang (*Mudīr Madrasat at-Tabdīb*, Titi Serong), 'Ārifīn 'Abd Allah, Lebai Nūh, Vice-Qāḍī of Tanjong Piandang were the branch Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer respectively; and 11 Executive Committee members were elected. See *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 2 May 1952.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 9 and 14 July 1952.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 14 July 1952. The other officers were Aḥmad bin Ḥāji 'Umar, Ḥāshim Baghdād, Ḥāji Ṣaleh Bakrī as Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer respectively.

spread the party in Kelantan by Hāji Husin Dol.⁵⁸ By December the PAS succeeded in forming 16 branches in Malaya and Singapore and several others would soon be formed in Beruas, Selama, Telok Anson, Perak Hilir and Kelantan.⁵⁹ In that month the party also planned to form three sections known as youth, 'ulamā' and women councils.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 10 September 1952. Immediate attention was given to the district of Pasir Puteh where he delivered a speech in the house of Ustādh Adam Kāmil to explain about the PAS.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2 December 1952.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 11 December 1952.

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST PAS CONFERENCE, KEPALA BATAS, 3 AND 4 JANUARY 1953: INCIPIENT IDEOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS AND INTERNAL CONFLICT

After more than a year of its existence, the PAS held its first conference at *Madrasat ad-Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif*, Kepala Batas,¹ Province Wellesley, on 3–4 January 1953. It was at this conference that Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad and his colleagues from the *kaum tua* held a *mudbākarab* (literally deliberation) on 4 January to which Hāji Ibrāhīm 'Aqībī², Shaikh Ṭāhir Jalāl ud-Dīn and their colleagues from *kaum muda* were invited but did not attend.³ Instead of remaining unbiased toward his political followers, Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad became a champion⁴ of the *kaum tua*.

¹ *U.M.*, 5 January 1953.

² The PAS President of Penang branch.

³ It is beyond the scope of this study to observe this *mudbākarab* other than what is relevant to the PAS political conditions in its formative stages. However it is worth noting that *mudbākarab* was originally initiated by a circular issued by Penang and Province Wellesley's *Muḥtī* concerning some controversial religious issues (*masā'il kbilāfiyah*). This induced the *kaum muda*, who regarded themselves unconservative, to make a strong protest especially from those of Balik Pulau and Kampong Baru, Penang. At their meeting at Kampong Baru the *kaum muda* formed a preparatory body for *munāẓarab* (debate) between 'Aqībī and *Muḥtī*. But no *munāẓarab* took place because the *Majlis Penasibat Islām Pulau Pinang* did not agree with it. Then the PAS and Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad proposed a *mudbākarab* at Kepala Batas (*W.N.*, 3 January 1953) in which 21 'ulamā' participated and 16 *masā'il Kbilāfiyah* resolved (*W.N.*, 5 January 1953; *U.M.*, 2, 3 and 6 January 1953). One of the resolutions was that it was not permissible (*tidak barus* or *gbair mubāḥ*) for Muslims women to participate in politics by which they might be induced to holding public authority otherwise it was permissible.

⁴ Cf. *U.M.*, 9 and 11 December 1952. Even Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad explicitly expressed his readiness to defend the *mudbākarab* resolutions (*W.N.*, 5 January 1953)

The conference was chaired by Hāji Aḥmad Mukhtār and attended by 20 Executive Committee members and 20 delegates representing 11 PAS branches.⁵ In his opening speech Hāji Aḥmad Fu'ad expressed his dissatisfaction with the activities contributed to the PAS either by himself or the Executive Committee members.⁶

Surprisingly the party did not reflect a clearcut commitment to the Islamic political ideology⁷ but rather crudely a synthetic mixture between Islam and democratic political programme accepted at the conference. It consisted of seven points. Firstly, the PAS was to introduce a genuine independence to the people besides inculcating them with the spirit of independence and showing them the ways to attain it. Secondly, the PAS was to introduce a real democracy and to explain its benefits to the state and the Islamic *ummah* and to inculcate them with the spirit of democracy and to show them the ways to attain it. Thirdly, the PAS was to organize efficiently a youth council which would work for the implementation of the aspiration of independence according to the PAS and to organize an '*ulamā*' council which would function as an advisory body for the party activities and to carry out all responsibilities relating to the Islamic religion. The fourth point was to introduce the PAS to the Islamic world and to the Islamic welfare bodies all over the world. The fifth point was to create an Islamic slogan.

which, according to some '*ulamā*' in Singapore, were based on *Shāfi'i* School (*U.M.*, 8 January 1953). Many readers wrote in *U.M.* and *W.N.* during this period for and against the *mudbākarah*, even Singapore '*ulamā*' regarded it as useless. See *U.M.*, 3 January 1953.

⁵ *W.N.*, 5 January 1953. Some of the branches were Penang Town, Bayan Lepas, Pokok Sena, Bukit Mertajam, Perlis, Bukit Besar, Titi Serong, Kerian, Perak Hilir, Perak branch, Sentol, Kuala Lumpur and Sungai Penchala. According to *U.M.*, (5 January 1953), 200 persons attended the conference including delegates and observers. The previous report that the PAS had formed 16 branches (see *infra* p. 36) did not seem to contradict with the reported 11 branches, because there was no mention about other branches which were reportedly formed before the conference such as Kuala Kangsar.

⁶ *U.M.*, 5 January 1953; *W.N.*, 5 January 1953.

⁷ Cf. the PAS ideology.

Sixthly, the PAS was to build up a single independent state which would be founded by the people, from the people and for the people. Finally, the party was to agree that Malaya independence be within the British Commonwealth.⁸

Some of the points were not accepted by *kaum muda* from Singapore who contemptuously posed questions through their monthly journal, *Qalam*⁹ such as: 'where are we heading?' and 'has Western democracy been made a basic principle for the PAS?' But the PAS programme was warmly hailed by a Malay daily, *Melayu Raya*.¹⁰

Apart from the seven-point programme, the PAS passed several resolutions which did not much imply ideological complications. On religious administration, the party resolved to urge the authority to form religious councils for Penang and Malacca with the power to carry out religious administration according to permanent *shari'ah* law, to urge the sultans that the representatives in their religious advisory committee be appointed according to the will of the people¹¹ and be increased by 11 more members to become 33.¹² The general resolutions were to urge the government to make the first of *Muharram* (the first month of the Islamic calendar) a public holiday, to lower taxes on rice land and rubber estates, to contact shipping companies abroad for the transportation of pilgrims to Mecca, to appeal to the govern-

⁸ *U.M.*, 5 January 1953; *W.N.*, 5 January 1953; See *S.T.*, 5 January 1953. The seventh point, proposed by the PAS Executive Committee, was strongly opposed by 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah of Perak Hilir but he was defeated by 22 to four votes.

⁹ *Qalam*, February 1953.

¹⁰ Said 'Melayu Raya' (6 January 1953) as quoted by *Qalama*, February 1953:-

... Perhaps some people, especially the fanatics are not satisfied with the PAS political programme for attaining independence for Malaya because it has not been mentioned in the programme that the future independent Malaya must be in accordance with the Islamic pattern . . . This is a wise step, because what must be fought for now is not the type of independence of Malaya in the future, but the attainment of independence for Malaya to be achieved by proper and peaceful means based on the constitution . . .

¹¹ *U.M.*, 5 January 1953; *W.N.*, 5 January 1953.

¹² *U.M.*, 5 January 1953.

ment to lower the passport charges for pilgrims from \$20.00 to \$5.00, to appoint a committee for selecting prospective pilgrims, and by the PAS itself to award scholarship to religious students that year. The other resolutions seemed to signify the political tendency of the party such as to adopt the word *merdeka* (independence) as the PAS slogan, red and white as the party flag, at the front top corner of which was a green circle in which the words Allah and Muḥammad were printed in white. The party was also to accept its political programme with amendments, to publish a magazine, *Suara PAS* (the Voice of the PAS), and finally to approve plans for establishing 'ulamā', youth and women's councils.¹³

As proposed by the PAS Executive Committee, four amendments were adopted and several provisions were added to the PAS constitution in the conference. The additional provisions included the conditions for other unions or organizations which could form an alliance with the PAS,¹⁴ membership termination, the right and responsibility of associate members, liaison body, meeting and the party finance.¹⁵ There was an apparent ideological inconsistency when it required that an Islamic union or organization wanting to form an alliance with the PAS must, among other conditions, fight for Islamic aspirations, from Allah and for Allah.¹⁶

The other important aspect of the Kepala Batas conference was the election of the PAS leaders for 1951–1952. Hāji Ahmad Fū'ad from Province Wellesley¹⁷ was re-elected as the party President while Hāji Manṣūr J.P. from Penang became a new Deputy President replacing Hāji Muḥammad Ghazālī 'Abd Allah. Except Hāji Husin Dol from Kedah and Hāji

¹³ For all these resolutions see *U.M.*, 5 January 1953 and *W.N.*, 5 January 1953.

¹⁴ *Cf. S.T.*, 5 January 1953.

¹⁵ *W.N.*, 5 January 1953.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, cf. the PAS's sixth point of its programme, *infra*, p. 26.

¹⁷ Hāji Ahmad Fū'ad was an UMNO prominent figure who held post as an officer of *Madrasah Tengku Embong Fatimah*, Kuala Trengganu. He was married to a daughter of a well-known religious teacher in Bukit Mertajam, Tuan Hāji Ṣāleḥ al-Misri.

'Abd ar-Rahmān al-Jampuli from Singapore who retained their posts as Vice-Presidents for northern and southern zones respectively, Ḥāji Muḥammad Nūr from Selangor, who was previously a party Executive Committee member, became a new Vice-President for central zone. Two officers from Province Wellesley, Ḥāji Aḥmad Mālīkī and Ḥāji Aḥmad Tuan Husin, retained their previous posts as Secretary and Treasurer respectively. The new Executive Committee members were Ḥāji Muḥammad Long from Perlis, Muḥammad Hanīf from Penang, Ḥāji Zabīdī from Perak and Ḥāji Aḥmad Hāshimī from Province Wellesley, while three others, Ḥāji Aḥmad Badwī from Penang, Ḥāji Zabīdī from Province Wellesley, and Yaḥyā Junaid from Kedah, retained their posts as Executive Committee members.¹⁸ All these leaders were regarded as *kaum tua* and were from West Malaya; eight were from Penang and Province Wellesley; two from Kedah and one each from Singapore, Perak and Perlis.

The PAS President seemed to be pessimistic when he expressed the future prospect of Islām and Malays in Malaya. According to him:

The recognition of Malaya as an Islamic state will possibly disappear in the future because of the pressures imposed upon us and of the changes in the government which will certainly occur. The subjects of the Malay rajas at present consist not only of Malays but of various races embracing various religions and obtaining the same rights as the Malays

The PAS must prepare itself in advance with Islamic form and pattern so that it can face, together with other political parties of this country, the changes among which are matters concerning transitional government for

¹⁸ *U.M.*, 5 January 1953; *W.N.*, 5 January 1953. According to *U.M.*, (5 January 1953) the PAS President and Secretary were Ḥāji Muḥammad Daud and Ḥāji Aḥmad Mālīk (sic) respectively and both were from Province Wellesley. According to *W.N.* (26 November 1953) the conference had authorised the party President to appoint its Secretary. But according to *U.M.* (8 February 1953) Che Aḥmad Awang was as party Secretary elected at Kepala Batas Conference.

attaining independence for Malaya The PAS does not work satisfactorily now because of its deficient power¹⁹

It was observable that the elements of Malay nationalism prevailed more conspicuously in the conference – besides upholding Western democratic values. It gave an opportunity to *Utusan Melayu*²⁰ to promptly conclude that the intrinsic PAS policies were Islām and nationalism or nationalism based on Islām comparable to the defunct HM. In fact Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad in his closing speech was indicative of his serious concern with the future of the Malays, while the party's 'red and white' flag was reminiscent of the HM's 'Indonesian nationalism'. This condition and the publicity given by the Malay dailies to the PAS were undoubtedly conducive to increasing attention given by the Malays to the PAS.²¹ At this stage and in addition to the party's nationalistic characteristic, Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's Malay sentiment seemed to be in tune with Datok Onn's 'anti-Chinese' tirade.²² This was obvious in his response to the proposed Chinese University, as 'an aspiration to conquer Malaya through Chinese Culture' and 'an evidence that the Chinese in Malaya were still not sincere to Malaya and the Malays'.²³

An expression of this kind was not without reasons. But if Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad intended to develop a parallel political platform with Datok Onn's and then to direct his party closer to Datok Onn's politics, he was making a gross political

¹⁹ *U.M.*, 5 January 1953.

²⁰ 11 January 1953.

²¹ The Kedah Executive Committee meeting of the *Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung* – PEMAS (Peninsular Malay Union) invited the PAS to arrange a round table conference between their respective branches in Kedah. See *U.M.*, 12 January 1953.

²² See *Malay Mail*, 28 April 1953. Some political observers believed that Datok Onn's tirade against the Chinese was prompted by the recent influx of Malays into the IMP. For detail see B. Simandjuntak, p. 69.

²³ *U.M.*, 20 February 1953.

miscalculation, because what he was doing was not concomitant with the popular tendency in his party. There was no greater threat to his political future than this, though the problem of *kaum muda* and *kaum tua* caused a temporary split²⁴ in the PAS.

Meanwhile, Datok Onn and Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān were poised against each other in a bitter political struggle as the IMP was approaching the state of gradual collapse. In March 1953 Tunku 'Abd ar-Rahmān announced that he would organize a Malayan national congress to which all political parties would be invited.²⁵ In the midst of April, a writer poignantly reminded the PAS to be watchful on Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad so that the party members could not be deceived by the 'ulamā' 'who became a colonial tool' and 'to be easily influ-

²⁴The *kaum muda* Ḥāji Ibrāhīm 'Aqībī organized a second *mudbākarab*. The PAS Perak Hilir wanted that the party Executive Committee members would not attend it (*Ibid.*, 24 March 1953), because it was, according to the PAS Perak Hilir's 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah, useless and to split the Malays (*Ibid.*, 6 April 1953). But the PAS, as decided by its Executive Committee meeting, would attend it on three conditions: (i) all *muftis*, Chairman of *Majma'a Syaikh al-Islām*, Kedah, Head of Religious Department of Perlis and Chief *Qadī* of Singapore were to be invited; (ii) it would be held at an appropriate location; and (iii) participants should be religious experts (*Ibid.*, 11 April 1953). Ḥāji Husin Dol supported, in order to avoid split, these three conditions (*Ibid.*, 30 April 1953). In fact the *kaum tua* and the PAS boycotted it. In connection with this *mudbākarab* Abū Bakr Ḥamzah, who later became the PAS Deputy President and Secretary, stated that Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad would be teaching *bid'ah* (religious innovation) and his students would develop *khurāfat* (superstitions) in society (*Ibid.*, 20 April 1953).

²⁵*Ibid.*, 16 March 1953. Organized by the UMNO the congress of Malay organizations was held on 14 August 1953 at Johore Baharu, attended by the UMNO, the PAS, the *Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung (A)*, the *Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung (B)*, *Gabungan Persatuan Pemuda Melayu Kelantan*, *Persekutuan Persetiaan Melayu Kelantan*, *Kesatuan Melayu Singapore*, *Lembaga Kesatuan Melayu Johore*, *Kesatuan Melayu Johore* and the Malay Graduate Association. The PAS was represented by Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad and Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf. See *UMNO 10 Tahun*, pp. 94–95. According to *S.U.*, (1 September 1953), 11 organizations were invited and nine of them attended: the UMNO, the PAS, the *Kesatuan Melayu Johore*, *Persekutuan Persetiaan Melayu Kelantan*, *Kesatuan Melayu Singapore*, Pemas, Malay Graduate Association, *Gabungan Pemuda Melayu Kelantan* and *Lembaga Kesatuan Melayu Johore*. The congress did not make any decision.

enced by the seven Chief Ministers', but to understand who stood behind them.²⁶ This was in connection with Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's statement that the PAS would attend the National Conference sponsored by 16 prominent persons.²⁷

At this stage, Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, besides calling upon the 'ulamā' and imām to involve themselves actively in politics, was apparently attempting to clarify the party stand, if not to conceal his pro-Datok Onn politics. He explained about the PAS willingness to attend the UMNO – MCA – sponsored National Convention and justified that his party would participate, by sending two delegates, to the seven – Chief Minister – sponsored National Conference, which would be held on 27 April 1953. According to him, the Conference's resolution was not binding upon the PAS and the latter would withdraw from the former had that resolution been contrary to the objective of the PAS struggle. His expressed regret over the UMNO–MCA boycott of the Conference was not without any meaning.²⁸ There was also indication that he intended to project the party stature and impress the Malays. Besides emphasising the Qur'ān as the party guideline he directed his criticism against the *muftis*, 'ulamā' and the religious councils.²⁹

In fact the PAS was the only Malay organization attending the Conference and represented by Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad. He stated that the presence of the Chief Ministers was a great

²⁶ Aha Johore, 'Ālim 'Ulamā' Tanah Melayu', *U.M.*, 16 April 1953.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, both the names of the seven-chief – Ministers – Sponsored National Conference and the UMNO–MCA – Sponsored National Convention were reported inconsistently as National Congress, National Conference and National Convention. The Malay word conference is *persidangan*; convention, *perbim-punan*; and congress, *kongres*. The National Convention was regarded as in compliance with Datok Onn's politics.

²⁸ See *Ibid.*, 18 April 1953.

²⁹ According to him these people could not be relied on to correct the sultans because of their chairs and salaries and all these conditions could be redressed by the Muslims by allying themselves in an Islamic organization like the PAS (*Ibid.*). He later concluded that the causes of the Islamic downfall were insincerity among the leaders and the sultans, and as the PAS was founded on sincerity it did not hide important matters (*Ibid.*, 20 April 1953).

contribution to the task of achieving Malaya independence and the boycott of the Conference by some political parties was due to misunderstanding.³⁰ Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's attitude towards the Conference had the backing from his party Secretary, Che Aḥmad Awang. The latter argued that the PAS needed independence based on Islām and was ready to cooperate with and support other political organizations which did not deviate from, and give up, Islamic religion, nor did violate the rights of the Malay Muslims.³¹

Early in June 1953 the PAS Executive Committee, in a meeting held at the party headquarters, Bukit Mertajam and chaired by Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, decided to arrange constitutional proposals for the Federation of Malaya to be moved in the National Conference.³² It also studied carefully the UMNO—MCA — sponsored National Convention and resolved to attend it if invited.³³ In its later meeting the Executive Committee accepted Tunku 'Abd ar-Raḥmān's invitation³⁴

³⁰ See *Malay Mail*, 28 April 1953; *S.T.*, 28 April 1953. According to *U.M.*, (18 April 1953) Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad and Muḥammad Ḥanīf would attend the Conference.

³¹ This view was expressed at a PAS rally at Bayan Lepas, Penang. Muḥammad 'Asrī, Assistant PAS Secretary, and Hāji Aḥmad Tuan Ḥusin, the PAS Treasurer also gave a speech. The latter said in his speech that 'the PAS demanded independence and simultaneously defended Islamic sovereignty . . . Let there be no independence if it is not according to the Islamic pattern'. See *W.N.*, 3 August 1953.

³² *U.M.*, 2 June 1953 and also 10 July 1953. This was perhaps the second session of the National Conference. In August, the PAS arranged four general outlines for independence. Firstly, there was to be a federal government based on democracy with elected representatives. The cabinet ministers were responsible to the federal legislature. Secondly, the official religion was Islām, run centrally by religious ministry. Thirdly, the official language was Malay and the second language was English for the time being. Fourthly, citizenship was according to what existed in the Federation at that time. See *Ibid.*, 25 August 1953.

³³ *Ibid.*, 2 June 1953; see also 31 July 1953. According to *W.N.* (4 August 1953) the PAS was one of the 13 political organizations being invited to the National Convention.

³⁴ *U.M.*, 31 July 1953.

and attended the UMNO — sponsored meeting of the Malay political bodies on 14 August 1953.³⁵

The UMNO—MCA — sponsored National Convention was held on 23 August 1953 at Kuala Lumpur. There seemed to be a serious internal problem as instead of Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf and Muḥammad bin Awang represented the PAS.³⁶ The Convention resolution demanding nation-wide Federal election in 1954 was supported by the party. A committee, in which Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf was initially a member, was appointed to consider and recommend constitutional reforms in Federation of Malaya.³⁷ The reported appointment of Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf as a committee member was denied by Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad and the PAS Secretary.³⁸

Despite the fact that the PAS President thus far had shown a negative attitude toward the National Convention and that he was in a position to create a leadership crisis in the party, the party branches showed enthusiasm and proved their capability to spread the PAS influence. Among its outspoken branches were Perak Hilir and Kerian,³⁹ and the former had, for instance, founded 10 sub-branches by March 1952 and another 30 would be formed in April 1953.⁴⁰ In the East Coast of Malaya the first party branch was formed in Pasir Mas, Kelantan, on 23 July 1953 with 'Umar bin Yūsuf and Amal ud-Dīn Darus as the branch President and Secretary

³⁵ See *infra*, p. 43, n. 25.

³⁶ See *S.T.*, 24 August 1953; *UMNO 10 Tabun*, p. 96. The other political organizations attended the Convention were PEMAS and *Pemetaan Melayu Kelantan*.

³⁷ *Malay Mail*, 24 August 1953.

³⁸ See *U.M.*, 24 and 27 August 1953. In *UMNO 10 Tabun* (p. 97) Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf was not on the list of the committee members. In *W.N.* (25 August 1953) Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad stated that 'as far as the PAS was concerned the appointment of Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf as a committee member was not recognized by the PAS'.

³⁹ See *U.M.*, 22 February 1953.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 10 March 1953.

respectively.⁴¹ It was followed later by the formation of the Machang branch by Hāji Muḥammad Nūr bin Hāji Yūsuf.⁴² It was reported that by July 1953 the party had formed 20 branches throughout Federation, the most active of which were those of Perak, Kedah and Perlis.⁴³

⁴¹ Amaluddin Darus, *Kenapa Saya Tinggalkan PAS*, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, p. 27.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28; cf. *U.M.*, 21 April 1953.

⁴³ *U.M.*, 15 July 1953.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND PAS CONFERENCE, BAGAN DATOK, 26 AND 27 AUGUST 1953: POLITICAL NAIVETY

In June 1953, it was reported that the PAS Executive Committee decided that the party would sponsor an Islamic congress¹ on 25 August 1953, to be followed by the party conference on 26 and 27 August.² Both congress and conference were held at *Madrasat al-'Ulūm*, Batu 20, Bagan Datok,³ Perak, and were attended by about 600 persons. The congress was to have three principal programmes and objectives for the attainment of independence, genuinely based on Islām. The three objectives were, firstly, to make an effort for establishing a Muslim youth body for the implementation of the Islamic and political demands based on democracy; secondly, to encourage and achieve the building up Muslim brotherhood, and to avoid things which might cause split among the Islamic *ummah*; and, thirdly, to instil and revive the Islamic spirit and to practise Islamic teachings in life in the real sense of the terms. For practical purposes the objectives were to be directed into three aspects: firstly, to strive to increase private schools and unify them under a

¹ *U.M.*, 27 June 1953.

² *Ibid.*, 18 July 1953. The Committee made the same decision on 31 July 1953, and the party office holders for 1953 - 1954, as decided by that Committee, were: Hāji Ahmad Fu'ad, Hāji Mansūr J.P. from Penang, Hāji Ahmad from Province Wellesley and Muḥammad bin Hanīf from Penang, as the party President, Deputy President, Treasurer and Secretary respectively. The Executive Committee members were Hāji Muḥammad Nūr from Segambut, Dr. 'Abbās from Kuala Lumpur, Ustādh 'Uthmān al-Yūnusī from Kedah, Hāji Ahmad Long from Perlis, 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah from Perak Hilir, Hāji 'Abd ar-Rauf from Malacca, and Hāji 'Uthmān Tā'ah from Negeri Sembilan. See *Ibid.*, 1 and 20 August 1953.

³ *Ibid.*, 1 and 29 August 1953.

single administration; secondly, to train Muslim youth to qualify themselves in state administration according to the Islamic principles and to encourage them to take active part in defending the country; and, thirdly, to train them to become leaders and encourage them to take active part in welfare organizations.⁴

A committee for running the PAS Youth Council was appointed with 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah from Perak Hilir as its Chairman. The other office holders were Aḥmad Awang from Province Wellesley and Ustādh 'Abd al-Qādir Kamal from Pahang, as Deputy Chairman and Secretary respectively. The committee members were Jamāl ud-Dīn Aminī from Alor Star, Kedah, Ḥāji Ja'far from Perak, Ḥāji Aḥmad Ḥāji 'Alī from Perak Hilir, Ustādh Muḥammad Nūḥ and Isma'īl, both from Province Wellesley, Ishāq Baḥrūm from Selangor and Termidhī from Perak.⁵

The PAS conference was officially opened by Chief Minister of Perak. He reminded the party to work for the people and hoped that it would succeed in its struggle. Then in his opening speech Ḥāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, as the party President, called upon the people to support the PAS wholeheartedly. He said that the party was fighting firmly for the loftiness of Islamic sign (*shī'ār*).

The conference resolutions were very modest: to appeal to Gerald Templer that a retail shop which capital was less than \$1,000.00 be exempted from government registration and licence; to urge the authority to introduce Islamic religious knowledge into 'English Schools' and to make it as a subject in the School Certificate examination for the Muslim children.⁶

⁴ See *Ibid.*, 20 August 1953.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 29 August 1953.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, Not much had been reported about this conference. Even W.N. and S.T. did not mention about it all. (Sir) Gerald Templer was the British High Commissioner for Malaya at that time.

CHAPTER VI

THE PAS SPECIAL CONFERENCE, BUKIT MERTAJAM, 26 SEPTEMBER 1953: LEADERSHIP CRISIS

The months of August and September 1953 were the most critical stage in Hāji Aḥmad Fu'ad's political career. Apart from being the PAS President and its primary spokesman, he was an unofficial member of the Federal Legislative Council, an important social and religious figure¹ and an educationist. In connection with the Muslim youth congress he, for instance, had had time to write in *Utusan Melayu*,² as often as he could concerning religious matters, appealing to the Muslim youth to struggle for Islām.

All these activities and his personal stature were of no avail when he was, influenced by Datok Onn politics, trying to make a major political decision affecting his future and his position in the party which he was one of its founders. The critical moment came when the PAS leaders had to decide whether to support the Chief-Minister – sponsored National Conference or the UMNO–MCA–sponsored National Convention. So important the PAS looked on the Conference and the Convention that the party held a special conference on 26 September 1953³ at *Madrasat al-Maṣriyyah*, Bukit Mertajam⁴ to decide its own stand in facing both bodies. As far

¹ He was often an important speaker or a chairman at an important social or religious occasion such as the mass Muslim rally at Datok Keramat, Penang. See *U.M.*, 22 August 1953.

² 22 August 1953.

³ 13 branches sent delegates to the conference. See *W.N.*, 28 September 1953.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27 September 1953.

as Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad was concerned, he openly defended the PAS involvement in the National Conference:

Today is the day which will determine where we must be, in either one of the two bodies mentioned and we cannot be in both because both bodies have different, and probably, contrary plans Among the matters which we will deal with today is to study the report of the Working Committee of the National Conference regarding the Federation of Malaya Legislative Council including the election for that Council to be held at the latest in 1956 and as a member of the National Conference Working Committee let me clarify as much as I am able to about the Working Committee in order to bring to light the problem when you deliberate it. Firstly, what I want to mention is that the report was made after studying thoroughly the Federation of Malaya agreement⁵

In fact Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad confessed later that he had made earnest request to the party to support the National Conference.⁶

The closed door special conference took eight hours to deliberate and eventually passed a resolution in favour of the National Convention,

Hereby the meeting agree in principle that the PAS is to support and cooperate with the UMNO—MCA — sponsored National Convention but is not bound by it if things inappropriate with the PAS exist; and does not agree that

⁵ *Ibid.* In *U.M.* (27 September 1953) Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad clarified that for the attainment of independence a multi-racial organization was necessary. He argued that the PAS participation in the National Conference was in accordance with the decision of the party Executive — Committee meeting last April and based on the PAS constitution: to cooperate with political bodies not opposed to the PAS policies. The PAS did not reject the National Conference resolution but to consider it carefully in that special PAS conference because the latter was previously in the former. The party could not be in both bodies.

⁶ *U.M.*, 3 December 1953.

the PAS is to support the National Conference sponsored by 16 prominent persons including seven Chief Ministers.⁷

Because of this, Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad had no alternative but to tender his resignation and leave the party,⁸ and subsequently the PAS withdrew its representatives from the Working Committee of the National Conference.⁹ However one day later the PAS Executive Committee decided to request Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad to resume the party presidency.¹⁰ This was done by the party officers, Hāji Aḥmad Mālīki, Hāji Mansūr J.P. and Hāji Aḥmad Tuan Ḥusin, who formally met him at his house in Bukit Mertajam. But neither side was compromising: he would not resume the PAS presidency until the party withdrew the resolution or at least the PAS was to stand neutral without supporting or cooperating with any other political body in Malaya. Though the latter condition was moderate, the party was resolute on its decision.¹¹ There was, however, a directive issued by the party headquarters requesting all its branches to hold their meetings promptly to deliberate whether or not to withdraw that resolution,¹² but again no positive outcome ensued.

It was in October and November 1953 that *Utusan Melayu* was inundated with letters from its readers who criticized Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad for leaving the PAS. There was also a tendency

⁷ W.N., 27 September 1953. The resolution was proposed by Pasir Mas delegate with 23 against 10 votes. According to *Majlis* one vote abstained.

⁸ According to U.M. (27 September 1953) he withdrew himself from being the PAS President, and W.N. (27 September 1953) he declared his resignation from the PAS. Whatever was said about Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad one thing is obvious, that is, he involved in Datok Onn's political retransformation and became a victim of it. He became an Executive Committee member of the *Parti Negara* (the State Party) when it was formed by Datok Onn on 28 February 1954 (U.M., 1 March 1954) as a substitution for his ailing IMP.

⁹ S.T., 28 September 1953.

¹⁰ U.M., 28 September 1953.

¹¹ See *Ibid.*, 12 October 1953.

¹² *Ibid.*, 18 October 1953.

to raise doubts about his character.¹³ His strong defender was Hāji 'Abd ar-Raḥmān al-Jampuli who engaged, in Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's favour, a polemic against Ahli PAS Utara.¹⁴ For *Majlis*¹⁵ Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad's resignation from the party was regarded as not a wise step, while *Warta Negara*¹⁶ boldly emphasised that 'any new leader, who was to be elected by the party and to be more active and arrogantly outspoken, would not have the knowledge that Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad had'. From the UMNO side, its Youth leader, Sa'dūn Hāji Zubīr, regarded the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) withdrawal from the National Conference and the PAS objection to support it as the greatest victory in the political movement.¹⁷

¹³ A former teacher of *Madrasah Tunku Embong Fatimah* expressed hope that Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad would clarify about the money which was donated to that *Madrasah* and in his safe keeping (*Ibid.*, 2 November 1953). About two months later Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad, a former officer of that *Madrasah*, refunded \$2,000.00 to it (*Ibid.*, 19 November 1953).

¹⁴ See *Ibid.*, 20 and 30 October and 6 and 12 November 1953.

¹⁵ 30 September 1953.

¹⁶ 28 September 1953.

¹⁷ *U.M.*, 3 October 1953. For MIC withdrawal from that Conference, see Gordon P. Means, *Malaysian Politics*, London, 1970, pp. 143-144.

CHAPTER VII

CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE PARTY IDENTITY

It was in October that the PAS, far from being influenced by Hāji Aḥmad Fu'ad, showed sign of incompatibility with the UMNO and of paving its own way to crystallizing its self-identity in opposition to that of the UMNO. The PAS sent two delegates, Muḥammad bin Ḥanīf and Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, to the second session of the UMNO—MCA — sponsored National Convention on 11 October 1953. The Convention unanimously approved, with some changes, the report of its Working Committee for electoral, constitutional reforms and Federal election in 1954. But the demarcation line between the PAS and the UMNO was the question of electors. Muḥammad Ḥanīf as the PAS delegate could not agree with the liberalizing of the qualifications for electors because, he argued, the non-Federal citizens could not be guaranteed of their loyalty, and thus voting rights should be restricted to those who were subjects of the Malay rulers or were Federal citizens.

Though this view was supported by another Malay party, PEMAS, Dr. Isma'īl replied that 'the argument was fallacious' and 'if you want to make this country democratic then the first thing to do is to give democratic rights' ¹

Undoubtedly the PAS was in a great political frustration. It gave up support to Datok Onn's IMP mainly because the latter was advocating inter-communal politics and 'Datok

¹ S. U. 1 November 1953; see S. T., 12 October 1953; *Malay Mail*, 12 October 1953. However the Convention accepted the PAS proposal that the Chairman of the three-man commission to study the delimitation of constituencies should be a person from outside Malaya and that the official language of the proposed Federal legislature should be Malay and English. The other PAS proposal, that there should be a member to represent padi growers, was rejected.

Onn's' National Conference objected to the proposed Federal election in 1954. Then the party faced almost the same communal problem in the National Convention, the problem of electors' qualification. Because of this the party did not attend the third session of the National Convention, held on 14 January 1954². It had come to the position that its cooperation with the UMNO would inevitably come to an end, as reflected in the writing of its Publicity Secretary, 'Abd Allah Akin:

The inclusion of the PAS in the UMNO—MCA Alliance does not undermine the former aspirations because the PAS is unfettered. The PAS, through its representatives in the Alliance meeting, has lodged a protest in order that the right to vote is conferred only to the subjects of the sultans and of the Federation. But it was frustrated. Nevertheless the PAS is invariably in a state of protest. The PAS does not as yet make a memorandum for that purpose because it does not yet declare its withdrawal from the Alliance³

At this stage of the PAS development, it had to overcome two main problems. Internally it had to find out a new president and externally to deal decisively with the National Convention and particularly the UMNO. Because of Haji Ahmad Fū'ad's resignation the party headquarters were shifted from Bukit Mertajam to Kepala Batas effective from 19 October 1953, and from the new headquarters the party directed its officers at all levels to find out and appoint an acting leader until the next conference.⁴ The problem came to an end when Dr. Hāji 'Abbās was appointed as the party Deputy President after 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah, Hāji Muḥammad

²See *S.T.*, 15 February 1954; *S.U.*, 1 March 1954. The participating bodies were the UMNO, the MCA, Pan-Malayan Labour Party and Selangor Rent Payers' Association.

³*Warta*, 4 May 1954.

⁴*U.M.*, 23 October 1953.

Nūr and Che 'Abd Allah Akin met him⁵ and a few days later he was appointed as Acting PAS President.⁶

Though following resignation of Hāji Aḥmad Fū'ad there were rumours that some PAS officers at branch levels left the party,⁷ the party showed no sign of stagnation. The party officers at their new headquarters became more determined to fight for the party ideology, and its Secretary, Aḥmad Awang, indicated that the party involvement in politics was based on Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* and would expel members who attempted to disrupt it.⁸ Dr. Hāji 'Abbās himself was as active as expected. The only obstacle was that he was a medical officer and was unable to devote full time to the party.⁹ On 26 December 1953 he chaired the party Executive Committee closed door meeting in which the most controversial issue, party discipline,¹⁰ was debated for two hours. It was known that for the time being and considering political conditions in Malaya, that issue could not be enforced in the party. There were also decisions to amend the party constitution and to form a party publicity body. Both decisions were to be worked out by two sub-committees. The former was headed by Dr. Hāji 'Abbās¹¹ while the latter by Hāji Muḥammad Nūr.¹²

⁵ *Ibid.*, 16 November 1953.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18 November 1953.

⁷ See *Ibid.*, 5 December 1953 and 8 and 29 January 1954.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 7 November 1953. This was expressed in an occasion.

⁹ When he was on duty to head a medical team to Mecca he appointed Che Ahmad Awang, Hāji Ahmad Tuan Husin and Hāji Mansūr J.P. as Acting PAS Presidents. See *Ibid.*, 26 May 1954.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 27 December 1953. The issue of 'party discipline', that is, a PAS member could not become member of any other political party, was of concern for several PAS branches, which urged the party to enforce it. Those branches were namely Bagan Tiang, Perak (*Ibid.*, 22 June and 2 July 1954), Benut Johore (*Ibid.*, 31 July 1954), and Pasir Mas (*Ibid.*, 5 August 1954).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 27 December 1953.

¹² *Ibid.*, 28 December 1953. The Publicity Committee was responsible for carrying out party publicity and to form its counter part at branch level. The other decisions were to contact Islamic bodies and 'ulamā' in Singapore in order to study a reportedly proposed family law aimed at enforcing monogamy on Mus-

There was evidently an indication that the party at branch level was not inert and, in some branches, more active. The Kerian branch alone, for instance, was reported to have 470 members and several sub-branches would be formed there.¹³ On 19 March 1954 the party's Johore branch was formed in a meeting at Johore Baharu, attended by about 100 persons,¹⁴ while the Benut branch was formed on 6 May 1954.¹⁵ In the East Coast the most active Pasir Puteh's (Kelantan) PAS member was Ustādh Adam Kāmil.¹⁶ In fact one PAS branch in Kelantan showed itself strangely tolerant. There were events in which Ḥāji Muḥammad Nūr, the Machang branch PAS President, welcomed, because of the nominal existence of the UMNO there, Tunku 'Abd ar-Raḥmān and later Ja'far al-Bār when they visited Machang, Kelantan.¹⁷ It is surmisable that by 1954 the party activities were spread to all states in Malaya.¹⁸ Although there was no report of the party movement in Trengganu, Pahang, Negeri Sembilan and Malacca, at least its members existed in those states.

lim men (*Ibid.*, 12 and 27 December 1953); and to hold an Islamic conference consisting of all Islamic organizations in Malaya (*Ibid.*, 28 December 1953).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 15 January 1954.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 20 March 1954. The branch office bearers were Ḥāji 'Arifin, Che 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah and Yūsuf Ḥāji Raḥīm as President, Secretary and Treasurer respectively. Eight Executive Committee members were appointed. The PAS members in Johore were reported to be 200.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7 May 1954. The branch office bearers were Ḥāji 'Abd ad-Razzāq, Muḥammad Tāhir and Ḥāji Embok Masat and Ḥāji Yūsuf bin 'Abr ar-Raḥīm as President, Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer respectively. Six Executive Committee members were appointed.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15 April 1954. He seemed to be the man responsible for organizing the PAS gathering there where the party officers from headquarters, such as Muḥammad 'Aṣri and 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah, gave their speeches. Cf. *Ibid.*, 22 May 1954.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 24 November 1953.

¹⁸ In Singapore the PAS registration was not thus far approved by the authority although it was formed two years earlier. See *Ibid.*, 9 May 1954.

CHAPTER VIII

THE THIRD PAS CONFERENCE, TITI SERONG, PARIT BUNTAR, 12-14 AUGUST 1954: FINAL PROCESS OF SELF-IDENTITY

The PAS held its third annual conference at *Madrasat at-Tabdbib ad-Diniyyah*, Titi Serong, Parit Buntar, Perak, on 12-14 August 1954,¹ the first and the last under its three Acting Presidents,² because Dr. Ḥāji 'Abbās was at Mecca. It was officially opened by Datok Muda Ḥāji Ja'far,³ and chaired by 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah. The Acting President's message, read by Muḥammad bin Awang, politically showed little tangible objectives. It reflected that the party had yet to muster support from religious circles as it appealed to the 'ulamā', muftīs, and religious teachers to come forward fighting for the interest of the nation and religion by joining the party. There were unexpressed political motives because the message advocated that the independence should not be preceded by election but, instead, it wanted the sultans' cooperation in demanding that independence and in abrogating their previous treaty with the British.⁴ Also it expressed dissatisfaction with the government appointed members of the Federal legislature.⁵

¹ *U.M.*, 11 August 1954.

² *W.N.*, 12 August 1954

³ *Ibid.*, 13 August 1954. He was an Orang Besar of Kerian District. The branches sending delegates were, Bayan Lepas, Kepala Batas, Pokok Sena, Kubang Semang, Perlis, Bukit Besar, Bandar Baru, Benut, Machang, Pasir Mas, Kuala Lumpur, Bangsar Road, Kerian, Batu 8, Kuala Kurau, Bagan Tiang and Kuala Kurau Coast Road. According to *U.M.* (14 August 1954) 40 delegates attended the conference representing 40 branches.

⁴ There was no report of PAS insistence on this idea.

⁵ *U.M.*, 14 August 1954. The PAS admitted that financial problem was its main weakness.

As distinct from the Acting President's message, the PAS resolutions, passed at the conference, indicated that it approached the Islamic political ideal, at least ideologically, in contrast to other political parties. Its new objectives were to make efforts and take steps for realizing independence of Malaya and of the Islamic *ummah* and to fight for the Islamic aspirations in society and in the administration of state government. According to the ratified constitution, 'the PAS would make an effort to realize an alliance of Islamic brotherhood in order to form a collective force for implementing all Islamic and political requirements based on democracy'. The party would also concentrate all its efforts and powers for realizing a uniform religious administration throughout Malaya in order to safeguard and defend the rightful interest and honour of the Islamic *ummah*; and would make an effort to implement Islamic rules and teachings in the life of individual and society in accordance with Allah's pleasure. It was explicitly stated that, in an effort to attain democracy, justice for the people and humanity, the party wanted to cooperate with other organizations whose policies and objectives were not contrary to the Islamic teachings.⁶

The party Executive Committee took up the responsibility for blazing the trail toward political self-identity. A clear-cut commitment to an independent political movement was taken when it was resolved that the party was to withdraw from National Convention and to support any political organization fighting for the independence. It was also decided that the party was to have its own publication.⁷ In this process, the party might be expected to involve itself in the electoral struggle and this was exactly what the party decided⁸ — a decision which would create further split in Malay politics.

⁶ See *Ibid.*

⁷ Proposed by the party Executive Committee, this resolution was unanimously accepted by the conference. See *Ibid.*, 17 August 1954: W.N., 15 August 1954.

⁸ W.N., 15 August 1954. The other resolutions were to urge the government to make Malay and English as the first and second languages respectively, to sponsor

The new officers elected at the conference were Dr. Hāji 'Abbās from Kuala Lumpur, Aḥmad Awang from Province Wellesley, 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah from Telok Anson as the new party President, Deputy President and Vice-President respectively. Hāji Aḥmad Tuan Ḥusin from Province Wellesley retained his previous post as party Treasurer. The eight Executive Committee members were Hāji Muḥammad Nūr from Kuala Lumpur, Hāji Zabīdī 'Alī from Province Wellesley, Hāji 'Abd Allah Akin from Kuala Lumpur, Hāji Aḥmad bin Hāji 'Alī from Bagan Datok, Hāji Maṣṣūr J.P. from Penang, Hāji Ḥasan 'Adlī from Bagan Datok, Hāji Aḥmad Long from Perlis and Che Muḥammad Daud bin Hāji Sāleh from Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Hāji Aḥmad Mālikī was the party 'Permanent Chairman', while Che Aḥmad Maḥfūz 'Alī and Che Isma'īl Maḥmūd were party Auditors.*

The third PAS conference had revealed that its disagreement with the UMNO on the liberalization of franchise was a major starting point of a prolonged clash between the two Malay parties. No matter who caused the split among the Malays or the Malays 'crumbled' themselves, the fact remained that Datok Onn left the UMNO because of favouring non-Malay political consideration and then the UMNO let the PAS go mainly because of the same reason. The PAS seemed to be not an immediate political challenger to the UMNO and one of the latter's main concerns was Datok Onn's new party, the *Parti Negara*. However the PAS was behaving in such a way that its open clash with the UMNO was inevitable. When the Vice-President of the PAS branch of Kota Bharu, Kelantan,

collecting donation for Muslim College for one week duration, to urge the College to prepare syllabus for all religious schools throughout Malaya, to compose party anthem, and finally to arrange courses for PAS officers from every branch. The conference ended with a solemnisation by which party officers performed *bai'ab* by expressing pledge of allegiance to the party new leader, Dr. Hāji 'Abbās. See *U.M.*, 16 August 1954. *Bai'ab*, known as investiture of a caliph, signifies a mutual resolution on the part of both the ruler and the ruled to abide by the provisions of the *shari'ab*. See Muḥammad 'Azīz Aḥmad, *The Nature of Islamic Political Theory*, Karachi, 1975, p. 81.

* See *U.M.*, 16 August 1954; *W.N.*, 15 August 1954. The names of those party officers were spelled differently in both dailies.

Muhammad Daud, said that the question of Islamic *ummah* had distinguished the PAS from other political parties, he implied that 'the wealth and development in Malaya did not benefit the Malays'.¹⁰ Similarly, Muhammad 'Asri, the Acting PAS Secretary, expressed the same view in broad terms: the PAS was fighting for the realization of an independent Islamic state and for the betterment of the Malay nation.¹¹

The expression of such basic ideological elements apparently did not cause any immediate negative response from other parties. But when the PAS, from its ideological standpoint, developed an indirect criticism against the UMNO an outburst from the latter might be expected. When a circular of Kota Bharu PAS, Kelantan, stated that the party was an Islamic political organization without mixing up itself with the non-Malay race and had the objective of establishing an independent state and Islamic *ummah*, the UMNO must feel the intention of the Kota Bharu PAS. Furthermore the UMNO must be shocked by the circular's implicit reference that the Malays with their Islamic religion had been undermined by foreign element which would create a Malayan nation; and the Malay could not take refuge in the 'infidel'.¹² In its vehement reaction the UMNO regarded the circular as a propaganda to bring hatred to the UMNO and was pro-colonial.¹³

By 1955 the PAS was clearly going on its own way without associating itself with other political parties, even though it was accused of being a propaganda instrument for another party.¹⁴ Such a development of self-identity had drawn the attention of some Muslim intellectuals who found in the PAS an appropriate vehicle through which they could express

¹⁰ *U.M.*, 25 September 1954.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7 October 1954.

¹² *Ibid.*, 4 and 9 October 1954; *Merdeka*, 1 October 1954.

¹³ *Merdeka*, 1 October 1954.

¹⁴ *Malaya Merdeka*, 23 June 1955. The first UMNO magazine was *Suaru UMNO* and it was successively followed by *Merdeka* and *Malaya Merdeka*.

their minds and an ideological party to fight for. Ustādh Dhulkiflī Muḥammad was a notable example and was considered as one of the party ideologues and the brain behind its development.¹⁵

It seemed that the last process of assuming its self-identity was when the party was inundated by the former PKM, API and HM activists, such as Muḥammad 'Aṣrī,¹⁶ Baḥar ud-Dīn Laṭīf, 'Uthmān Ḥamzah, and Aḥmad 'Azam. Their devotion to the party had great influence upon its growth. This was markedly obvious when Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn joined it on 14 December 1956¹⁷ and was elected as its President in its annual conference at Kuala Lumpur on 23–25 December 1956.¹⁸ He was followed later by former PKM activists of high rank such as Muḥammad Tahā Kalu and 'Abd Allah Zawāwī.¹⁹ The latter was the party Secretary before his death in 1969.

Finally, the *Persatuan Islām Se Malaya* (PAS)²⁰ was registered by the Registrar of Societies as the Pan-Malayan Islamic

¹⁵ His name appeared prominently when he contested on PAS ticket in the 1955 Federal election and later became the party Deputy President.

¹⁶ According to Muḥammad 'Aṣrī he was repeatedly persuaded by 'Uthmān 'Abd Allah to join the PAS, and finally agreed upon condition that the party objectives must be changed to be more Islamic. Interview with Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, 4 May 1974. (hereafter 'Aṣrī)

¹⁷ Saleha Haji Hassan, 'Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Hulaimi: The Ideals of a Malay Nationalist', *Malaysia History*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Kuala Lumpur 1974.

¹⁸ Two contestants for the party presidency, Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn and Ustādh Zulkiflī Muḥammad. The former obtained 85 votes and the latter 12 and four votes were invalid. See Amaluddin Darus, p. 93.

¹⁹ It is interesting to note that the Alliance secret weapon in the final hours of the 1959 Federal election campaign was the distribution of the reproduced PKM top leaders' letter, dated 1 May 1950, which stated that Ibrāhīm bin Ḥājī Yaakob was authorized to continue the Malay nationalist movement outside Malaya. The letter, *Surat Kuasa Penob* (A Letter of Full Authorization), reproduced and printed by P.L., Kuala Lumpur, was signed by Muḥammad Tahā Kalu, 'Abd Allah Zawāwī and Dr. Burhā ud-Dīn as Acting President, General Secretary and Supreme Adviser of the PKM respectively. See the letter and Amaluddin Darus, pp. 123–128.

²⁰ See *infra*, p. 26.

Party (PMIP) one day before the nomination day²¹ (15 June 1955) for the first Federal election held on 27 July 1955.²² The name *Persatuan Islām Se Malaya* was amended in the party conference on 25–27 December 1958 to *Persatuan Islām Se Tanah Melayu – PAS*²³ (Pan-Malay Land Islamic Union). However, the initials of the English version, i.e. PMIP, remained unchanged. It was finally amended in 1971 to *Parti Islām Se Malaysia – PAS*²⁴ (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and now it is commonly called *Parti Islām Malaysia – PAS* (the Islamic Party of Malaysia).

²¹ According to Ustādh 'Uthmān Ḥamzah, the PAS 'Ulamā' Secretary; cf. Gordon P. means, p. 254, n. 2.

²² T.E. Smith, *Report on the First Election of Members of the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya*, Kuala Lumpur, 1955, pp. 16–17.

²³ 'Rengkasian Keputusan Mesyuarat Agung PAS Yang Ke-17, Disember 25–27, 1958,' Kuala Lumpur.

²⁴ According to Ustādh 'Uthmān Ḥamzah.

PART II
THE PAS IDEOLOGY

CHAPTER IX

IDEOLOGY : A COMPARATIVE REVIEW*

The emergence of an ideology is the result of a process of interaction between man and his environment. Ideology reflects the expression and synthesis of events and of man's experiences. The environment, natural or cultural, provides the matter which forms and shapes man's mind. The cultural environment produces a relatively greater immediate impact upon man's mind than does the natural one. In other words, 'the materials for man's explanations may be said to lie in two places: in the part of the culture . . . and in himself.'¹ However, the relationship between man and his environment is observable by the fact that man is able to form a subjective image of the things lying outside his immediate physical and sensual contact. That is to say that man 'thinks of foreign places,' and that the image he has of the unknown 'out there', or of strangeness in people and places, all give direction to his thought.² Man's spontaneous reactions will be more obvious in relation to his immediate physical or cultural environment. Such reactions are not only spontaneous. They also enable him to think creatively. There is a close relation between matter, observably existing things, and sensation, man's experience of being immediately aware of existing things, in the process of his thinking.³ Man is able to see and perceive events occurring within the environment. Thus mat-

*A part of this Chapter was published in the *Islamiyat*, Vol. II, 1979. The writer republishes it here, with permission, without change.

¹ Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology*, New York, 1962, p. 310.

² *Ibid.*, p. 295.

³ Cf. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, 1974, pp. 1-6.

ter or events are the raw materials for man's thinking. But man's ability to think about the causes and effects or to teleologically formulate a concrete ideology differs in one individual and the next.

All these three elements, i.e. man's rationality, his environment and the subjective image, are the basic factors determining the behaviour or action of man. These are also the basis for the development of man's thinking which may be expressed in different ways. In other words, the expression of thought is characterised by the nature of his knowledge. Thus events or experiences can be expressed and explained politically or sociologically. It is at this point that Converse's definition of 'political ideologies as belief systems characterised by high constraint, great ranges and centrality of political items,'⁴ seems to be comprehensive. Events in human life can be transformed into a concrete form of ideological expression. The ideology normally produces several consequences, in the sense that 'the ideology of a society shapes its social and political institutions.'⁵ Thus to a greater extent, the interaction takes the form of a movement in a circle, the starting point is the environment, events or experiences which influence man's creative thinking. Then man creates the ideology or belief system based on these events or experiences. However, the ideology will in turn influence the environment, events or experiences. The constraint may be taken to mean the success we have in predicting, given initial knowledge, that an individual holds a specific attitude, or that he holds certain further ideas.⁶

If the explanation of the term ideology, as stated above, appears to be too general and comprehensive, Maurice Du-

⁴ Philip E. Converse's, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,' quoted by Richard M. Merelman, 'The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization,' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIII, No. 3, September 1969, p. 750.

⁵ Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology*, p. 439.

⁶ Converse quoted by Richard M. Merelman, p. 751.

verger's explanation seems to be more precise. For him 'ideologies are systems of ideas, of opinions and beliefs.'⁷

The whole structure of ideology is, therefore, based on events occurring in man's life. Man's life is not free from problems or needs which must be solved or satisfied. This is the area in which lies the inevitable relationship between man's problems or needs and the possibility of their being respectively solved and satisfied. Ideologies are an attempt, at least in this sense, at providing a means or, to a certain extent, to express all these situations. This similarly indicates that the creator of ideas, forms and techniques works under the pressure of social needs on the other hand, the fate of his work depends on the welcome given to it by society: between the two occurs the mysterious alchemy of individual creation.⁸ Not all men can create ideologies and not all ideologies can produce ideologies of similar shape or form and effect. The reason is simply that there are different abilities of, and different social or political responses from, different individuals or nations. The influence of Marxism in Russia differs in its nature and degree from that of Montesquieu's 'Separation of Power' in the United States of America. Viewed in this light, the ideologists are the builders, the architects who gather materials for erecting the ideological edifice out of realities, events and social forces taking place within man and his environment.⁹

In relation to this, one may distinguish between ideology and myth as commonly understood. As two principal categories, the former consists of more rational, formulated beliefs. The latter is based on irrational beliefs, which are more spontaneous.¹⁰ Both can, however, be grouped into what is called a belief system of one kind or another.

⁷ Maurice Duverger, *The Idea of Politics*, (tr. by Robert North and Ruth Murphy), London, 1971, p. 74.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Idem*, *The Study of Politics*, (tr. by Robert Wagoner), London, 1974, p. 96.

The preceding discussion is an attempt at tracing the distinction between ideologies as commonly understood and the way the Muslims look at and understand their 'religion'. Applied to non-Western countries, the generalization of political events which is based on Western norms and experiences appears to result in either exaggeration or distortion, even to the eyes of some scholars trained in the West. This is not to question the validity of that method of judgement, but to take into serious account or consideration the cultural set-up, the standard of values and the ways of response, for example, among the peoples in Asia. Such a state of affairs is expressed by M.S. Agwani another way:

Until not very long ago political science derived its generalization from norms and processes peculiar to the Western experience. As the political scientist extends his scope to systems other than Western, the inadequacy of these generalizations becomes increasingly evident. Thus it can no longer be maintained that all modernizing political systems are marching toward a single goal represented by the 'Western' model. As Organaki put it: 'The world is not marching toward monogamy, Christianity, free enterprise, and two party government . . .'. In other words, while all modernizing and modern political systems have some common properties, each one of them possesses distinctive characteristics derived from its cultural tradition and modes of acculturation.¹¹

Based on Western experience and standards of judgement one thing is evident: ideology does not convey the same meaning to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. When ideology is generally understood as the product of man's mind or the formulation of thought based on the interaction between man and his environment, the Muslims understand their 'religion' as having been revealed by God. By saying that Islām is an ideology or that there is an Islamic ideology, does

¹¹ M.S. Agwani, 'Religion and Politics in Egypt', *International Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September, 1974, pp. 385-386.

not mean for the Muslims that they have created the ideology or that the ideology has been the product of their minds. What they believe is that they have a role to play. This role is partly to translate or make the 'words' of God clear to common understanding, as well as to interpret and organize them into an orderly system. So the 'ulamā' (scholars) are those who are supposed to understand and explain God's revelation and the Tradition of the Prophet (*Ḥadīth*).

Metaphysically this is derived from one basic principle, the belief in a Perfect Being Who is the creator and sustainer of nature,^{1 2} without which the whole system regulating the material and spiritual life of Muslims becomes meaningless. Thus man has to conduct an Islamic life in this world in order to ensure salvation in the life hereafter. This is, however, the general feature, because the Muslims believe that Islām embraces all aspects of human life including what is termed the secular or mundane. That is to say that there is no separation between worldly and religious affairs. Obviously this kind of thinking is especially applicable in the field of Islamic political thought. The Muslims, therefore, do not accept the notion that Islām is religion as understood in the West, i.e. a religion which is concerned with private affairs and man's relation with the Supreme Being. The Muslims believe 'that Islām is something more than a creed, it is also a community, a nation, and the interests of the individual as a unit are subordinate to the interests of the community as an external symbol of Islamic principle'.³ A more elaborate exposition of this sort of thinking is expressed by Moḥd. 'Azīz Aḥmad:

No other religion is so misrepresented and misinterpreted as Islām, yet it survives by virtue of its purity, vitality, and clarity of fundamentals, 'Islām is religion' is the general view, and 'religion is politics.' Religion and politics cannot be separated in Islām. A true Muslim is shocked to think

^{1 2} Stephen Körner, *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, Middlesex, 1973, p. 170.

³ Alama Iqbal, *Islām as a Moral and Political Idea*, Karachi, (n.d.), p. 24.

in terms of religion and politics; he only thinks in terms of Islām. Islām is not only a religion or a name for beliefs or certain forms of worship, it is, in fact, a way of life — a complete code for the guidance of the individual's entire life The Holy Qur'an lays down the broad principles of life, the details came from the Prophet. Islām is all-embracing in its nature and affects all aspects of human activity, of the people, of the country and of humanity . . .¹⁴

However, this is not to say that there is no contradiction of thought among the Muslims. There is a diametrical contradiction. Evidently this is the effect of Western influence which has produced a different form of thinking. It is adhered to by Muslim intellectuals who are called 'secularists.' If the impact of Western influence has given rise to 'reformism' in Islām, Islamic 'secularism' is its other aspect. Although the latter has attracted some followers, especially in the Arab world in its early growth, its influence is comparatively limited. Late developments indicate that the majority of Muslim intellectuals do not deny the existence of the political aspect of Islām. What they question is its applicability to the life of modern men. The most outstanding figure among the Muslim secularists is an Egyptian, 'Alī 'Abd ar-Rāziq. Unlike the reformist, the secularist lays greater emphasis on the negative political aspect of Islām. Their attempt is generally to reduce the role of Islām to the purely 'religious' sphere as understood in the West. According to 'Alī 'Abd ar-Rāziq, the political institutions or specifically 'the Caliphate is no part of religious plans political matters do not concern religion, but they are matters of reason judgement and experience.'¹⁵ From this premise he arrives at the conclusion that there is nothing in religion to prevent Muslim from competing with other nations in the political

¹⁴ Mohd, Aziz Ahmad, 'The Nature of Islamic Political Theory,' *Islamic Culture*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1943, p. 39.

¹⁵ Mohammed Aboulkhair Zaki, 'Modern Muslim Thought in Egypt and Its Impact on Islam in Malaya,' unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1965, p.337.

and social sciences generally, and from destroying this ancient system by which they have been humbled and to which they have succumbed, and from building the bases of their kingdom and the organization of their movement upon the most modern beliefs which the human mind has produced.¹⁶ Immediate response to this kind of thinking, coming from as far as Indonesia, is as obvious as its failure to influence substantial numbers of Muslim intellectuals. Indignant at such thoughts, Rashid Riḍā depicted it as 'a modern innovation, the like of which no claimant of Islām in truth' has ever encountered and 'it is a devilish innovation which never crossed the mind of a Sunnī, Shī'ī, Khārijī, Jahmī or Mu'tazilī'.¹⁷

In addition to the reformists and the secularists there is another group in contemporary Islamic world which is occupying a middle position. Its characteristics vary according to place and time, exhibiting different degrees and nature of effects brought about by Western influence. The views of the members of this group are more or less a reflection of the impact of Marxism. For them Islām is interpreted in general terms, allowing a sort of incorporation of some foreign elements into it. Of many examples, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) can be cited as a good one. This party does not disregard the ethical value of Islām, although its expressed goal is that of a classless society, i.e. equality of citizens and fraternity under the rule of democracy in an order based on economic and social justice.¹⁸ Even with such a stigma as that of Marxist influence, the PPP still confesses to strive 'to put into practice the noble ideals of the Muslim faith'.¹⁹

This is a typical, not exceptional, feature of a political party all over the Muslim world which claims to adhere to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Eqbal Ahmad, 'Pakistan—Signposts to a Police State,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1974, f.n. 2. It is an excerpt from 1970 Election Manifesto of the PPP.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Islamic socialism.²⁰ However, this claim is neither acceptable to, nor reaches a common ground with, the 'reformists' or 'traditionalists'. Thus Islamic socialism has been characterised by the 'traditionalists' as 'a new edition of Islam some of whose components have been taken from Islām and some from socialism . . . a synthetic mixture which deceives the Muslim people.'²¹

As asserted earlier, there is a common assumption that the ramifications of thought among the Muslim intellectuals is only a reaction of one form or another to Western civilization. It ranges from a total rejection of Islam, which is not discussed here, to the re-evaluation of Islamic political theory and institutions with strict adherence to the traditional standards of value and judgements. In the light of this it is quite possible to see the nature of the PAS ideology in relation to its counterparts in the other countries of the Muslim world.

→ The PAS ideology is influenced by the Islamic movements in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt. It is, therefore, quite relevant to briefly look into the origin of modern Islamic political movements. It is commonly known that such movements were introduced into Egypt firstly in the form of study of Islamic philosophers at a time when the country was under Western domination.²² In this situation the time was ripe to try to find an *indigenous* ideology that could bring about the reform and strength that the intellectuals desired.²³ Beginning with an overall re-examination of Islamic thought, those intellectuals had mostly become 'reformists' with certain aims and objectives. In the later stages of its development it took the form of a political movement which had its own political philosophy presented in the form of a new interpretation of Islamic political theory

²⁰ Anwar Husain Syed, *China and Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente Cordial*, the University of Massachusetts Press, 1974, p. 197.

²¹ Sayyid Maudoodi, *Come Let Us Change This World*, (compiled and tr. by Kaukab Siddique,) Karachi, 1971, p. 54.

²² Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, California, 1968, p. 18.

²³ *Ibid.* The italics are in the original.

and institutions. All these were contributive to the rise of some of the modern Islamic political parties all over the Muslim world, particularly in the Malay archipelago. From the ideological point of view, the idea that Islām is a complete code for the entire individual life or 'rather a comprehensive way of life, spiritually or materially,'²⁴ is inherent to those movements. This was also expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood, the modern Islamic political party, dissolved by the late President Nāsir, in the following way:

We believe the provision of Islām and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs of the people in this world and the hereafter. And those who think that these teachings are concerned only with spiritual or ritualistic aspects are mistaken in this belief because Islām is a faith and a ritual, a nation (*watan*) and a nationality, a religion and a state, the spirit and deed, holy text and sword . . . The Glorious Qur'ān . . . considers (these things) to be the core of Islām and its essence . . .²⁵

Modern Islamic political thought embodies a new form of expression intelligible to the modern mind. The expression that the Caliphate substitutes for the Law-giver, in as much as it serves like the latter to preserve the religion and to exercise leadership in worldly affairs,²⁶ has been replaced by modern phraseology such as:

Internationalism, nationalism, socialism, capitalism, bolshevism, war, the distribution of wealth, the relation between producers and consumers, and whatever is related to these topics . . . which have occupied the leaders of nation and philosophers of society – all of these, we believe

²⁴ Dr. Sa'īd Ramadān, *Islām a Liberating Force*, MISG Series No. 3, London, (n.d.) Dr. S. Ramadān was one of the former leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.

²⁵ Excerpted from the Muslim Brotherhood official publication: 'al-Mu'tamar al-khāmis,' quoted by Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, London, 1969, pp. 232–233.

²⁶ Ibn Khaldūn, *Lesson from History*. Karachi, (n.d.), p. 31.

Islām has penetrated to the core. Islām established for the world the system through which man can benefit from the good and avoid dangers and calamities.²⁷

Islamic political theory is essentially based on the Qur'ān, *Hadith* and the historical evidence of the Well-guided Caliphs (*Khulafā' ar-Rāshidīn*). The medieval Muslim scholars who profoundly analysed Islamic political theory and institutions, such as al-Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn etc., laid special emphasis on the question of political authority. Without disregarding certain qualifications, modern Islamic political theory is, therefore, a new expression of the old, and is the result of an adjustment to modern political conditions.

A proper examination of the PAS ideology cannot, therefore, be made in isolation from these developments. It is a chain of reaction, either in terms of space or time. The political movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, with its political thought, was founded in Egypt and it generated other Islamic political movements in the Muslim world. But the PAS ideology is not only influenced by Egypt, because the *Jama'ati Islami*, an Islamic political party of Pakistan, and *Mashumi* an Indonesian Islamic political party (now defunct) have also influenced the PAS. Because of this the PAS forms part of a universal reaction in the Islamic world. Like many other parties of its kind, it encounters several obstacles appearing in the form of conflict between its political ideals and the realities of the changing political situation.²⁸ So long as the PAS claims itself to be an Islamic political party, it may be looked upon as a religious party, which by its very nature is primarily concerned with religious issues and will draw its adherents from as many sections of the population as are to be found among the actively interested members of this par-

²⁷ Excerpted from the Muslim Brotherhood official publication: 'Ila ayy Shay' Nad'u al-Nās,' quoted by Richard P. Mitchell, p. 233.

²⁸ Cf. Clive S. Kessler, 'Islām, Society and Political Behaviour: Some Comprehensive Implication of Malay Case,' *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23, No. 1, March, 1972, p. 33.

ticular faith.²⁹ This social fact shapes the type of tension or conflict which will determine the party's survival or the nature of its existence in Malaysian politics.

Any political party is confronted by opponents or rivals. The PAS is facing a special situation as the result of internal strife between the Muslims themselves. Broadly speaking, the Muslims in Malaysia can be located in two camps, as is uniformly the case everywhere, i.e. those who adhere to Western norms and values and those who adhere to Islamic moral or political values. The influence of Islamic reformism and of revolutionaries of the Muslim Brotherhood is evident. Generally it is the conflict between Western-educated and Islamic-educated Malays. Though the former still profess themselves as Muslims, at least in name, and identify themselves with Malay culture, most of them are influenced by, and cling to, Western social values as well as political ideas and systems. Some of them have feudal or aristocratic origins. They served in the colonial administration during the British rule and they took over political power when the British left Malaya in 1957. Thus their ascendancy in Malaysian politics was the result of a long process. Their education and position enabled them to understand and to deal with the colonial government on the basis of political bargaining. While these products of the West were gradually gaining political control, the Islamic-educated Malays demanded that Islām should form the basis of the political system. Needless to say this entails an apparently endless dispute. There is also an external conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims which appears to have caused a different kind of impact. It is responsible for producing feelings of 'communalism' among the Malay-Muslims and the non-Malay non-Muslims such as the Chinese and Indians. However, if the external conflict is allowed to exist and develop, it will have more disastrous consequences for the political survival of the country. Thus broadly speaking, the external rivalry is that

²⁹ Cf. Scott D. Johnston, 'Religious Politics and Parties in Israel,' R.K. Sakai (Ed.), *Studies on Asia*, University of Nebraska Press, 1963, p. 139.

which exists between Malays and non-Malays and is concealed beneath the surface of political development, whereas the internal one takes the form of the PAS-UMNO confrontation.

CHAPTER X

MALAY NATIONALISM

From the characteristics described in the preceding pages, the PAS, to a certain extent, can be considered as a religious party because it is fighting for the supremacy of the religion of Islām. If Islām, as understood by the PAS itself, is taken into consideration then it is more than a religious party. It has the characteristics of an ideological or doctrinal party in which a group or, with some exceptions, the whole party rank and file stands for definite principles or doctrines and seeks to put these into effect in the government and administration.¹ Even if Islām is regarded from a purely religious aspect, the party's Malay nationalism has its own meaning and definition which falls within the scope of an ideology. This type of nationalism does not qualify the party to be characterised as a special interest party which aims at upholding or advancing the particular interest of a particular group of people,² because, as can be seen later, Malay nationalism applies to any person irrespective of racial origin.

The issue of Malay nationalism is relatively under-emphasised in the party's earlier constitution. In the English Version Constitution (EVC), there are two sub-rules (of Rule Two) which respectively state that the aims of the PAS are to re-establish, strive for, maintain and defend the rights of the sons of the soil, and secondly to strive for the achievement of, to implement and to maintain, a healthy political justice for the country and the people with the adoption of Malay as the sovereign official national language and with the obser-

¹ Cf. Samuel A. Johnson, *Political Science*, New York, 1971, p. 173.

² *Ibid.*, p. 174.

vation of the characteristic Malay national culture unopposed to Islām.³ Even though the party's constitution has been amended several times the elements of Malay nationalism are retained. The party Constitution of 1973 has, however, been adjusted to the changing political situation, indicating basically the effects of 'May 13, 1969' and the formation of the Coalition government in January 1973 in which the PAS acted as a partner. In this Constitution, it is stated that the party's objectives are 'to defend in practice the Malay language as a single national and official language, to fight for the existence of national culture based on Malay culture which is not opposed to the Islamic teachings, and to fight for realizing the aspiration of racial harmony in the country, for the rights and interests of the Malay nation and of the indigenous people.'⁴

Malay nationalism, as expressed by the PAS, had evolved through three stages in its historical development.⁵ During the time of Ḥāji Ahmad Fū'ad's leadership, Malay nationalism did not assume a concrete form. Even the party's ideology as a whole was not clear. Party's objectives were very trivial in the political sense.⁶ Ideological crystallization began after the former PKM and HM activists had been involved in the party, especially after Dr. Ḥāji 'Abbās's takeover of the party's leadership. The climax of nationalistic expression was reached in 1956 when Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn was elected the PAS new President. It was apparently because of the possibility of expressing some aspects of the PKM ideology through the PAS that Dr. Burhān un-Dīn had accepted the leadership of the party.

The re-emergence of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn in Malayan politics was marked by his repeated ideological articulation and by

³ The PAS Constitution, (English Version) Rule 2:2 and 6. (hereafter EVC). The word 'rule' here is equivalent to the word article.

⁴ Constitution (of 1973), Rule 2:3 (7, 8 and 9).

⁵ Special emphasis is given in this section when the party was under Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn.

⁶ 'Asri.

his re-adjustment to the changing political situation. Islām and nationalism were regarded as compatible. According to this PAS leader they were mutually dependent. Due to certain social and historical factors, Islamic ideals could be realized on the basis of Malay nationalism.

This is not to say that Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn was predominantly preoccupied with Islām when he became PAS leader. Islām and Malay nationalism had already formed the main cornerstone of his political thinking long before he became involved in the PAS. He believed that Islām regarded nationalism as a means, not an end,⁷ and that there was no contradiction between Islām and Malay nationalism.⁸ Thus his Malay nationalism was envisaged from an Islamic point of view. According to him the Quranic verses such as '... and We made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other,' and 'Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you,'⁹ are evidences of the Islamic recognition of the existence of nations, and of the hostility of Islām toward communalism or fanaticism (*ta'aşşub*).¹⁰ Such nationalism would also be composed of the feelings of humanity and international fraternity (internationalism).¹¹ By expressing these ideas in the PAS, he was not at odds with the party or ideologically estranged, because what he was expressing was in harmony with the goals of the PAS.

The moment he had become party leader, Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn delivered a lengthy speech outlining the ideological basis for the PAS. At the outset he distinguished three forces emerging at the same time and fighting for independence

⁷ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, Bukit Mertajam, 1954, p. 44.

⁸ *Idem*, *Sejarah Perjuangan Kita*, Penang, 1955, p. 40.

⁹ *Qur'ān*, XLIX: 13. The translation of the Quranic verses from now and then is based on *The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary*, by 'Abdullah Yusof 'Ali, Beirut, 1968.

¹⁰ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, p. 54.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

from imperialism. These three forces are nationalism, religion and socialism. All are inseparable and based on the people. According to him the elements of one force exist in the other and *vice-versa*. Therefore the elements of socialism exist in nationalism, because nationalism is basically the consciousness and the ideas for the establishment of a just society for the whole people. Similarly socialism has the elements of nationalism because socialism could not exist without nationalism. As a vanguard, the spirit of nationalism is essential for paving the way toward social independence by which socialism can be established as the final aspiration of nationalism.¹² This method of thinking was also applied to religion. He asserted that the elements of nationalism are also found in religion. For him nationalism is instrumental in establishing a social independence in which the principles of the holy religion are realized. For these reasons there are similarities common to these three forces: anti-colonialism, fighting for independence, for a democratic and sovereign nation.¹³

As a leader of an Islamic political party it is quite surprising that Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn did not express opposition to socialism but rather called for cooperation between the three forces.¹⁴ This attitude is reminiscent of his involvement in the PKM and may support the claim of Aḥmad Boestamam, the former leader of *Parti Rakyat Malaya* (Malaya People's Party), that he and his colleagues had given their approval to Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn before the latter joined the PAS.¹⁵ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn did not, however, identify with the socialist ideology at all times and he could not come to a common ground with the UMNO. His association with the leftist movement served as the only outlet for his anti-colonial

¹² See Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn speech in *Suara Islām* (the PAS official magazine, hereafter *S.I.*), Vol. 1, No. 2, January, 1957, pp. 15-16.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16; cf. R.S. Milne, p. 94.

¹⁵ Aḥmad Boestamam, *Dr. Burbanuddin: Putera Setia Melayu Raya*, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p. 65 (hereafter *Dr. Burbanuddin*).

nationalism. It was not a sign of a real leftist attitude. It is in this sense that his 'intention' to join the PAS in order to influence it with leftist ideas¹⁶ can, if what Aḥmad Boes-tamam said is correct, be understood, because his political thoughts, behaviour and expression were all manifestations of two essential elements, i.e. Malay nationalism and Islām. His involvement in the PKM, as in the case of some former PKM and HM activists such as Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, 'Uthmān Ḥamzah etc., was simply the only effective way to be active in politics at that time.¹⁷

Prior to Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn's takeover of leadership, the Malay nationalism of the PAS was inspired by anti-colonialism with reference to the uncertain political position of the Malays. In other words the party was worried about the future position of the Malays and the 'exclusive' Malay rights over Malaya. With the coming of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, the emphasis altered. His Malay nationalism was not only anti-colonial but also showed aspects of anti-feudalism, anti-capitalism and anti-conservatism. Because of this he incorporated into the PAS another feature of Malay nationalism. This was reflected in his speech at the closing session of the PAS conference in 1956, after his election as the new party President:

The imperialism which we face is not an imperialism from a single country but it characteristically assumes the international pattern. This imperialism has also a national form in the sense that it strengthens and has been strengthened by forces inside the country, i.e. the national reactionary forces, the national feudalists and the national compradores.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁷ 'Aṣrī.

¹⁸ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn Speech, *S.I.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January, 1957, p. 16.

This is an oblique reference to the UMNO and its partners in the Alliance, the MCA and MIC. Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn recognized the UMNO as a symbol of nationalism but his opposition to it was not new. According to him, the weakness of the UMNO lay in the fact that the character of its leaders was 'conservative and feudalistic.'¹⁹ For him the PAS nationalism differed from the UMNO's. The former was partly inspired by PKM elements which were influenced by nationalism with leftist overtones. If the PAS had become a new base for Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, the former had found a new ideologist who could fully express the meaning of Malay nationalism and transmit it through the party to the Malay people. In addition he basically established party tactics and directed the ideological battle against the UMNO. In the same speech he characterised the UMNO as a type of nationalism which could be utilized by imperialism:

The people's nationalism is led by a group of aristocrats within the UMNO in collaboration with a group of Kuo Min Tang capitalists and Indian moneylenders. For their own interest the imperialists find that the nationalist leaders of these kinds are the best tools to be used in facing the genuine aspirations of the people. In this way genuine nationalism can be checked and utilized by the imperialists for the interests of the latter. The UMNO leaders have proved that they themselves can be trusted to guarantee the imperialist interests in this country in the future, because they have shown their ability to compromise.²⁰

The dichotomy of Malay nationalism became very obvious. With this development the ideas of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn basically transformed into an elaborate ideological expression of the PAS and sharpened the antagonism between the two Malay parties. One of the main reasons for this was not due to the UMNO's 'feudal-aristocratic' leadership, but to the fact

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

that the UMNO had accepted the Federation of Malaya Constitution, as a substitute for the Malayan Union's while the content of the former was, according to Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, to provide the means for the political development of Malayan elements, not desired by the Malay nation.²¹ Thus in the eyes of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn and his followers in the PAS, the UMNO leaders were 'traitors to' their 'nation and country'.²² This explicitly meant an outright rejection of the concept of nationalism aspired to by the UMNO. The Malay nationalism of the PAS therefore became a more anti-Malayan nationalism.

As the former leader of the PKM, Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn was the most outstanding Malay nationalist. His switch from the PKM which was considered as a nationalist-leftist party, to a 'religious' party such as the PAS came as surprise to some people who might think that Islām and nationalism were mutually antagonistic. In fact it was the ability of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn to express Malay nationalism in terms of Islām which made him acceptable to the PAS. Of course, the broad notion of nationalism is inherently not thought to be in contradiction to Islām.²³ For the PAS, nationalism is not the content or essence. It is a 'space' to be filled up by the content. This line of argument was taken to justify and clarify the idea of nationalism as expressed by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, as taken up by *Suara Islām*:

Nationalism is . . . not the ultimate aim . . . It is precisely an instrument . . . because nationalism in its basic definition is the conscious desire for the establishment of a just society for the whole people. To fight for the interest of the nation, language and country or to fight for the realization of a just society . . . then such fights are not contrary to the teaching of Islām, because these are not the real meaning of ideology . . . but preliminary for re-

²¹ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, p. 71; cf. p. 3.

²² Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn speech, *S.I.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January, 1957, p. 18.

²³ Cf. *infra*, p. 81.

alizing an ideology (*'aqīdah*). It is on this basis that there are similarities between the PAS and other political ideologies Regarding the method of how we organize and run our independent, democratic and sovereign country, the method as to how to form a just society, Islām has its own stand and views, because the law and prescriptions have already existed and been revealed by God in the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*.²⁴

While this is a general explanation of the meaning of nationalism, Malay nationalism has its own specific meaning. Without pretension, the party expressed it in its publication and public rallies, in a variety of forms and tones, but carrying the same implications. On the whole this had been summed up by the party conference in 1957 which formulated five basic principles for an independent Malaya to be incorporated in the Constitution. Out of these five principles only one was about Islām.

In the first place the party decided that it should be acknowledged that the Malay nation is the rightful owner of Malaya. Secondly, the Malays should be granted special rights. The Constitution should stipulate that not a single interest will be tolerated if it contradicts with the interests of the Malays. Thirdly, Malayan citizenship cannot be conferred on individuals unless conditions have been laid down in advance which guarantee their sincere loyalty to Malaya. The party suggested ways and means to ensure that this citizenship can be withdrawn if there are indications of disloyalty. Fourthly, Islām should be the official religion of the country. According to the party this meant that the Islamic religion (*Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*) should be the guidance for the citizens and government, to be equally applied to all matters. Finally, Malay should immediately be made the national, official language of the country. According to the party this meant that the English language, as an official and second language,

²⁴*S.J.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January, 1957, pp. 3-4.

must be abolished as soon as possible, unless it is beneficial and necessary.²⁵

These five basic principles were seemingly the collective product of the PAS leaders led by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn. The question of the Malay rights in terms of Islām was the main concern of the party and Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn. When Dr. Ḥāji 'Abbās stated that 'Malays are absolutely the rightful owners of Malaya',²⁶ then this was simply in line with what had been written by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn in 1950 that 'anywhere in the world political rights belong only to the sons of the soil and Malaya belongs to the Malays'.²⁷ The concept of Malay rights is, therefore, not new to the PAS. Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn's fame as the most prominent Malay nationalist had made the PAS more dynamic as the champion of Malay rights, thus eclipsing Dato Onn's *Parti Negara* (State Party). Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn's achievement was not essentially that he had introduced this concept into the PAS programme. His contribution lay in the fact that through him the party could fully express this concept, which turned out to have a forceful appeal for the Malays.

It was mainly because of this that the party was accused of being a communal one which developed from the propositions that independence was originally conferred on the basis of an inter-racial agreement between the major races, i.e. the Malays, Chinese and Indians. Any claim of exclusive ownership would imply that non-Malays have no equal political rights in Malaya and that any political development must be based on the consideration of the special interests of the Malays. Thus any party propagating this, will be regarded as dangerously communal.

But from the PAS point of view, such propositions are contradictory to the historical facts. The party does not, however, develop the historical argument further than by stating that the Malays have established their political power

²⁵ See *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 7, June, 1957, pp. 3-4.

²⁶ Dr. Ḥāji 'Abbās speech, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January, 1957, p. 10.

²⁷ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, 'Melayu atau Malayan,' *Qalam*, December, 1950.

long before the coming of the immigrant peoples or before the advent of colonialism. Apart from this the PAS rejects the view that it is a communal party, because it is in fact an ideological party with a membership open to all citizens, irrespective of their racial origins.²⁸ Thus according to the PAS, it is the UMNO which is a racial party²⁹ and it is the politics of the Alliance which is extremely communal,³⁰ because the UMNO, MCA and MIC limit their membership to their respective races only.

Two shortcomings can be detected from the PAS method of argument. Its historical proposition is vague or too general and sometimes rather loose. The party has frequently reiterated the same things without giving its arguments a legal basis. The notion that the Malays have formed the first effective governments in Malaya, that their states have been internationally recognized since the beginning of Malaya history, that the Malays have been the real and original rulers and owners of Malaya, and that there have been international relations among the Malay states, as put forward by the UMNO leader, Dr. Mahathir,³¹ are almost exactly what the PAS has neglected to point out. It seems that Dr. Mahathir, the outstanding figure among the UMNO's 'ultras', has put forward these ideas, some of them of a legal nature, to defend and justify the dominant position of the UMNO in the Alliance government. Such contentions have never been advanced by the PAS and there is no acknowledgement by the PAS that the Malays and their states have achieved a status of international persons³² long before the advent of Europeans in Malaya.

²⁸ See *S.I.*, Vol. I, No. 12, November, 1957, pp. 14-15; *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 11/12, October/November, 1958, p. 26.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 12, November, 1957, p. 15.

³⁰ See *PAS Manifesto for the General Election of 1969*, Kuala Lumpur, (n.d.), p. 4.

³¹ Dr. Mahathir bin Muhammad, *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore, 1970, p. 127.

³² The State as a person of International Law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other States. See D.J. Harris, *Cases and Materials on International Law*, London, 1973, p. 94.

Perhaps the party is of the opinion that such legal arguments are commonly understood and that no further elaboration is necessary.

Secondly, it is doubtless the case that the PAS is fighting for Malay rights. Nonetheless, not all Malays are Muslims. Thus according to this thinking, non-Muslim Malays are also qualified to obtain political rights just like Muslim Malays. If this is to be related to the concept of nationality as advocated by the PAS, then this will be rather more recondite. For the party, Malay rights imply that several requirements should be fulfilled by non-Malays before they can become Malay nationals. Yet, by embracing Malay nationality, a non-Malay is entitled to enjoy rights in a similar way as can the Malays.

When the party demanded that the nationality of the citizens of Malaysia was to be termed 'Malay nationality',³³ as was done by the former party Deputy President, Abū Bakr Ḥamzah, in the Parliament, what was meant was that 'Malay' in this context should not indicate the racial origins or creeds of the individuals concerned. According to him, without being a Malay, a person can have Malay nationality whether he is a Christian, Muslim or anything else.³⁴ For this reason the word 'Malay' in this respect has no literal meaning but is a legal term.³⁵

The influence of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn on this particular point was clearly marked. It seems that this is the exception that this concept of nationality was introduced by him into the party. It was a common knowledge that the PAS was articulating Malay rights. However the concept of Malay nationality was a new element in the PAS programme, remembering the fact that Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn was only the

³³ Abū Bakr Ḥamzah, *Malayu Tidak Boleh Jadi Rupa Bangsa dalam Dewan Rakyat*, Alor Star, (n.d.), pp. 5-9.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9. cf. *S.I.*, Vol. 1, No. 10, September, 1957, p. 4.

³⁵ Abū Bakr Ḥamzah, pp. 8-9.

third successive leader of the party. However the PAS, when compared with the PKM, offered very little explanation about this concept, thus leaving room for various interpretations. The PKM concept of Malay nationality was indicative of the thinking of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn as it was on his insistence that this concept was mentioned in the draft of the People's Constitution of the PUTERA – AMCJA. According to Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, Malay citizenship (*kerakyatan Melayu*) should not be based on race. It should be understood in the context of a nation,³⁶ i.e. any person can be a Malay national provided he is willing to call himself Malay.³⁷ This was similarly stated by him in the *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu (The Philosophy of Malay Nationalism)*:

... any person from any group or nation who breaks up his relationship with the origin of his nationality and gives full loyalty to, and satisfied the condition and requirement of, Malay nationality, will become a Malay national according to the political terms³⁸

But the *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu* is of a rather general character, because the detailed explanation of the concept has been made by the PKM. The term 'Malay', according to the PKM, applies, firstly, to a person who has been born in the Malay archipelago; secondly, to a person who speaks the Malay language; thirdly, to one born outside the Malay archipelago but with parents originating from it. In addition, this person can speak, read and write the Malay language besides acknowledging the Malay nation and identifying himself with the Malay aspirations.³⁹ However, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu* does not base the concept of nationality on a particular creed or ideological commitment, and persons of different

³⁶ Ahmad Boestamam, *Dr. Burhanuddin*, p. 27; cf. *Idem, Merintis Jalan Ke Puncak*, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p. 135 (Hereafter *Merintis*).

³⁷ *Idem, Dr. Burhanuddin*, p. 27.

³⁸ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, pp. 78–79.

³⁹ Muhammad Hanif, Vol. 1, pp. 165–166.

religions and political views can become Malay on condition that they identify themselves with the Malays.⁴⁰

Generally speaking the development of the PAS's Malay nationalism has been in a straight line. It began with the Malay exclusive rights and ended, for the time being, with the concept of Malay nationality. It began with its own vague meaning of Malay nationalism and finally shared the same ideological viewpoint of Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn's PKM. Looking from this point of view the Malay nationalism of the PAS is not much different from that of the PKM, and Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, the leader of both parties at different times, was responsible for putting both on the same footing.

If Malay nationalism as understood by the PAS is to be compared with the contents of Islamic ideology, then it will be quite difficult to reconcile the two. However, according to *Suara Islām* the party's Malay nationalism is limited by its commitment to Islām, or nationalism is subordinated to Islām. Hence Islām and nationalism do not contradict each other. As stated by *Suara Islām*:

Nationality (*kebangsaan*) which is fighting in every field in accordance with the law of Allah and with the aim of implementing all the teachings of Allah, is not opposed to the Islamic teachings, because Islām in principle does not come out in favour of liquidating human nature or the love of one's nation. Islām recognizes the existence of a nation and nations. Islām merely urges all of them to observe the law of Allah and not to be arrogant about one's racial origin.⁴¹

It seems that the party has assumed that nationalism can be based on principles in accordance with Islām.

Relevant to this and with regard to Malaya, the party classifies three types of nationalist groups. Firstly, there is the group of rightist nationalists who are pro-imperialist.

⁴⁰ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, p. 74.

⁴¹ *S.I.*, Vol. III, No. 1, December, 1958, p. 27.

Secondly, there are leftist nationalists, who are pro-socialist and communist. Between these two are the moderate nationalists, i.e. the Malay nationalists. According to the party, the Malay nationalists are the progressive ones whose aims are in harmony with the principles of the PAS struggle.⁴² From Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn's point of view, these progressive nationalists are in the middle, *aṣ-ṣirāt al-mustaqīm*: the straight way.⁴³ This idea was originally laid down by him in the *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu* which states that the guide is the Qur'ān and the way is *aṣ-ṣirāt al-mustaqīm*⁴⁴. If the progressive Malay nationalists occupy the position of the 'straight way,' a Quranic phrase, then they are the Muslims who fight for Islām. Perhaps that is why Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn and his party equated the Malay nation with the concept of Islamic *ummah* (community). According to him the logic would indicate that, as an Islamic *ummah*, the Malay nation should adopt Islām as its ideology.⁴⁵ Both for Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn and the party, this was the method for identifying Malay nationalism with Islām, in which the interests of one relate to the interests of others. Similarly if the Malay nationalist movements attain political power, Islām will rise and if the Malays fail, it means conversely that Islām will fail.⁴⁶

Almost all the arguments, which Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn and his party advanced, were directed partly against the principles which were detrimental, according to the PAS, to the Malay nationalism which was originally fought for by most Malays. Thus in the mind of the PAS leaders the concept of 'Malayan' is diametrically opposed to Malay nationalism. According to

⁴² The PAS President speech, 'Perjuangan Kita Menghadapi Tahun Merdeka,' *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 10, September, 1957, p. 10.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Qur'ān, 1:6.

⁴⁴ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, p. 53; cf. Qur'ān, 1:6.

⁴⁵ The PAS President speech, 'Perjuangan Kita Menghadapi Tahun Merdeka,' *S.L.* Vol. I, No. 10, September, 1957, p. 22.

⁴⁶ The PAS President speech in the Seventh PAS General Meeting (GM), *Ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 2 and 3, January and February, 1959, pp. 8-9.

the party, the word 'Malayan' implies an amalgamation of various races, among which is the Malay race, from which a new nation would come into being. Therefore according to the PAS the Malay nationality (*kebangsaan Melayu*) as a nation (*sbu'ib*), cannot possibly be changed into a Malayan nation, thus transforming the Malay nationality into a race (*qaum*).⁴⁷

Malay nationalism, as generally expressed by the PAS, does not end at this stage. It is the first step toward what is termed as *Melayu Raya* (Greater Malay). This is expressed by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn in his books, writings and speeches. According to him the Malay peninsula is the *Melayu Kechil* (Smaller Malay).⁴⁸ This also implies that Indonesia and the Philippine Islands are *Melayu Kechil*. The party, particularly through Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, asserted that all these Malay states originally formed a single political entity which 'had been separated and divided in appearance by the imperialists but which were one in spirit.'⁴⁹ Seen from this viewpoint, therefore, *Melayu Raya* is a single state stretching from the Isthmus of Kra to New Guinea, and from Sumatra to the Philippines, uniting all Malay races in the region.⁵⁰ This idea was adopted by the PAS, especially when the party opposed the formation of Malaysia. This opposition was made, in part, because the newly proposed Federation of Malaysia, was not considered to be a step toward a *Melayu Raya*, but as a danger to the Malays. As an alternative the party suggested the new concept of 'Maphilindo,' i.e. a state consisting of Malaya, Philippines and the Indonesia and all the entire Malay archipelago.⁵¹

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁸ Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, *Falsafat Kebangsaan Melayu*, p. 87.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Saliha Haji Hassan, p. 7.

⁵¹ Cf. Dhulkiflī Muḥammad's three-hour speech in the Parliament on 12 August 1963. The text of his speech was circulated in cyclostyled form by the PAS headquarters.

CHAPTER XI

ISLĀM AS AN IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THE PAS

As an ideological or doctrinal party, the PAS believes in a certain ideology or doctrine by which the party differentiates itself from other political parties, and which basically influences its behaviour and actions. The most common features of ideological expression of the party are based on Islām. Islām is its ultimate aim. Any action must be justified by the doctrine of this religion. Any response to any political change must be looked at, and studied from, the Islamic political point of view. Generally its acceptance or objection in any political bargain is based on the consideration of whether or not it is justifiable according to Islamic principles and then whether or not it is politically advantageous.

As Islām is the basis of its ideology, the party has its own understanding and interpretation of this 'religion'. The party looks at Islām as an organic whole. It means that the PAS believes in all the teachings of Islām and adopts them as its complete ideology. It does not believe in parts but in the totality, i.e. all aspects of the Islamic teachings such as politics, economy, social values etc. From this point of view the PAS differs from the UMNO. If the UMNO leaders claim, for instance, that they are Muslims, this implies that Islām for the UMNO is limited to certain aspects. However, if the PAS leaders claim that they are fighting for Islām, it means that they are fighting for the realization of Islamic teachings not only in the field of worship but also in that of politics, economy etc.

As this is a total ideological commitment, the party expresses or explains its ideology according to its understanding of Islām, which is mostly based on textual evidences (*nuşûş*).

Thus reference to the Qur'ān and *Hadīth* are quite common in the party statements.

In the first place the party sees the cosmos as an objective reality. The entire creation, including man himself, is the reality of the universe. In general terms, this idea has been expressed by Iqbal as follows: 'Islām looks upon the universe as a reality, and consequently recognizes it as reality.'¹ The entire creation, according to the party, does not exist by coincidence, it has been created by God, and is possessed by Him.² Thus the party believes in the 'revealed' religions and the existence of Supreme Being Who has unlimited authority over His creation. The existence of the world and of the variety of natural resources are for man's benefit.³ According to Budiman Rāḍī, former Vice-Chairman of the PAS Youth Section, natural resources are part of the pre-destined right (*ḥaq azalī*) which has been bestowed by God upon man and therefore no man has the right to deprive others of them.⁴ Evidently this view is based on the Quranic verse, 'O ye people! Eat what is on earth, lawful and good; do not follow the footsteps of evil one, for he is to you an avowed enemy'.⁵ In this way the party regards the universe as a natural phenomenon and man as part of it. It is the natural right of man to make use of what he has in the universe.

This is the way in which the party looks into the creation with particular reference to the world in which man lives, a view which has nothing to do with such things as the theory of the origin of the universe. With regard to man himself the party provides its own explanation, for it does not concern itself with the general theory of the origin of man. It believes that man is created as a rational animal with specific characteristics and a definite purpose. According to the party, as

¹ Allama Iqbal, p. 8.

² See Budiman Rāḍī, *Borob dalam Islam*, Kota Bharu, Kelantan, 1972, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁵ *Qur'ān*, II: 168.

expressed by Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, man is created for a purpose, that being to serve Allah. This was expressed by him in the introduction of the Arabic-lettered *PAS Constitution*:

Every one is created by Allah for a precise purpose, that is, to serve Allah and to do good to Him, so that he may be well-pleased by Allah and will have a role in the realization of Allah's pleasure. Man is responsible to do what is enjoined by Allah and to avoid what is forbidden by Him. This is the obedience to Allah and fear (*taqwā*) of Him, the primary element of life for a Muslim.⁶

The need to serve Allah, or in abstract terms, the Supreme Being as the purpose of life, is common in the party statements. In fact this is derived from the verse: 'I have only created jinns and man, that they may serve Me.'⁷ From this point of view the life of a Muslim is, according to Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, not without aim and an objective which determines the entire human conscious action. This argument will lead to the conclusion that Islām must be the guide for Muslims. This is to say that a Muslim will respond to the environment, or to any social or political situation, not only because of the subjective outlook based on his personal considerations but because there is a guide provided in the Islamic teachings. Consequently the pattern of man's relation with his environment must be in accordance with the injunction of the Islamic law. It seems that in a broad sense, the PAS tries to explain that any social or political act which is in accordance with the Islamic law, is considered as a kind of worshipping Allah. Abū Salmī, a regular writer in *Suara Islām*, has specifically stated that the worship (*'ibādat*) of Allah in a wider sense of the terms includes service for the nation and for all mankind.⁸ The basis of this idea, the broad meaning of

⁶ The *PAS Constitution*, (Arabic-lettered), (n.d.), p.1.

⁷ *Qur'ān*, LI: 56.

⁸ Abū Salmī, 'Beberapa Pegangan dalam Islām', *S.J.*, Vol. II, No. 11/12, October/November, 1958, p. 17.

worship, is relevant to the passages usually cited by the party from the Qur'ān, such as: 'By (the token of) time through the ages, verily man is in loss, except such as have faith, and do righteous deeds, and (join together) in mutual teaching of truth, and of patience and constancy.'⁹ In conjunction with these verses, according to Dhulkiġlī Muġammad, the life of human beings will be valuable if it is utilized for the service of Allah, society and the state in accordance with the injunctions of God, without being rebellious to Allah and without doing harm to oneself and to others.¹⁰ As will be seen later such an interpretation has been incorporated in the ideology of the party.

The relation of man to the universe and to the Supreme Being is one aspect of his essence. The other aspect of man forms the subject for serious thought in the party. These are what can be termed as the dual elements of man. The PAS does not believe, and indeed completely rejects, the notion that 'man is what he eats,' because it believes that the human phenomenon comprises physical as well as spiritual elements. This view is expressed by the party in a booklet: *Socialisma dan Percanggabannya dengan Islām (Socialism and Its Contradiction with Islām)*, as follows:

The life of human being consists of two absolute aspects. Firstly, we know a human being as an individual composed of two elements, spirit (*ruhānī*) and physical body (*jas-mānī*). If these two elements are separated, he will not be called a human being. Spirit without physical body is not a human being. Physical body without spirit is also not a human being. . . .¹¹

There is the other way of looking at man with special reference to the spiritual aspect. This is of a rather mystical

⁹ Qur'ān, CIII: 1-3.

¹⁰ Dhulkiġlī Muġammad, *Pegangan Hidup Ummat Islām*, Kuala Lumpur (n.d.), pp. 5-6.

¹¹ *Socialisma dan Percanggabannya dengan Islām*, Kelantan, (n.d.), pp. 7-8.

nature as expressed by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn. According to the PAS leader, Qur'ān classifies human beings according to three categories. Firstly, those who belong to the 'straight way', secondly, those who 'incur wrath' and thirdly, those who 'go astray'. Obviously this classification is based on the Quranic verses: 'Show us the straight way, the way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy grace, those whose (portion) is not wrath, and who go not astray'.¹² According to Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, who was influenced by Islamic sufism, these three categories are parallel to three types or classes of human soul or spirit. Thus there is the evil soul (*an-nafs al-ammārah*) which is motivated by various urges such as animal desire, selfishness and rebelliousness against the law of Allah. In general, this soul always acts against moral and ethical requirements. This soul may bring human being down to the level of baseness and meanness. Secondly, there is the self-reproaching soul (*an-nafs al-llawwāmah*) which is contrary to the evil soul. It is inclined to obey the law of Allah, has the desire to establish the truth, is not satisfied with what exists and is in need of perfection. Thirdly, there is the tranquil soul (*an-nafs al-muṭma'innah*), which is well under control. It is against all evils, defends justice and is for God's pleasure.¹³ These three classes of human souls have been separately mentioned in the Qur'ān.¹⁴ The significance of this thinking lies in the fact that it is a mixture of Islamic mysticism and political thought.

By whatever method man is analysed, the party rejects materialism. God is, to the party, the Supreme Being, the creator and the sustainer of the universe. Man's role is to realize the law of the creator, which is revealed to the prophets throughout history and according to which Muḥammad is the last Prophet. This means that the PAS accepts all revealed religions.

¹² Qur'ān, 1: 6-7.

¹³ See Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, 'Panduan Jiwa Perjuangan,' *S.I.*, Vol. II, No. 1, December, 1957, p. 5.

¹⁴ See Qur'ān, XII: 53, LXXV: 2, and LXXXIX: 27.

If this is the PAS religious view with reference to man and his role in general, this does not mean that the party neglects the empirical aspect of man, because it admits that man has undergone several stages of development. This view appears to be Aristotelian in the sense that man is considered to have emerged from his individuality to the family life. From a group of families there has appeared the society of states and finally the situation has been transformed into the society of the world.¹⁵ In other words, the party views man as part of his society so that he cannot isolate himself from it:

... Man is a social creature. Since he is born into this world, he becomes a member of the society. Every one is in need of the other, not a single man can isolate himself from his society ... he needs to live together with other men, he needs cooperation etc.¹⁶

Similar ideas were expressed by Muḥammad 'Aṣrī who concluded that, instead of the family, the individual is the first component part of society, because a group of individuals forms a society. The society then in turn will form the state. There must be interrelation between those three elements: individual, society and state. Thus a study of state involves, according to Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, a study of society and hence a study of society involves a study of the individual. Similarly the existence of the state depends upon the existence of society and that of society upon that of the individual.¹⁷ All these three elements are inherent in the natural existence of man. However, all human beings need guidance for regulating their natural existence. For the party, that guidance can be found in the revealed religions. The party believes that Islām is the last revealed religion which comes to restore corrupt

¹⁵ *Socialisma dan Perchanggabannya dengan Islām*, p. 8; cf. Aristotle, *The Politics* (tr. by T.A. Sinclair) Book I, Ch. 2, Middlesex, 1962, pp. 27-28.

¹⁶ *Socialisma dan Perchanggabannya dengan Islām*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁷ See Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, 'Kursus Kita', *S.I.*, Vol. II, No. 1, December, 1957, p. 9.

human society and 'as a mercy for all creatures'.¹⁸ The party not only claims that it adheres to Islām, but its objective is to realize the Islamic teachings and to build up a society upon Islamic principles. While on one hand it believes in the superiority of Islamic ideology as a complete way of life, it rejects on the other any idea which is incompatible to Islām. Thus the Prophet Muḥammad had provided a final guide for mankind. This belief was summed up by *Suara Islām* in the following way:

Human beings, since Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers, have been engrossed in the intellectual endeavour which they themselves called 'philosophy'. However they are not yet able to possess a strong principle which can be used as a guide for life While God, since He has created human beings, has bestowed upon them one thing called religion, as a guide for life. Such religion was bestowed throughout the ages, through succeeding messengers, one after another, in accordance with the appropriateness of each respective place and time, until that time comes for the last messenger. He is Muḥammad, the leader of Islām and the builder of the *ummah*. A guide, called al-Qur'ān which is suitable for all places and times, was bestowed upon him¹⁹

For the PAS Islām is, therefore, not only a belief system, a system of dogmas to be strictly adhered to but also a programme for action with a definite purpose and objective to be performed by all Muslims according to their particular capacity. From this point of view, the party looks upon Islām not only as an embodiment of several principles, but as having parts and units, for example, politics or economy etc., with their respective rules and functions. They are inter-related one with the other thus forming an organic structure: a malfunction of one part will affect the rest. What the party

¹⁸ Qur'ān, XXI: 107.

¹⁹ *S. J.*, Vol. II, No. 5, April, 1958, p. 3.

tries to explain is that Islām is a complete code for all human life, social or political etc. As the *Suara Islām* put it:

... we have a guide for life ... not only in the field of worship but in all fields: social, economic, political and government fields. But unfortunately, in their life, our *ummah* are groping in the darkness ... in order to find a guide. They have lost their way to the right, they have encountered corpse (religion and politics are different matter), and they have lost to the left, they have been smeared with dirt (religion is no longer useful, no longer to be an order for the life of the people, for building up social justice) while they nominally remain as Muslims²⁰

As an all-inclusive system, Islām is regarded as the only guide. This idea is of a similar nature to that expressed by a writer of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to this writer the guide is the basic factor for transforming a certain human period into an ideal society which provides 'principles, ideas, values and criteria embracing every sector of human life.'²¹ This kind of interpretation of Islām, as a guide, is made not only to adjust the revelation or the Qur'ān, to the need of the religious community,²² but also to reflect a sort of rationalization to the extent that it is an expression of natural human instinct. In other words the Qur'ān is not against human nature (*fiṭrah manusia*) but is instead all for natural human development. Thus the Qur'ān is suitable for all men at all times.²³ Explanation of this argument was put forward by Sayyid Quṭb who contended that 'a basic characteristic of Islām is this: that it never forgets for an instance, at any time

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Sayyid Quṭb, *This Religion of Islām*, (tr. and published by) International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), Gary, Ind, U.S. (n.d.), p. 44.

²² H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Trs. and Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essay in Sociology*, London, 1974, p. 270.

²³ Budiman Rāḍī, *Borob dalam Islām*, pp. 22-23.

or place, the nature of man and the limit of his capacities, nor does it neglect the material realities of his existence²⁴

Such a basic understanding of Islām makes the party aware of the material factor in human life, negating ascetic views. The PAS does not reject specifically the economic factor in the historical development of man. What it rejects is the proposition that the economy is the only exclusive factor responsible for the shaping of human history. In other words, it denies the validity of the materialist conception of history. For the PAS the interrelation of several factors is the basis of all historical progress.²⁵ It seems that the PAS tries to explain that religion, i.e. Islām, is not only one of the basic factors, but also creates a certain direction in the historical progress, specifically with reference to a certain period of human history. Material conditions are not the exclusive base upon which religion is only one part of the superstructure. The PAS reverses this proposition: religion and belief in God are expressions of natural human instincts, they are not the product either of culture or of civilization.²⁶ This view was similarly expressed by a Pakistani writer who asserted that Islām was not a creed or dogma invented by the Prophet.²⁷

The party appears to believe that Islamic history is the climax of God's manifestation on earth. It is the most important epoch which has never been preceded nor will it be succeeded by any other of that kind, not only in terms of the history of religion but in human history as a whole. Consequently the party declines to accept the view that Islām is a religion just like any other religion, because Islām is, according to the party, the perfect accomplishment of all previous revealed religions.²⁸ It means that as a last revealed religion, its all-inclusiveness is applicable for all periods of history. The historical hero here is Muḥammad who, in the language of

²⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *This Religion of Islām*, p. 2.

²⁵ *Socialisma dan Perchangghabannya dengan Islām*, p. 16.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Inamullah Khan, *Islām in the Contemporary World*, Kerachi (n.d.), p. 4.

²⁸ Muḥammad 'Asrī, 'Kursus Kita', *S.I.*, Vol. II, No. 2, January, 1958, p. 12.

Inamullah Khan, the Secretary of the Muslim World Congress, consummated the progressive realization of Islām.²⁹ In one sense the party believes that Muḥammad has a unique place in historical perspective considering the fact that material conditions do not provide adequate means for explaining his historic achievements. This is reflected in the discourse delivered by Muḥammad 'Aṣrī:

Muḥammad, the messenger of Allah . . . as a builder of the greatest human revolution, has created world history and the history of human life by which all problems of life faced by previous prophets and thinkers are solved. The fact that he was poor, illiterate and did not know the names of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and other Greek philosophers, is evidence that his advent is willed and predetermined by Allah, the Lord of the universe. Qur'ān and his guide are not the product of his mind but are a gift from God . . . Islām which was revealed to Muḥammad did not exist in ideas or in theory alone . . . but it had been transformed into reality, during the time of the messenger and Well-guided Caliphs, . . . in the individual conduct, . . . in the soul of society and even in the state . . .³⁰

The views of Muḥammad 'Aṣrī and the party concerning the place of Islām in history seem to be shared by all Muslims, particularly those of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sayyid Quṭb stated that at one time this Islamic Message created a generation . . . without comparison in the history of Islām, even in the entire history of man.³¹ It might be that Islamic history forms merely one chapter in world history, but for the Muslims and particularly the PAS it is the most important one. For them Islām has made most important historical achievements in the sense that 'the main task of mankind was

²⁹ Inamullah Khan, p. 4.

³⁰ Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, 'Kursus Kita', S.I., Vol. II, No. 2, January, 1958, pp. 12-13.

³¹ Sayyid Quṭb, *Milestone*, IIFSO, Kuwait (n.d.), p. 17.

accomplished by Muslims³² Thus the implication of this belief is that Islām must not be put on the same level as the other religions in the world.

Muḥammad 'Aṣrī has tried to briefly analyse the history of ideas in order to prove the truth of his convictions. According to him Christianity had been considerably distorted until it deviated from its original principles. It ended in religious wars and the suppression of individual freedom. Individualism was a reaction to universalism and feudalism. Individualism with its slogan, 'Freedom, Equality and Fraternity,' was transformed into capitalism and then imperialism. As a reaction to capitalism and imperialism, socialism and communism were founded.³³ In outlining this, Muḥammad 'Aṣrī acknowledged that individualism created class struggle between labour and capitalists. This was transformed into economic war and armed conflict between states.³⁴ But to him this is only a minor feature in the panoramic view of historical events. It is not the absolute basic factor which is entirely responsible for the historical development, because the notion that the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle, is only a materialistic interpretation of history. This is the materialism which, according to Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, forms the lifeblood of Western peoples and the source of all disorders there.³⁵

Apparently the party believes that materialism is not only the cause of disorders but also an insufficient tool for understanding history in the sense that 'progress was not limited or directed by any process or dialectical materialism.'³⁶ This view by no means denies the interplay of material factors in the historical march. Only for the party the emphasis should be

³² George Sarton, 'Introduction to the History of Science,' Vol. I, p. 634, quoted by Inamullah Khan, p. 10.

³³ See Muḥammad 'Aṣrī, 'Kursus Kita', *S.J.*, Vol. II, No. 3, February, 1958, p. 27; *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 4, March, 1958, pp. 22-23; *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 5, April, 1958, p. 22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 5, April, 1958, p. 22.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁶ Mohd. Quṭb, *Islām and Communism*, Karachi, (n.d.), p. 8.

placed upon the existence of the Supreme Being Who directs the movement of material factors in the realization of history. The consciousness of man and his spiritual state are the invisible agents of the Supreme Being Who shapes the direction of events while the material realities of human existence are the 'puppets' upon which those invisible agents act. Ideas and arguments like these will lead to the conclusion that a world order cannot be established upon the basis either of materialism or of spiritualism alone. Materialism will lead to catastrophe and spiritualism to stagnation.

The view held by the PAS concerning the development of history comprises criticism of both the materialistic and idealistic views. On one hand, it rejects the notion that the moving force in history is anything as insubstantial as the spirit, or idea, or thought, or reason, or any other metaphysical abstraction constructed by Hegel.³⁷ On the other, it also rejects the view that historical development is rather the result of the relations in which man stands one to another in the process of production.³⁸ For the party both spirit and matter are only factors representing the agents through which the divine will gets into operation. Matter without spirit or thought or idea will not assume the function of prime mover on the historical stage. Likewise, spirit without matter will not produce any form because it is the inner force which moves matter.³⁹ Both are subject to the divine will. But human history has a beginning and an end. Muḥammad himself was not only the greatest historical actor who had made history. He was also the last and final Prophet giving guidance to mankind toward salvation in this world and hereafter. So long as the Muslims follow the Qur'ān and *Hadīth*, they will not go astray. Doomsday is the termination of world history.

³⁷ Lane W. Lawcaster, *Master of Political Thought*, Vol. III, London, 1959, p. 16; see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, (tr. by J. Sibree), New York, 1956, p. 9.

³⁸ Lane W. Lawcaster.

³⁹ Cf. *infra*, p. 97.

Perhaps these beliefs may be compressed under the term 'historical determinism', but this is essentially the basis upon which the political ideology of the PAS is built up.

CHAPTER XII

THE ISLAMIC STATE: ITS PURPOSE

As Islām is understood by the PAS as all-inclusive, it is considered to encompass four types of systems. Firstly, a system of creeds or beliefs (*'aqā'id*); secondly, a system of worship (*'ibādāt*); thirdly, a family system (*munākahāt*); and, finally, a social, economic and political system (*mu'āmalāt*). This classification was made by Aḥmad 'Azam,¹ and was obviously based on the classification made by Muslim jurists. The political ideas of the PAS are mostly derived from the last system.

The common expression of the party is that it is fighting for the realization of an Islamic state. However, there is an inadequate explanation about the nature and characteristics of such a state as compared to other aspects of the party ideology. For the party, the Islamic state is not the end but a means to an end. The end is to realize the Islamic law. An explanation of this was made by the PAS 'Ulamā' Section (US) which passed a resolution on 25 December 1958. This resolution stated that 'it is obligatory for the Islamic *ummah* to establish an Islamic state in which the law of Allah is enforced.'² Actually this is a form of political *ijtibād* of the US by which a conclusion must be drawn on valid evidence from the Qur'ān and *Hadīth*. According to the resolution the obligation is inductively based upon the verse: 'the same religion has He established for you as that which He enjoined on Noah — the which We have sent by inspiration to thee —

¹ See Aḥmad 'Azam, *Kenapa Kita Berjuang*, Bukit Mertajam, 1959, pp. 4-5. Aḥmad 'Azam was a former PAS Commissioner of Trengganu.

² See *S.I.*, Vol. III, No. 2/3, January-February, 1959, s.v. 'Pendapat Dewan 'Ulamā PAS,' pp. 4-5. This is the view of the PAS 'Ulama Section (hereafter *US View* 1958).

and that which We enjoined on Abraham, Moses, and Jesus: namely, that ye should remain steadfast in religion, and make no divisions therein” According to the resolution, the ‘ye should remain steadfast in religion’ means the establishment of the Islamic religion which, the resolution contended, includes all injunctions concerning all laws about the life of the Muslims.⁴ In general, the Islamic injunctions are in accordance with the verse: ‘ So take what the apostle assigns to you, and deny yourself that which he withholds from you’⁵ According to the US, the Islamic injunctions cannot be enforced unless there is an Islamic state which possesses Islamic form and principles and enforces the law of Allah.⁶ The US is aware of the political implications of the life of the Prophet. Thus according to the US, the enforcement of Islamic law during the lifetime of the Prophet and the realization of his authority are the concrete evidence and the necessity of establishing an Islamic state.⁷

To justify the decision, the US and even the party as a whole commonly cited the verse: ‘If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what God hath revealed, they are (no better than) those who rebel’⁸ or ‘wrong doers’⁹ or ‘unbelievers.’¹⁰ Based on the Quranic verses and the history of the Prophet, the resolution concluded:

After we have examined the question of statehood and the need for building up an Islamic state in which all law of Allah is enforced — that is the basic question relevant to the conditions of our state — we conclude that the election

¹ *Qur’ān*, XLII: 13.

⁴ *US Views 1958*, p. 4.

⁵ *Qur’ān*, LIX: 7.

⁶ *US Views 1958*, p. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

⁸ *Qur’ān*, V: 50.

⁹ *Ibid.*, V: 48.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, V: 47.

of *uli al-amri*, besides involvement in the general elections in our country are regarded as ways, tools and means by which what is called the state is established. All these are regarded as obligatory, because they are based on the application of the rule of *al-fiqhiyyah*: if to realize the end is obligatory, to realize the means also becomes obligatory.^{1 1}

It means that, as a doctrine of action, if the enforcement of the law of Allah is obligatory, to have the means for achieving it also becomes obligatory.^{1 2} The enforcement of the law of Allah can effectively be realized through political power. By this argument the party as a whole justifies all aspects of its political activities. However, this justification is not without limit because the party rejects the notion that the end justifies the means. According to Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, 'to adopt an unislamic means for realizing an Islamic objective is not the good means' or the PAS 'must have the right means, good intention and the outcome must also be good.'^{1 3} Thus, for the purpose of realizing the Islamic state in which the law of Allah is enforced, the political struggle becomes obligatory, not only for the party but for the entire Islamic *ummah*. However, the degrees of participation in that struggle must vary according to the individual capacities and conditions of space and time.

^{1 1} *US Views 1958*, p. 5.

^{1 2} See Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, *Pegangan Hidup Ummat Islām*, p. 16.

^{1 3} *Ibid.*, p. 41.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ISLAMIC STATE: THE DOCTRINE OF *KHILĀFAH*

The term *kbilāfab* is mentioned in several places in the Qur'ān. The significance of the term is closely related to the political institutions in Islām. The doctrine is not new and the PAS, like other Islamic political parties, believes in that doctrine. In the first place, the PAS believes that man, as a social being,¹ has to perform his functions as vicegerent of God on earth, because he is created as one. Abū Salmī and other PAS leaders cited the verse: 'It is He who made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth.'² The appointment of man as God's agent on earth concomitantly implies the responsibility of man to observe what is ordained by God, because vicegerency (*kbilāfab*) is the trust of God. This idea was partly derived from the verse: 'We did indeed offer the trust to the heavens and earth and the mountains, but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof, but man undertook it; . . .'³ This notion of trust, if related to other verses which the party often cites, is closely connected with political power. According to the party, God promised to confer this political power, i.e. the power to rule over the earth, upon those who believe and do good deeds. Thus, the party believes that it makes an attempt at realizing the verse: 'God has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the

¹ Dewan 'Ulamā' PAS Perlis, 'Disekitar Dayausaha Menjalankan Dakwah dan Terbiah Islamiah kepada Ahli-ahli PAS dan Masyarakat Muslimin di Tanahayer,' (a working paper, n.p., n.d.).

² Qur'ān, VI: 165 and n. 988; see Abū Salmī, 'Perbezaan Kelas dalam Islām,' *S.J.*, Vol. II, No. 6, May, 1958, p. 7.

³ Qur'ān, XXXIII: 72.

land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion – the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace . . . ⁴ According to Dhulkiġlī Muġammad this means that the Muslims must have a genuine belief in Islamic ideology, in addition to doing good deeds for mankind and their society: the construction of good things (*ma'rūf*) and the destruction of evil (*munkar*).⁵

The concept of trust (*amānab*) and vicegerency (*kbilāfab*) is closely related to the concept of community or people (*ummab*) which is found in several places in the Qur'ān. According to the Qur'ān, the best *ummab* are those who 'enjoin what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God . . .'.⁶ This verse together with the one: 'Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong . . .'⁷ have been interpreted by the PAS US of Perlis as indicating that Islām has several characteristics: Islām is the religion for all mankind, its *ummab* are the bearers of trust, the dissemination of Islām is the responsibility of all Muslims – to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong.⁸ Thus the Islamic *ummab* are not only the best *ummab* but they are also, as cited by Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn, 'an *ummab* justly balanced',⁹ being entrusted with the task of realizing Islām on the earth.

⁴ Ibid., XXIV: 55; cf. Hāji Nik 'Abd al-'Azīz Hāji Nik Mat (Chairman of the PAS US), 'Aqidah Hidup Ummat Islām' (a working paper), 25 August 1972, p. 1; text of Muġammad 'Asrī Speech at PAS Annual GM, 28 July 1972, printed by Yayasan Anda, Kuala Lumpur (n.d.), p. 10; Dhulkiġlī Muġammad, *Pegangan Hidup Ummat Islām*, pp. 28–29.

⁵ Dhulkiġlī Muġammad, *Pegangan Hidup Ummat Islām*, pp. 28–33.

⁶ Qur'ān, III: 110.

⁷ Ibid., III: 104.

⁸ See Dewan 'Ulamā' PAS Perlis, p. 1.

⁹ Qur'ān, II: 143. cf. Dr. Burhān ud-Dīn speech, *S.I.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January, 1957, p. 23.

The words *kbilāfab* and *ummah* are not to be understood literally. The very nature of the Islamic *ummah*, as explained by Iqbal, a Pakistani thinker, is the membership of a community or a nation, based on Islām, which is not determined by birth, locality or naturalization, but consists of the identity of belief.¹⁰ Based on belief, non-Muslims are not qualified to be real members of the Islamic *ummah*, having equal responsibility as have the Muslims. The classification was broadly made by Ḥasan Shukrī, the PAS General Secretary as follows:

Islām has broadly classified the citizenship of mankind into two groups: Muslims and non-Muslims. This classification includes all human beings of various origins Such classification is not based on blood origin (nation) or communal grouping (*qaum*) or colour, but based on unity of creed (*'aqīdah*) and Islamic law (*shari'ah*) or, in other words, based on one's acceptance of, or objection to, the call of Islām besides having the belief, or not, in Allah and His messenger.¹¹

The three terms, *kbilāfab*, trust and *ummah* are closely related to each other; but the term *kbilāfab* here is originally meant for all mankind, implying that they are superior to other creatures. While *kbilāfab* which has appeared since the death of Prophet Muḥammad is actually the political institution which has become a historical source of reference for Muslim writers including those for the PAS.

¹⁰ Allama Iqbal, *Islām a Moral and Political Ideal*, p. 24.

¹¹ Ḥasan Ḥāji Shukrī, 'Kerakyatan dan Negara Menurut Pandangan Islām'. *Bulan Bintang*, Vol. II, No. 2, October–November, 1968, p. 13.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ISLAMIC STATE: THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

The PAS does not elaborate the doctrine of *khalīfah*, 'the power to rule over the earth' being 'promised to the whole community of believers'. It also does not explain that 'every believer is a caliph of God in his individual capacity'.¹ The theory of *khalīfah* is neither tantamount to the doctrine of sovereignty nor to the theory of the theocratic state. If sovereignty means 'the supreme power of the state over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law',² then this is basically distinct from how the PAS understands the term according to the Islamic concept. It is also different from the notion that sovereignty is entirely in the hands of the people by which they can formulate, amend or abrogate any law of the state.³ This is in diametric contradiction to the PAS, because according to the party no one can have the status of law-giver other than God. If the entire community is not the law-giver so it is not sovereign. For this reason, sovereignty is absolutely possessed by God.⁴

It seems that Budiman Rāḍī's *Tata Negara Islām (Islamic Political Science)* is very much influenced by Maududi's *Political Theory of Islam* and other works by this author. Like Maududi, Budiman Rāḍī, the former Vice-Chairman of the PAS Youth Section, based his views on the verse, '... the command is for none but God: He hath com-

¹ S. Abul A'la Maududi (the former leader of *Jamaati Islami*, Pakistan), *Political Theory of Islām*, (tr. and Ed. by Khurshid Ahmad), Lahore, 1967, p. 38.

² Idem, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, (tr. and Ed. by Khurshid Ahmad), Lahore, 1960, p. 18, n. 4.

³ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, Penang, 1963, p. 54.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

manded that ye worship none but Him; that is the right religion'⁵ Budiman Rāḍī has made a further elaboration of this concept. As sovereignty in Islām indicates the supreme authority of God, he regards all mankind as equal.⁶ The Prophet himself is, therefore, not sovereign, he is just like other human beings. His functions, according to Budiman Rāḍī, are to follow what was revealed to him⁷ and to transmit the revelation to mankind.⁸

It is argued that, no one can be a law-giver, not even the Prophet himself, but in the case of the latter, he can deduce, in the absence of revelation, some rule which nobody other than he can abrogate, except God, through revelation.⁹ His main functions are to transmit and clarify the will of God to mankind and he is not free from being criticised by God. He is also subject to the law as the other Muslims.

It is as a result of this belief of the PAS that the concept of sovereignty forms part of the party political ideology. It becomes a foundation for building up an Islamic state as advocated by the party. The basis of the state as envisaged by the PAS is not common interest, on the basis of which every society should be governed, nor a mystical general will which characterises the political collective product, the state.¹⁰ At first glance, the form of the state which is in the mind of the party is apparently not dissimilar from that of the medieval theocratic state. However, the statements of the PAS leaders tend to reject this notion as may be seen from the following quotation:

⁵ Qur'ān, XII:40.

⁶ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 57.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57; cf. Qur'ān, VI:50.

⁸ Qur'ān, XLV:23

⁹ Cf. Muḥammad Hamīdullah, 'Constitutional Problems in Early Islām,' *Islām Tetkikleri Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Istanbul, 1973, p. 22.

¹⁰ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, (tr. by G.D.H. Cole), London, 1955, p. 20.

... Islām does not run the government in a theocratic way. Islām does not have a system of priesthood and it does not confer special rights to the religious class for determining the fate and ways of human life. With the absence of this class in an Islamic state, it becomes clear that the question of suppression in the name of religion and in opposition to social advancement will not arise at all. In an Islamic state advancement is the symbol of the state, education becomes the object while the welfare of the people is the ultimate aim of the government¹¹

Essentially this means that the PAS does not recognize the political authority of the religious class. The Islamic state is not to be run by the whole community of Muslims in accordance with the book of God and practice of the Prophet.¹² It would be impossible to think that the entire Muslim community could run their government. In fact it is the opinion of the PAS that only the *khalīfah* as head of the Islamic state and government will do the job of discharging administrative functions. In this sense, the Islamic community delegates their political authority to the *khalīfah* for this administrative purpose, while the legislative functions will be mainly handled by the legislative or consultative assemblies. In addition a separate judicial body will function independently without being unnecessarily disturbed by other state organs.

At one point, the party expresses its aim of establishing a state structure which resembles a welfare state (*balad al-fayyibah*) in which the Muslims will act and organize their state and society according to the Islamic order.¹³ The party does not elaborate the nature of this state, although there is the implication that this would be an ideological one: 'the

¹¹ Dhulḳiflī Muḥammad, 'Islām Sebagai Suatu Sistem Politik dan Masyarakat,' *al-Isḫāḫ*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 15 July 1970, p. 9. *al-Isḫāḫ* was published in Penang by Ḥājjī Yūsuf Rawa.

¹² S. Abul A'la Maududi, *Political Theory of Islām*, p. 24.

¹³ See Baḥār ud-Dīn 'Abd al-Laṭīf, 'Negara Kebajikan Islām,' *Bulan Bintang*, Vol. 1, No. 11, June, 1968, p. 8.

administrators of the state must be those whose whole life is devoted to the observation and enforcement of divine law, and who not only agree with its reformatory programme and fully believe in it but thoroughly comprehend its spirit and are acquainted with its details.¹⁴ There is 'some sort of resemblance between the Islamic and the communist states,' but in practice, they differ greatly.¹⁵ This ideological state is not exclusively ruled by Muslims, because there are provisions which concern the position of the non-Muslims in the state. Basically, they are not allowed to influence the fundamental policy of the ideological state because that function is reserved for those who believe in the state ideology.¹⁶

¹⁴ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *Political Theory of Islām*, pp. 34–35.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XV

THE ISLAMIC STATE: *KHILĀFAH* AND THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The general aspiration of the PAS is to realize an Islamic state rather than to restore the system of *kbilāfab*. This is understandable because the party is concerned with the content of the state rather than with its name or form. The preceding examination of the doctrine of *kbilāfab* is also relevant to metaphysical abstraction. Keeping this in mind, the institution of *kbilāfab* which emerged after the death of the Prophet is interpreted as an embodiment of the will of the Islamic community. This is to say that 'all Muslims delegated their caliphate to the caliph for administrative purposes.'¹ It can be assumed that this is a theoretical construct of the Islamic political system based partly on history or events which occurred immediately after the Prophet's death. Thus, the first four Caliphs in Islām have become sources of reference especially with regard to the conduct of public affairs in the Islamic empire, because it is believed that their political behaviour and their enforcement of the Islamic law are the model for Muslims in the formulation of political ideology. An Islamic party like the PAS has believed in this system and has tried to explain it in the language intelligible to the modern mind.

The emergence of the caliphate as a political institution in Islām began when 'Umar, the second Caliph, first paid homage (*bai'ab*) to Abū Bakr as the first Caliph in Islām. Subsequently, his example was followed by all Muslims who were present at the meeting for the purpose of electing the head of

¹ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *Political Theory of Islām*, p. 41.

the Islamic community.² The Consultative Assembly (*Shūrā*) was first instituted by 'Umar³ and it was regarded as the symbol of the existence of the legislative body in the Islamic state structure. What 'Umar had done was regarded as a translation and formalization of the nature of the relationship between the legislative and executive, 'because the Prophet not only consulted his companions in all sorts of questions, even in matters of religion and . . . he always repeated that he was as much subject to what he taught as any other Muslims'⁴ Not only that, the institution of caliphate had been linked in a manner indicative of the supreme importance of the executive body so that this could function in a harmonious way with the legislative and other organs of the state. From this history, the nature of the Islamic state and its structure of government was analysed in the light of the contemporary form of government. A rather sketchy presentation of such a structure was made by Budiman Rāḍī in his *Tata Negara Islām*, which outlines the nature of Islamic government as composed of three branches, i.e. the legislative, executive and judiciary.

Firstly, the Islamic government has a legislative body, but its power in making law is limited or is subordinate to Islamic law. As far as the legislature is concerned, it would be *ultra vires* to enact any law which is contradictory to the Qur'ān and *Hadīth*.⁵ That does not mean, however, that there is no human element in Islamic legislation. There is a large place for it, provided there is no clear provision found in the Qur'ān and *Hadīth*.⁶ The power of the legislature is confined to certain areas which are outside the reference of the Qur'ān and *Hadīth*. In its actual formulation and implementation,

² Muḥammad Ḥamīdullah, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 29; G.E. von Grunebaum, *Islām: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, London, 1970, p. 58.

⁴ Muḥammad Ḥamīdullah, p. 21.

⁵ See Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 58; see S. Abul A'la Maududi, *Political Theory of Islām*, p. 36, n. 30/i.

⁶ Cf. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullah, p. 22.

the legislation must not deviate from the spirit of Islām. In other words, neither the legislature nor the whole Islamic *ummah* can change the Islamic law without changing its real identity.

Under the modern form of government, unlike that of the classical city-state, the people cannot directly participate in the process of legislation. They have to elect their representatives who will legislate on behalf of the people and according to the needs of the latter. This is, at least, in theory. In the case of the Islamic state, this is not the central political problem because the Muslims believe that the law is to be found in the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. The main task of the government is to enforce, interpret and deliberate this law in accordance with the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. Theoretically this is not the function of the legislative, executive or judicial bodies alone but of the whole of the Islamic community. The members of this community, individually or collectively, are entitled to express their legal opinion provided that they have the necessary qualifications to do so. Thus, legislative power is entrusted to the community and it is to be exercised by consultative assembly (*shūrā*: legislature) consisting of those who possess knowledge and judgement which is termed *ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd*.⁷ The problem is who will elect them and how in general the election is to be implemented. This should be answered within the context of modern forms of government. Budiman Rādī did not give a definite answer to the question. In the first place he cites the verse: 'O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the apostle and those charged with authority among you. If you differ on anything among yourselves, refer it to God and to His apostle . . .'⁸ In his interpretation the words 'among yourselves' mean representatives of the people (*wakil-wakil rakyat*).⁹ He seems to agree

⁷ Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, *Islām in the Modern National State*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 72.

⁸ Qur'ān, IV : 59.

⁹ Budiman Rādī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 41.

with the interpretation that 'those charged with authority' are equivalent to the *abl ḥall wa al-'aql* ('ulamā', leaders, intellectuals who are obeyed by the people) and in other places as the *abl al-ijmā'* (those who are entitled to give decisions).¹⁰ The former, according to Budiman Rāḍī, include all those who have the confidence of the society and people,¹¹ and both he and the PAS equate them with the members of parliament.¹²

Some writers argue that the early history of the Islamic political institutions must be understood in the context of the condition of the periods concerned. According to Maududi 'the members of the Consultative Assembly were not chosen through organized general elections,'¹³ but in early times there were certain specific persons called *abl al-ḥall wa al-'aql* who had continuously held positions of great trust for a very long time and were entitled to take collective decisions in all important matters affecting the *ummah*.¹⁴ Perhaps in this way he tried to explain that the confidence of the people was not obtained through the electoral process, because this is the modern way of determining the people's confidence. Partly, this argument reflects the way of determining the psychological condition of the people in general which is applicable for that period. Thus, human qualities such as sincerity, ability and loyalty which are above reproach in the eye of the public will be regarded as desirable for those holding public posts and for implementing all decisions taken.¹⁵ Yet, this argument does not rule out the need for proper

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42. This is in line with the resolution passed by the PAS Kelantan 'Ulamā' Section (US): 'those charged with authority' means the leaders (people's representatives) elected by the people, who are entrusted with the task of making plans, of implementing them and of leading the government. These leaders must observe the law of Allah, see *S.I.*, Vol. III, No. 1, December, 1958, p. 4.

¹¹ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 42.

¹² *Ibid.*: see *S.I.*, Vol. II, No. 3, February, 1958, p. 24.

¹³ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, p. 48.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹⁵ *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 53.

elections.¹⁶ Budiman Rāqī realizes this when stating that the members of the legislature are elected and shall have the confidence of the people.¹⁷

There is a question concerning the qualification of the members of the legislature. Theoretically, all members of the Islamic *ummah* are qualified to be members provided that they can satisfy the requirements for that purpose. These include the possession of an upright character, sufficient knowledge and experience and, finally, ability, firmness and wisdom.¹⁸

The powers and functions of the legislature have been specified by Budiman Rāqī. Firstly, it has the power to elect or depose the head of the state if the latter does not fulfil the conditions as head of an Islamic state.¹⁹ According to him, the legislature is not only empowered to enact the law within certain limits, but also to implement it.²⁰ On the whole, all matters concerning the rules and legal organizations²¹ and the administration of the state will be decided by the legislature,²² which is responsible to Allah and to the people.²³

The second branch of Islamic government is the executive body (*majlis at-tanfīdh*) which is responsible to Allah and to the legislature,²⁴ and to the Islamic *ummah* as a whole. The main function of the executive is to run the administration of the state in accordance with the law of God which is deliberated upon by the legislature.²⁵ However, the manner in which it discharges its functions must not be contradictory to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁷ Budiman Rāqī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 42.

¹⁸ See *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *S.I.*, Vol. II, No. 3, February, 1958, p. 24.

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 7, June, 1958, p. 20.

²³ Budiman Rāqī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 43.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

the Islamic law,²⁶ because under no circumstances can the government and its organs violate this law. Therefore, according to Budiman Rāḍī, it is obligatory to obey the government so long as it observes the law of Allah, but once it acts contrary to it, obedience is not obligatory. Then anyone and the *ummah* have the right to dissolve it and replace it with a new one.²⁷

The whole structure of the executive organization is headed by, and subordinate to, the head of state. It does not become a problem for the party whether the name of the head of state is either 'caliph' or 'president' or something else, because the essential problem concerns his powers and functions and the manner in which he performs them. As the head of state, of the government and of the administration, he must bear the ultimate responsibility for any discrepancy in the execution of his duties. He is not only answerable before the parliament but also before the people, and not only for his public acts but also for his private and personal conduct.²⁸ The nature of the responsibility of the head of state is reflected in the contractual formula expressed by the legislative members when the formal appointment of the head of state is made. The formula reads as follows: '*I install you as caliph for the running of the government of the state according to the religion of Allah and His messenger: I witness I will obey your government as long as you enforce the law of Allah and His Messenger.*'²⁹ Ostensibly this reflects a kind of state of God or a theocratic state as known in the West. However it is claimed that Islām does not envisage a state of that kind. As put forward by a Muslim writer:

... The religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order ... not a church; it is an organised life conceived as a contractual organism . . . , and animated

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 58–59.

²⁸ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, p. 55.

²⁹ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, pp. 43–44. The italics are in the original

by an ethical ideal which regards man as a spiritual being possessing rights and duties under a social mechanism³⁰

Thus the Islamic government 'cannot be identified with any modern form of government, but . . . stands in the fullest accord with the ideology of Islam'.³¹

It is this type of government that determines the characteristics of the head of state. As every member of the *ummah* is entitled to be head of state,³² the candidate for the highest post must be chosen from the best man among the *ummah*, 'the most righteous'.³³ According to Budiman Rāḍī, the candidate for the head of state should have an adequate education which will form the basis for efficient running of the government,³⁴ and an upright character.³⁵ He should be brave, firm and wise³⁶ and free from any defect which might impair his mental capability or diminish his physical ability.³⁷

In the modern form of government, the power to be exercised by the head of state or legislature reflects the mandate given by the people. When the people cast their ballots in an election, which is normally influenced by the issues raised in the election campaign, the winning candidates for the presidency or membership in the legislature will be regarded as

³⁰ Moḥd, 'Aziz Aḥmad, *Islamic Culture*, p. 42.

³¹ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, p. 55.

³² Up to the time of al-Māwardī (991-1058) and even later, it was generally believed that the head of the Islamic state should not only be a Muslim of upright character but must be from the tribe of Quraysh. From at least the twelfth century onward the condition of Qurayshite lineage was abolished by many Muslim jurists, but not that of being a Muslim; see Javid Iqbal, 'The Islamic State in Pakistan,' R.N. Spann (Ed.), *Constitutionalism in Asia*, London, 1963, p. 149.

³³ *Qur'ān*, XLIX : 13.

³⁴ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 45.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

having obtained a mandate from the people to carry out the specific tasks of the state, i.e. to run the administration, to legislate according to the will of the majority etc. They represent the people in the management of the affairs of the state. If a legislature does not obtain a mandate from the people through the electoral process, as for example in the case of the British House of Lords, it cannot exercise as much legislative power as the Senate in the United States of America. While both form the upper houses of each respective national legislature, the Senate membership is elected, but that of the House of Lords is not. Similarly the veto power of the President of the United States of America, as part of the checks-and-balances apparatus, is understandable because the President is elected as are the members of the Congress. If the people do not give their mandate directly to the head of state through the electoral process, such as the head of state appointed by an elected legislature, then the former will have nominal power only. He will become a titular head of state, and will be subject to the will of the legislature.

The basis and aims of an Islamic state, it is claimed, are entirely different from the characteristics of these modern governments. Representation is meaningless if the power to be exercised by the elected head of state or legislature is contrary to the Islamic law. This argument does not imply representation is unnecessary, because the right will of the people is, from the Islamic point of view, supreme. Therefore justice and rule of law on the part of the caliphs were more important than the question of whether they were democratic or autocratic, or whether they had the right to veto the decision of the majority of their councils (or legislatures) or not, or of whether the counsellors were selected or elected. All these constitutional conceptions are claimed to be *sui generis* for Islām, partly because the head of state is leader of the mosque as in the citadel and government house (*dār al-imārah*).³⁸

³⁸ Cf. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullah, pp. 23–24.

This explanation of the nature of the Islamic state and government forms part of the political ideology of the PAS. A more detailed explanation was made by Budiman Rāḍī. He elaborated the notion that the head of an Islamic state is, firstly, considered to be responsible for the safeguarding of religion, the freedom of expression concerning *ijtibād*,³⁹ internal and external peace and security of the state and of its people.⁴⁰ Secondly, he is responsible for the economic development of the state, for the state treasury (*bait al-māl*), industry, trade, commerce, agriculture etc. provided all these are not contrary to Islamic law.⁴¹ On the whole he had to act as general supervisor of state affairs, in the course of which he has to delegate responsibility to the state administrative officers according to their respective ability and efficiency and to allow them to organize and take necessary actions concerning their jobs according to Islamic law.⁴² He must identify with the people and observe their conditions.⁴³

The executive functions of the head of state are not his exclusive pre-occupation, because in fact the administration is done collectively. Nonetheless, the other state organs in the legislative, executive and judicial fields function under him separately and independent of one another. The relationship between the head of state and the legislature appears to have given rise to constitutional controversy. According to Budiman Rāḍī, the questions of government, politics, economy, security and judiciary are to be decided by the legislature and the head of state is responsible for expressing his views and supporting them.⁴⁴ However he has to make constant consultation with the legislature concerning all political

³⁹ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 47.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

problems including war.⁴⁵ This is almost identical to Maududi's idea: 'to restrict and to subordinate the executive to the majority decisions of the legislature.'⁴⁶

The third and last branch of the Islamic government is that of the judiciary. It seems that the PAS gives very little explanation about the structure and function of the judicial body in an Islamic state. What Budiman Rāḍī has done is to explain in detail the qualifications and characters of judges, the position and characteristics of witnesses, the right of Allah and of man, the law of war, military organization and its rules.⁴⁷ The main emphasis here is on the judge's function to pass verdicts with justice according to the law of Allah.⁴⁸ There is no explanation as to how the judiciary is related to the other state organs: for example, how the appointment and the actual exercise of judicial functions occur without interference from other state organs etc.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴⁶ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, p. 41.

⁴⁷ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, pp. 112-140.

⁴⁸ Cf. Dr. Burhān u-Dīn, 'Perjuangan Kita Menghadap Tahun Merdeka,' *S.L.*, Vol. I, No. 10, September, 1957, p. 10.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ISLAMIC STATE: ITS CITIZENS

As the PAS claims adherence to the Islamic ideology, the nature of its classification of the citizens of an Islamic state is based also on that ideology. This means that belief and conduct determine the class of state citizens. A person's racial origin, colour and language do not affect his citizen's status. However the inhabitants of an Islamic state can be either Muslim or non-Muslim.¹ The non-Muslims are either *dbimmi* or *'adbi*² or *musta'min*.³ The *dbimmi* are, according to the PAS, citizens who are under the responsibility of the state, i.e. their rights are guaranteed and protected.⁴ According to *Suara Islām*,⁵ the *dbimmi* have five categories of rights. Firstly, they are free to believe and practise their religion. Secondly, they are entitled to get protection from the state for their church or place of worship. Thirdly, the safety of their property, body and honour is guaranteed. They have equal rights and responsibilities as those of the Muslim citizens. Finally, concerning personal law, e.g. marriage and inheritance, the *dbimmi* are entitled to be judged according to their statute-book and the verdict passed by their judges is enforced as the law of the state.

The responsibilities of the *dbimmi* are negligible. These are basically limited to giving undivided loyalty to, and observing the general law of, the state. According to the PAS, as a

¹ Cf. *Infra*, p. 112.

² *S.J.*, Vol. II, No. 1, December, 1957, p. 19.

³ Budiman Rāḍī, *Tata Negara Islām*, pp. 52-53.

⁴ *S.J.*, Vol. II, No. 1, December, 1957, p. 19.

⁵ See *Ibid.*, pp. 19 and 25.

symbol of loyalty poll-tax is levied on them.⁶ The *mus-ta'min* are non-Muslims who, upon their request, are given the protection of the Islamic state, but are not required to pay poll-tax, while *mu'ābad* are citizens of other friendly non-Islamic states to be protected⁷ even without a request being made. The last group is that of the *ḥarbi* or non-Muslim belligerents who will be treated by the Islamic state as enemy persons.⁸ Except for the *dhimmi* the other non-Muslims are not considered as citizens of the Islamic state.⁹

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁷ Budiman Rādi, *Tata Negara Islām*, p. 53. 'Abdi and *mu'ābad* are from the same root word. The *mu'ahad's* state has concluded a treaty of friendship with the Islamic state.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53–54.

⁹ It appears that the PAS is inconsistent in its explanation of the citizens of the Islamic state.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ISLAMIC STATE: ITS ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The PAS envisaged an Islamic state in which the economic system is built according to the principles of the Qur'ān and *Hadīth*. To carry out this system is regarded as doing a good deed (*'amal sāleḥ*).¹ In fact, the party is aware of the inter-relationship between economics and politics, and it is not the aim of the party to realize only one aspect of Islām but all aspects of it. It is not possible according to the PAS, to realize Islām in a capitalist or socialist society, but it can be fully implemented only in a society which adheres to Islamic ideology and attains an Islamic identity.² Thus the arguments advanced by Dhulkiflī Muḥammad do not suggest building up the Islamic state side by side with the features of capitalist or socialist ones. This is mainly because of the contradictions among these three systems.³ According to him, the first step to be taken is to islamise the society by uprooting the 'evil' of capitalism and replacing it with Islamic social concepts.⁴ Yet, on the whole the PAS does not elucidate adequately as to the distinctions between Islām and capitalism or socialism. The party does not reject the freedom of ownership and profit earning, the basis of capitalism, but rejects the 'ways' (the 'evil') of using property prevailing in capitalist society, and, in an broad sense, the relationship between individual

¹ Cf. Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, *Pegangan Hidup Ummat Islām*, p. 30.

² Idem, 'Islām Sebagai Suatu Sistem Politik dan Masyarakat,' *al-Islāb*, Vol. I, No. 9, 15 June 1970, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

ownership and the needs of the society. Perhaps here lie the similarities and differences between the PAS and capitalism.⁵

The party closely relates its economic system to the concept of equality and justice. According to Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, Islām regards all men as equally important⁶ which means that:

... Human beings differ because of the nature of their creation and because God has created them so. By this difference Islām tries to give them equality by providing them equal opportunity by which they can develop themselves. We cannot give everyone everything and at the same time deprive others of something which is most valuable to them.⁷

The fact that equal opportunity does not always produce equal achievement and that unequal achievements will materially and intellectually generate different positions of men in their society, has not been interpreted by the PAS as a factor generating the existence of social differences between individuals. Social differences tend to develop into class differences. By overlooking this proposition, Dhulkiflī Muḥammad asserted that there is not one class which is more important than, or which can exploit, another,⁸ because the basis of the Islamic social system is 'equality, brotherhood and justice.'⁹

The concept of equality becomes the criterion for the economic system of the PAS, but it is very vague. Generally it advocates that men, individually or collectively, have the right to work and are entitled to the rewards of their labour which they can utilize according to Islamic law.¹⁰ This gives

⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 132.

⁶ Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, *al-ʿIslām*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 15 June 1970, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

rise to the question, about which the PAS is less aware, of the relationship between individuals and society. According to the PAS the climax of individualism is the rise of capitalism which maximises individual freedom, while socialism and communism minimise it for the interest of society.¹¹ The PAS tries to achieve a balance between the two:

According to Islām, the interests of the individual and society must be harmonized. God created man as a free individual, he can act freely. But the free individual must recognize that he is not free from interrelationship with other individuals and with the society. Therefore the individual is not allowed to utilize his freedom if it upsets the interests of other members of society as a whole. But the society is not allowed to interfere in the private affairs of its members so long as the latter do not upset the interests of other members of society and the society as a whole. Islām does not allow the exploitation of the weak members of society; and individual fundamental rights cannot be abolished.¹²

The PAS does not, in this connection, mention that individual freedom is subject to Islamic law, because no individual can violate the Islamic law without being sanctioned by the state authority.

According to Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, Islām, instead of providing detailed rules, gives only general economic rules. Thus, this broad basis of the Islamic economic system gives wider scope for using discretion in the formulation of detailed rules which are flexible according to place and time.¹³ In principle, Islām allows private ownership to exist. Similarly, investment and profit reflect individual freedom to act economically. In such economic action, the PAS emphasises the Islamic prohibition of exploitation, monopoly, usury

¹¹ *Socialisma dan Perchanggabannya dengan Islām*, pp. 8-9.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹³ Dhulkiflī Muḥammad, *al-Islāb*, Vol. I, No. 10, 1 July 1970, p. 7.

(*ribā*) and other 'evils' (*kebahajatan*) of capitalism.¹⁴ But economic freedom does not mean for the PAS that the state is not allowed to involve itself in economic activities, because Islām, the party argues, permits the productive activities to be carried out by both the state and the individual. At the same time economic competition is permissible on condition that it occurs according to the moral and ethical rules of Islām.¹⁵ Perhaps in this way the party tries to find, in economic terms, the middle ground for its ideology, namely between capitalism and socialism, and to claim that it has the best of both worlds. Yet, it rejects the view that its system is a mixture of both. Thus in Islām, the party maintains, capital is one of the facts in economic production and for that the capitalist is entitled to get profit from his investment with a possible risk of lose.¹⁶ Without capital, according to the PAS, commerce and industry will not function. The PAS does not believe that the profit which the capitalist gets is a confiscation of part of the earnings of the workers.¹⁷

The party argues that the freedom of ownership is not without limitation. The property owned by a person has a 'social function' which means that it must be spent for the interests of oneself and of society. This social function is also expressed in the prohibition of miserliness and extravagance, the prohibition of hoarding wealth without proper use and of using property in such a way that it causes damage to other, in addition to the prohibition of displaying wealth to the poor.¹⁸ Apart from that the party is very much concerned by exploitation which must be wiped out and wrong-doing which must be eliminated, if necessary, by force.¹⁹ These limitations reach such a stage that the PAS begins to advocate that 'under certain emergency conditions, it is permissible for

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 15 June 1970, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Socialisma dan Perbanggabbannya dengan Islām*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

the government to confiscate one's wealth for the purpose of providing help to the most needy.²⁰

At one point the PAS propagates a form of economic system applied to an Islamic state which is tantamount to a welfare state (*balad ta'yiyab*). This is stated by Baḥar ud-Dīn 'Abd al-Laṭīf, a veteran PAS activist and CEC member. According to him, the Islamic welfare state will endeavour that every one will have enough food, clothing, shelter and education for themselves and their families. Secondly, the state will guarantee that there is no exploitation and fraud in the economy. Thirdly, the state will guarantee individual freedom in seeking a livelihood and ownership of property on condition that it is not contradictory to the common interests of society. Fourthly, the state will guarantee the social security of the old, disabled, orphans etc. Finally, prosperity in the state must be for all and not for certain sections of the people alone.²¹

As the preceding pages reveal, the PAS ideology is conclusively based on two basic elements: Malay nationalism and Islām. When the party demanded a strict implementation of the special rights of the Malays or expressed its support for the Malay movement in South Thailand or for Indonesia against the Dutch in the dispute over West Irian, then its Malay nationalism was reflected. When the party demanded a ban on lottery, intoxicating liquor, gambling, night-clubs etc. then this is because all these 'evils' are, according to the party, against the Islamic law. The party demonstrated its expressed support for Pakistan against India and for the Arabs against Israel thereby indicating the feelings of Islamic solidarity in the party. Concerning the global conflict between the super-powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the party appears to adopt a neutral position, because both countries are ideologically in conflict with the PAS. Apart from all this, the PAS expresses its adherence to democratic

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²¹ See Baḥar ud-Dīn 'Abd al-Laṭīf, 'Negara Kebajikan Islām,' *Bulan Bintang*, Vol. 1, No. 11, June 1968, pp. 8 and 13.

principles without giving adequate explanations in relation to Islām. 'It is permanently our continuous stand to respect the principles and concept of democracy and we choose our way of struggle through *parliamentarism (secara parlimenter)* in order to defend that stand.'²²

²² Hasan 'Adli, 'Perpaduan yang Lebih Kukuh untuk Demokrasi yang Lebih Utuh,' a working paper presented before the PAS General Meeting (GM), 12, 13, and 14 August, 1966, p. 1. The italics are in the original. Hasan 'Adli, a former PAS Deputy President, was expelled from the party in 1977.

**PART III
EPILOGUE**

CHAPTER XVIII

EPILOGUE

This is a brief concluding observation on the PAS and Islām.

I

The formative stages and evolution of the PAS reflect the socio-political background which has provided the foundation for the growth of an Islamic political party. Empirical evidence shows that this growth is unique in the sense that the PAS has emerged on the scene from the secular, nationalist political party, the UMNO, in the pre-independent period. In its early stage the PAS was no more than a religious wing within the UMNO. However, the subsequent leadership crisis within both the UMNO and the PAS caused the latter to break away from the former and thereafter it became the greatest rival of the UMNO in trying to win political power, supported by the Malay electorate.

II

Many changes have taken place since the formation of the PAS in the early 1950's. At first glance it becomes apparent that the party formed part of the nationalist movement against colonialism. Essentially it was also a part of the modern political revival.

In general, great changes have taken place in the lives of Muslims, and yet it would generally be thought that Islām remains Islām.¹ The Muslims in Malaysia, and particularly the

¹ W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*, Islamic Surveys 6, Edinburgh University Press, 1968, p. 123.

PAS, cannot escape from these changes. The party embodies, to a great extent, a movement which aims at transforming the existing political conditions in accordance with what it believes to be good and right.

III

The contemporary world witnesses fast changes in society that are unparalleled in history. Modern communications and mass media contribute much to the process of rapid acculturation in general and tremendously influence the lives and attitudes of people in particular.

'Strangely' this condition does not create a parallel 'development' in the dereligionization of modernizing societies.

Feuerbach (1804–1872) maintained that 'the secrets of religion find their solution and clarification not only in anthropology, but even in pathology as well.'² Marx (1818–1883) retorted that Feuerbach 'does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a *social product*, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.'³

This is the negation of religion (including Islām) that may strike some of the deepest human minds in some places and times, but certainly not all minds in all places and times. Instead of witnessing dereligionization, the world, throughout history, displays potential survival or ups and downs of religion rather than its 'withering away'. In operational terms, Lenin (1870–1924) implicitly 'recognized' religious strength when he expressed the necessity 'to take care to avoid hurting the religious sentiments of believers, for this only serves to increase religious fanaticism.'⁴

² Ludwig Feuerbach, *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*, (tr. by Ralph Manheim), London, 1967, p. 35.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, London, 1968, p. 29, s.v. 'VII'. The italics are in the original.

⁴ V.I. Lenin, *On Religion*, Moscow, 1965, p. 49.

IV

The Islamic political revival in Malaysia is not an immediate reaction to the conflict of ideas in the West but principally to the existing political condition in Malaysia. However, in broad terms, it is a part of the whole process in a chain of a universal reaction, or a response to the intellectual vibration in other parts of the Muslim world.

V

It seems that Islām is destined not to be swept away by the forces of progress and enlightenment. No outside observer can estimate the strength of those unseen threads which at an hour of challenge draw the members of diverse groups into a single community of purpose and will, transforming it into a political force. The reawakened and alert Muslims are moving into an unknown and unpredictable future.⁵

'To many Europeans and Americans it may seem strange to include religion among the political forces, because they have been accustomed to think of religion as concerned only with personal piety.'⁶ One may argue that it is in the interest of the West to have a clear vision about Islām rather than 'grope in the darkness' in order to trace the sources of the Muslims' strength.

VI

The history of Islām is the history of the Muslims' endless struggle while mankind is watching to see if Islām is fit to survive.

⁵ See H.A.R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey*, London, 1953, pp. 165-166.

⁶ W. Montgomery Watt, p. IX.

SELECTED GLOSSARY

(The meanings of the words in the Selected Glossary are mostly based on Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, edited by J. Milton Cowan, London, 1966.)

- 'Aqīdah* – Article of faith; creed; ideology; belief.
al-Fiqhiyyah – Juristic(al); relating to jurisprudence in Islām.
Ḥadīth – Narrative relating to deeds and utterances of the Prophet; the Tradition.
Ḥanafī – Relating to the first of the four Islamic Schools of Law founded by Abū Hanifah.
Ijtibād – 'Effort'; the use of individual reasoning.
Imām – Prayer leader; leader of Islamic *ummah* or of the Islamic government and state.
Jabmī – In early Islamic theology, relating to rationalistic views in eschatology or in the createdness of the Qur'ān.
Jamā'ah – Group of people; community.
Jibād – Fight; Islamic war.
Kaum muda – Rationalist group; young group.
Kaum tua – Conservative group; old group.
Kbārijī – Relating to a (political, theological and legal) sect in early Islam who opposed 'Alī bin Abī Ṭālib, the fourth Caliph.
Kbilāfab – Vicarship; caliphate; office or rule of a caliph.
Melayu Besar – Greater Malay.
Melayu Kechil – Smaller Malay.
Muftī – Official expounder of Islamic Law.
Mu'tazilī – Relating to rationalistic theological school in Islam and, like *Jabmī*, to the belief in the createdness of the Qur'ān.

- Qāḍī* – Islamic judge.
- Qaum* (in Malay *kaum*) – race; communal grouping; group.
- Ramaḍān* – The fasting month or the ninth month of the Muslim calendar.
- Sbāfi'ī* – The third of the four Islamic Schools of Law founded by Shāfi'ī
- Sbarī'ab* – Revealed or canonical law of Islām.
- Shawwāl* – The tenth month of the Muslim calendar.
- Shī'ī* – Relating to the Shī'ah, Muslims who recognized 'Alī bin Abī Tālib as the rightful successor of the Prophet.
- Sbūrā* – Advisory or consultative assembly; legislature.
- Sunnab* – The sayings, doings of the Prophet, established as legally binding precedents
- Sunni* – Sunnitic; generally relating to the four Schools of Law in Islam, *Ḥanafī*, *Mālikī*, *Sbāfi'ī* and *Ḥanbalī*.
- '*Ulamā*' (plural of 'ālim or 'alīm) – Learned; scholar; experts in 'Islamic religious knowledges' .
- Uli al-amri* – Those charges with authority; ruler or government of an Islamic state.
- Ummab* – Group; people, community.

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S.U. *Suara UMNO.*
U.M. *Utusan Melayu.*
W.N. *Warta Negara.*

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Ḥaji Muḥammad Ghazālī bin 'Abd Allah (telephone interview), the first PAS Deputy President, 9 October 1980.

Ustādh 'Uthmān Ḥamzah, the Secretary of the PAS 'Ulamā' Section, 23 October 1974.

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